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Over the past three decades, historians of the long eighteenth century have emphasized both 
the stability of the British state and the progressive growth of national sentiment over the 
period. The enormous mobilization of manpower during the French Wars is often characterized 
as the culmination of this evolution. Arming to fight the French, it is argued, was a formative 
process, which encouraged greater social cohesion, and forged an overarching sense of national 
identity.  
This thesis will contend that the ‘Nation-in-Arms’ interpretation has been constructed at a 
considerable remove from the culture and lives of common people. Adopting a ‘history from 
below’ approach, it will re-evaluate the popular experience of mass arming, by focusing upon 
two relatively neglected branches of the armed forces, the army and militia. Three central 
themes have been selected for investigation: The recruitment process, the experience of 
soldiering in the home garrison, and the role of armed force in maintaining public order. 
It will be shown that, between 1790 and 1805, the government was faced by a mixture of 
popular ambivalence and hostility towards the raising of the army and militia. It will be 
demonstrated that economic privation was the preeminent cause of enlistment and that, once 
recruited, soldiers and militiamen retained their working-class attitudes, and viewed their 
service primarily as a contractual form of labour. The extent to which armed service was 
viewed as conditional and negotiable will be emphasized through an examination of the 
military crimes of mutiny and desertion. Finally, an analysis of military deployments during 
industrial protests and food riots will demonstrate that, during the French Wars, the state 
became much more reliant upon armed force for maintaining public order. By adopting a 
‘history from below’ approach, the limits of social stability and social cohesion will be tested, 
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Introduction: War, Nation, Class, and the Common Soldier 
[W]hat is it but distress and poverty which can prevail upon the lower classes 
of the people to encounter all the horrors which await them on the tempestuous 
ocean, or in the field of battle? Men who are easy in their circumstances are 
not, among the foremost to engage in a seafaring or military life. There must 
be a degree of pressure, and that which is attended with the least violence will 
be the best. When hunger is either felt or feared, the desire of obtaining bread 
will quietly dispose the mind to undergo the greatest hardships, and will 
sweeten the severest labours.  
 
Reverend Joseph Townsend, A Dissertation on the Poor Laws 2nd ed., 
(London, 1787), p. 35-6. 
 
Over the past three decades, historians working on the theme of ‘war and society’ have 
repeatedly emphasized the essential stability of the British state and the growth of national 
identity in response to the armed conflicts of the eighteenth century. In particular, the enormous 
mobilization of manpower, witnessed during the French Wars, has been interpreted as a 
process which encouraged social cohesion. The volunteer movement has notably been given 
fulsome treatment by historians seeking to sustain this argument and is seen as formative of a 
growing sense of national identity. Moreover, within the historical literature, the meta-narrative 
of the ‘forging of the nation’, has come to supersede historical formulations of class conflict 
emanating from the Industrial Revolution. 
Undoubtedly, the case for a growth in nationalistic sentiment holds good for Britain’s elites and, 
perhaps, for many of the middle classes as well. However, the narrative of the ‘Nation-in-Arms’ 
has been conducted at a considerable remove from the culture and lives of working people. A 
number of social, military, and naval historians have recently argued that the analytical 
framework adopted by many ‘war and society’ studies is inappropriate when applied to the 
many thousands of ordinary men enlisted, balloted, or impressed, into the armed forces. As a 
contribution to this debate, this thesis seeks to re-evaluate the popular experience of mass-
arming in England, from the perspective of two relatively neglected branches of the armed 
forces, the army and militia. 
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The thesis will focus upon the recruitment process, the experience of soldiering in the home 
garrison, and the role of armed force in maintaining public order. It will be argued that, 
between 1790 and 1805, the government was faced by a mixture of popular ambivalence and 
hostility towards the raising of the army and militia. It will be demonstrated that economic 
privation was the preeminent cause of enlistment and that, once recruited, soldiers and 
militiamen retained their working-class attitudes and viewed their service primarily as a 
contractual form of labour. Through an examination of the military crimes of mutiny and 
desertion, the extent to which armed service was viewed, from below, as conditional and 
negotiable, will be emphasized. Finally, an examination of military deployments during 
industrial protests and food riots will demonstrate that, during the French Wars, the state 
became much more reliant upon armed force for maintaining public order. By adopting a 
‘history from below’ approach, the limits of social stability and social cohesion will be tested, 
and a richer, more variegated, understanding of the popular experience of mass-arming will be 
offered. 
This chapter functions as a detailed introduction to the literature summarised above. It will set 
out some of the most influential historical interpretations of warfare and its impact upon 
eighteenth-century society. Particular emphasis will be placed upon historical interpretations of 
the French Wars. Secondly, recent developments within the specific field of military history will 
be traced, and the debates surrounding the ‘forging of the nation’ thesis highlighted. A case will 
be made for the current need for a ‘history from below’ approach to the period, in order to 
excavate the experiences of common soldiers, and to challenge prevailing narratives. Finally the 
structure of the thesis and an outline of the chapters to follow will be set out. 
Historiography of the French Wars 
Since the Second World War, a literature has developed around the notion that histories of war 
should encompass more than military commanders and battlefields. The establishment in 1962 
of the department of ‘War Studies’, under the direction of Michael Howard, at King’s College 
London, was instrumental in broadening the field of military history to include the way in 
which strategy is related to social and political context.1 However, by the mid-1960s, ‘war 
                                                   
1 For a distillation of ‘strategy studies’ as pioneered by Howard see M. Howard, Studies in War and Peace  
(New York: Viking Press, 1971) and D. Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: 
Spellmount, 1976). Professor Sir Michael Howard, ‘Interview Transcript’, Making History Website, 5 June 
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studies’ had diversified further to consider many aspects of the interaction between war and 
society.2 Considering that Britain was at war one in every two years, in the period 1690-1815, 
the development of ‘war and society’ studies has had a particular resonance for scholars of the 
long eighteenth century.3 Both crime and economic historians, for example, have recognized the 
central importance of eighteenth-century cycles of war and peace to a comprehensive 
understanding of change over time, within their sub-disciplines.4 Moreoever, the influential 
work of John Brewer has established the importance of ‘war and society’ studies for an 
understanding of British history as a whole. In Sinews of Power, Brewer demonstrates that 
Britain’s mounting military mobilizations, over the course of the eighteenth century, fostered an 
increasingly centralized ‘fiscal-military state’. Brewer has therefore placed the demands of 
warfare as a central driving force behind the modernization of the British state.5  
In line with the developing interest in ‘war and society’ studies, historians have been 
particularly drawn to the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which were both the 
longest and most exacting of Britain’s eighteenth-century conflicts. Economic historians have 
focused on the vast cost of financing the French Wars.6 While military historians have attended 
to the unprecedented mobilization of armed force, which the British government required, in 
order to confront France’s conscripted forces.7 A range of studies have documented the sheer 
scale of this military effort. We now know that, between the outset of the French Wars (1793) 
and the battle of Trafalgar (1805), the British Navy multiplied 7.5 times to 120,000 men, the 
army quadrupled to 160,000 men, and the militia in Britain trebled in size to 90,000 effectives. In 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2008 [http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/interviews/Howard_Michael.html#resources, 
accessed 13 September 2015]. 
2 For a examples of the diversification of military histories to include an engagement with broader society 
see, for example, J.W. Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American 
Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); J.R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth 
Century: The Story of a Political Issue, 1660-1802 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). 
3 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Unwin, 1989)., Table 
2.1, p. 30. 
4 P. Deane, 'War and Industrialisation', in J. M. Winter (ed.), War and Economic Development: Essays in 
Memory of David Joslin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 90-102; D. Hay, 'War, Dearth 
and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record of the English Courts', Past & Present, 95 (1982), pp. 117-
60. 
5 Brewer, Sinews of Power. 
6 P.K. O'Brien, 'Public Finance in the Wars with France, 1793-1815', in H. T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the 
French Revolution, 1789-1815 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), pp.165-87; J.G. Williamson, 'Why was British 
Growth so Slow during the Industrial Revolution?', Journal of Economic History, 44 (1984), pp. 687-712. 
7 G. Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770-1870 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1982). 
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addition, a massive volunteer force of 310,000 men was raised. One in five men of serviceable 
age were reckoned to have been in arms by 1805.8 According to Conway, such a high level of 
popular involvement in warfare was not seen again until the First World War.9 Clive Emsley 
has produced perhaps the most penetrating ‘war and society’ study of this period. In British 
Society and the French Wars, Emsley argues that the demands which the wars placed upon the 
government, the economy, and the people, were at least as momentous as those of the 
Industrial Revolution. So pervasive were the effects of this late eighteenth-century war effort 
that, for Emsley, they represented a ‘common experience shared by all Britons’.10 
Linda Colley has subsequently enlarged upon, and popularized, this notion of a ‘shared 
experience’ through warfare. Whereas Brewer saw warfare as crucial to the growth of the 
modern central state, Colley argues for a parallel development in national culture, through war 
with the French ‘other’. The Napoleonic Wars are seen as a culminating episode, in which the 
scale of popular engagement in the war effort demonstrates that, ‘the unreformed British state 
rested upon the active consent of substantial numbers of its inhabitants’.11 Above all, the 
volunteer movement is seen by Colley as a genuine expression of popular loyalism and is 
manoeuvred into position to counter older and more ‘pessimistic’ interpretations of class 
conflict emerging from the Industrial Revolution.12 In an extension of Emsley’s argument, 
Colley claims that patriotic martial endeavour was the most characteristic working-class 
experience in the late eighteenth century, ‘not labour in a factory, or membership of a radical 
political organisation, or an illegal trade union’. Moreover, it is argued that the British 
experience of ‘training in arms’, was crucial to the growth of national identity.13 
A number of historians have supported Colley’s interpretation of the British war effort and its 
‘galvanising’ effects. Frank O’Gorman, for example, has seen mass volunteering as powerful 
evidence of ‘national enthusiasm’ and reminds his readers that this was a ‘war of nations not 
                                                   
8 J.E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation: 1795-1815 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 95; L. Colley, 
Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 4th ed. (London: Yale University Press, 2009, first published 1992), p. 
293; Western, The English Militia, p. 222; Commons Journals, Vol. 69 (1813-4), p. 638. 
9 S. Conway, The British Isles and the American War of Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
p. 28-9. 
10 C. Emsley, British Society and the French Wars, 1793-1815 (London: Macmillan, 1979). p. 4. 
11 Colley, Britons, pp. 316-7 
12 The classic articulation of this argument is, of course, E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working 
Class 14th ed. (London: Penguin, 1991, first published 1963). 
13 Colley, Britons, pp. 312, 243. 
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classes’.14 In line with this view, J.R. Western’s interpretation of the volunteer movement as an 
elitist, establishment-backed, and anti-revolutionary force, has been entirely overhauled.15 For 
Austin Gee, the volunteers were not a reactionary and counterrevolutionary force. In 
accordance with Colley, Gee suggests that this was a ‘spontaneous popular movement’ one 
which was ‘loyal’ in a general sense, but not stridently ‘loyalist’. Further, Gee argues that the 
existence of volunteer units had the effect of ‘strengthening the ties of social allegiance’ and 
assisted in creating a sense of national unity.16  
Implicit in what we might call the ‘Nation-in-Arms’ thesis, popularized by Colley, is a double-
pronged attack upon Edward Thompson’s Making of the English Working Class. Firstly, the 
experiences of English workers in the Industrial Revolution, as described by Thompson – ‘the 
poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the ‘obsolete’ handloom weaver’ – are disregarded as 
unrepresentative.17 Such a reading has been given credence by the recent agnosticism, evident 
in the work of a number of economic historians, regarding the changes brought about by the 
Industrial ‘Revolution’. It is now commonplace for a more gradualist perspective to be adopted, 
and for the long-term benefits of industrialisation to be espoused, in order to challenge, or at 
least moderate, the ‘pessimist’ reading of the Industrial Revolution.18 Secondly, in place of the 
Thompsonian picture, of exploitation and class conflict arising from rapid industrialisation, the 
‘galvanising’ effects of the ‘common experience’ of armed service during an era of warfare, is 
put forward. Thus, for the period under investigation, the ‘war and society’ approach has been 
used to supplant the narrative of class-formation with the story of growing national identity.  
However, in the last two decades, three main criticisms of the ‘Nation-in-Arms’ interpretation 
have emerged. The first argues that it is reductionist to talk of a conservative anti-French 
patriotic ‘consensus’ in this period. Political historians note that the French Revolution 
                                                   
14 F. O'Gorman, 'English Loyalism Revisited', in A. Blackstock and E. Magennis (eds.), Politics and Political 
Culture in Britain and Ireland, 1750-1850: Essays in Tribute to Peter Jupp (Belfast: Ulster Historical 
Foundation, 2007), p. 233. 
15 J.R. Western, 'The Volunteer Movement as an Anti-Revolutionary Force, 1793-1801.' The English 
Historical Review, Vol. 71 Issue 281 (1956), pp.603-14. 
16 A. Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, 1794-1814 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003)., pp. 1, 8, 74, 268. 
17 Thompson, Making, p. 12. 
18 N. F. R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985); G. Clark, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2007); J. De Vries, The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behaviour and the Household Economy, 1650 to 
the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); E. Griffin, Liberty's Dawn: A People's History of 
the Industrial Revolution (London: Yale University Press, 2013). 
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unleashed a multiplicity of ideological positions which are reflected in the British responses to 
the wars.19 Working-class radicals, middle-class religious dissenters, and elite Whigs each 
critiqued the war effort in their own way and for their own ends.20 In addition, from the mid-
1790s, economic downturns and wartime inflation considerably dampened popular enthusiasm 
for the war effort.21 Harling has argued that although there was a groundswell of anti-French 
sentiment, when Emperor Napoleon threatened to invade in 1803-5, there was ‘no lasting 
patriotic consensus’.22 Indeed, it has long been understood that ‘patriotism’, throughout the 
period under investigation, was contested political terrain.23 Painite republicans associated 
‘patriotism’ with a universalist sense of ‘human fellowship’. While radical reformers adopted 
the moniker of ‘patriot’ as part of their campaign to restore the lost ‘rights’ of the people, which 
were said to be enshrined in the ‘British constitution’.24 The language of eighteenth-century 
‘patriotism’ thus had an essentially confrontational quality.25 This fragmented political picture 
challenges Colley’s portrayal of widespread nationalism developing in response to war. 
The second critique arises from doubts about the revisionist interpretation of the volunteer 
movement. J.E. Cookson, for example, while taking a broadly similar approach to Colley, has 
played down the case for burgeoning loyalty and nationalism. For Cookson, the wartime 
experiences of the lower orders did not make them more loyal to existing institutions nor more 
nationalistic ‘in any firm ideological sense’.26 The ‘national defence patriotism’ exhibited by the 
poor majority of Britons, Cookson argues, was atavistic in its origins, and was ‘opportunistic, 
interested, and conditional’ in nature.27 This interpretation chimes with the work of Rogers and 
Emsley on the volunteer movement. Both historians have argued that service in the volunteers 
                                                   
19 For an excellent recent survey of British political responses to the French War see P. Harling, 'A Tale of 
Two Conflicts: Critiques of the British War Effort, 1793–1815', in M. Philp (ed.), Resisting Napoleon: The 
British Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797-1815 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp.19-40. 
20 Ibid.; E.V. Macleod, A War of Ideas: British Attitudes to the Wars Against Revolutionary France (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1998); J. E. Cookson, The Friends of Peace: Anti-War Liberalism in England, 1793-1815 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982); Thompson Making, Part 1. 
21 Macleod, War of Ideas, p. 189. 
22 Harling, 'A Tale of Two Conflicts’, p. 34. 
23 H. Cunningham, 'The Language of Patriotism, 1750-1914' History Workshop Journal, 12 (1981), pp. 9-16. 
24 J. Epstein, Radical Expression: Political Language, Ritual and Symbol in England, 1790-1850 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p. 26. 
25 J. Belchem, 'Republicanism, Popular Constitutionalism and the Radical Platform in Early Nineteenth-
Century England', Social History, 6 (1981), p. 31. 
26 Cookson, Armed Nation, p. 244. 
27 Ibid., pp. 9, 244 
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was seen by many contemporaries as a means of escaping more exacting forms of military 
service.28 Likewise, Kevin Linch has questioned the extent to which the scale of volunteering can 
be used as a means of ‘gauging’ the loyalty of the nation. As Linch points out, the threat of a 
conscriptive levy, which was held out by the government from 1803, was extremely important 
in mobilizing communities to find a sufficient number of ‘volunteers’.29 These lines of argument 
therefore suggest the volunteer movement was heavily orchestrated from above and was met 
from below by a form of ‘loyalty’ that was, at best, highly conditional. 
However, the ‘Nation-in-Arms’ thesis has been constructed to withstand both of these scholarly 
attacks. To the first criticism, Colley readily admits that this period was punctuated with 
‘massive, though uneven, [popular] discontent’, and accepts that the meaning of both 
‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ was highly contested. Nevertheless, it is maintained that political 
dissonance was isolated to a few select groups and that the loyalty of Britain’s ‘conventional 
patriots’ was of far greater moment.30 To the second critique, revisionist histories of the 
volunteer movement, tend to acknowledge a degree of compulsion and self-interest present 
within the mass mobilizations of the period. However, regardless of how they came to join the 
volunteer movement, it is argued that the active involvement of thousands of men in the war 
effort, bred a sense of conservative national feeling which overarched pre-existing political and 
social divisions.31 
One final area of debate focuses upon the evidential basis on which the ‘Nation-in-Arms’ thesis 
rests. In a little-known review of Britons, Edward Thompson argues, contrary to Colley, that the 
majority of Britons probably looked upon the war with France with ambivalence. Thompson is 
sceptical of the case for a ‘loyal patriotic consensus’ as it relies almost exclusively upon evidence 
                                                   
28 N. Rogers, 'The Sea Fencibles, Loyalism and the Reach of the State', in M. Philp (ed.), Resisting Napoleon: 
The British Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797-1815 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 45; Emsley, British 
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gleaned from the papers of the volunteer movement.32 Both Rogers and Cookson have recently 
extended this critique further by arguing that the experiences of men recruited to the regular 
armed forces have been only loosely fitted into the ‘Nation-in-Arms’ narrative.33 Considering 
that in 1805, at the height of the volunteer movement, the combined strength of the official 
armed forces rivalled the volunteers in point of numbers, this is a considerable omission.34 If we 
are to talk of a ‘common experience’ within Britain’s war effort then the army, navy, and militia 
must surely be brought into the equation.  
Nicholas Rogers has argued at length that naval personnel fit awkwardly into Colley’s schema. 
In particular, Rogers highlights the intense popular resistance to impressment, evident 
throughout our period, and to the social divisions which naval recruitment generated.35 
Additionally, the work of N.A.M. Rodger, suggests that social relations in the navy deteriorated 
dramatically in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Rodger posits that there was a 
growing gulf between naval officers and their men which was symptomatic of declining real 
wages, intensified working conditions, harsher discipline, and exacerbated class-tensions 
following the French Revolution.36 The authors of a recent edited collection confirm that all 
these factors were present during the dramatic naval mutinies of 1797.37 Such findings raise 
serious questions about the unconditional loyalty of the British people and about the presumed 
unifying effects of the French Wars. The distinct perspective which the naval experience gives 
us also suggests that historians should look more carefully at the different branches of the 
armed forces during this period. This thesis wishes to extend and deepen this analysis by 
examining the experiences of common soldiers in the army and the militia.  
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36 N.A.M. Rodger, 'Shipboard Life in the Georgian Navy, 1759-1800: The Decline of the Old Order?', in L. 
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Developments in the Field of Military History 
It would be fair to say that the Royal Navy occupies something of a privileged position within 
the historical literature. From the 1960s there has been a flood of studies detailing the social 
conditions of shipboard life and the manning of the navy.38 Similar histories of the army and 
militia have, by contrast, been much slower in appearing. Traditional military histories, 
produced in the first half of the twentieth century, tend to be unashamedly top-down and 
institutional affairs. Sir John Fortescue’s meticulous History of the British Army, for example, 
deals with the issues of pay and recruitment. However, these considerations are tangential to 
the main thrust of the argument, which chronicles the development of British military strategy, 
and the obstruction of this evolution by ‘meddling politicians’, for whom, Fortescue held a life-
long disdain.39 Similarly, Western’s English Militia includes some fascinating insights into the 
social life of the militiaman, and documents the intensity of popular resistance to the 
introduction of the Militia Acts (1757, 1796-7). However, the work is largely a treatment of 
‘high’ politics.40 This conservative strain of military history is, of course, alive and well today. 
Several recent studies demonstrate the continued attachment of military history to ‘high’ 
politics and to heroic military personalities.41 
Despite this seeming continuity, from the 1970s, the hugely influential work of British Marxist 
historians, notably Hobsbawm, Rudé, and Thompson, has challenged military historians to 
consider new perspectives.42 The influence of ‘new’ social history, or ‘history from below’, is 
particularly evident in Tony Hayter’s The Army and the Crowd, which borrows explicitly from 
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Rudé’s terminology, and adopts civil-military relations as a serious arena of study. Yet, while 
we learn something of the trials of the common soldier during riot-duty, Hayter’s work 
maintains the traditional institutional perspective, and is essentially an administrative history of 
War Office procedure.43 Glen Steppler, has however, delved more deeply, and outlines the 
many ways in which military records might be used for reconstructing the lived-experiences of 
soldiers ‘from below’.44 One of the most fruitful areas of research has been found to be General 
Courts Martial and Regimental Courts Martial (hereafter GCM and RCM) records. We now 
have several sensitive reconstructions of the military justice system which bring us much closer 
to understanding the world of regular soldier.45 Sylvia Frey’s pioneering study of the ‘redcoat’ 
in America, for example, represents the first systematic attempt to reconstruct the social profile 
of the rank and file from regimental records, and to consider, in comparison with plebeian 
civilian life, the standard-of-living among soldiers.46 ‘History from below’ has thus exerted a 
powerful influence upon historical approaches, even within the heavily-fortified realm of 
military history, and is a key inspiration for this thesis.47 
However, it is testament to the scholarship of Linda Colley, that all studies of the eighteenth-
century military, published after 1992, have had to grapple, first and foremost, with her ‘forging 
of the nation’ argument. Most eighteenth-century studies of ‘war and society’, have adopted 
Colley’s analysis, albeit with a degree of qualification. Bowen’s wide-ranging work of synthesis, 
for example, accepts a trend of rising nationalism, while giving more space than Colley, to the 
massive social and political divisions which eighteenth-century warfare generated at home.48 
Similarly, Conway’s local study of military encampments in the American War of 
Independence, has reconstructed the hardship of camp life for common soldiers, and the 
disruption which the arrival of troops entailed for host communities. Camps such as Warley 
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(Essex) and Coxheath (Kent) were vast, dirty, and rife with both disease and crime. However, 
for elite and middle-class newspaper readers, at least, Conway is at pains to stress that 
encampments represented ‘loci for Britishness’.49 Elsewhere, Conway has developed this theme, 
by suggesting that camps and garrisons were ‘military melting pots’, which threw together 
ordinary men from different backgrounds, and dissolved subnational identities in the process.50 
The same endorsement of Colley’s thesis can be found in Brumwell’s account of the British 
soldier in the Seven Years’ War. In terms of methodology, Redcoats bears a great similarity to 
Sylvia Frey’s work on the American War of Independence. Yet Brumwell parts company with 
Frey in two respects: firstly, in terms of his relatively optimistic account of the social conditions 
of soldiering in America, and secondly, in his conclusion, which suggests that the army was an 
‘incubator for shared Britishness’.51 
In recent years, within the field of military history, the pendulum has swung back against the 
‘Nation-at-Arms’ thesis. Reviewers have questioned, for example, whether Brumwell has 
provided sufficient evidence to substantiate his claims of a growing national identity amongst 
the rank and file in the army of America.52 Similar doubts could also be raised about Conway’s 
concept of a ‘military melting pot’. As John Cookson has pointed out, rank and file soldiers ‘are 
rarely heard with their own voices fighting for a larger cause’. In a brief but succinct essay, 
Cookson foregrounds the ‘reciprocity’ of the ‘officer-soldier relationship’, and the importance of 
a soldier’s ‘regimental identity’, over and above a sense of nationalism.53 A similar conclusion is 
reached by Edward Coss, who argues that soldiers were motivated primarily by the 
camaraderie engender by ‘campfire community’, and not by loftier ideals. Coss also strikingly 
evokes the soldier’s marginal existence in the Iberian Peninsula, where Wellington’s men were 
consistently terribly underfed.54 While Norman Buckley’s statistics, of military mortality, 
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demonstrate that over half the British soldiers sent to the West Indies died of disease.55 This 
research helps to contextualise the recent findings of Kevin Linch, who shows that, during the 
later Napoleonic Wars, the British government experienced serious difficulties in raising men 
for the army, and was confronted by considerable popular hostility.56 Together these works on 
the Napoleonic period, demonstrate that the empirical evidence exists to sustain analyses of 
both the common soldier and the process of recruitment. They highlight the need to re-evaluate 
the crucial period of 1793-1805 and, what is more, they demonstrate a growing dissatisfaction 
with the narrative of nationalism, as applied to the British army. 
A ‘History from Below’ Approach 
In line with this historiographical dissonance, a powerful case has recently been made for 
bringing together the disparate worlds of labour and military history, in order to better 
understand the common soldier. Both Mansfield and Way have suggested historians should 
approach the military through the theoretical framework of class analysis.57 The strict hierarchy 
adopted by the British army, they argue is, is a close fit for the social structure of industrialising 
Britain, with plebeian rankers led (and governed) by patrician officers.58 Furthermore, a strong 
argument can be made that the lived-experience of common soldiers is broadly analogous to 
that of other wage-labourers. After all, much of the ‘military task’ lay beyond the battlefield in 
manual ‘civil labour’. Bound by the strictures of military justice, and by the terms of enlistment, 
yet granted wages and certain rights, the soldier should be seen as an ‘anomalous labourer, 
both free and unfree’.59 Mansfield highlights that many soldiers retained their pre-enlistment 
trades, and their working-class attitudes, which contributed to sense of the military as a ‘labour 
force’.60 While Way views the process of mobilization as one of proletarianization, in which 
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masses of diverse civilian workers were converted into uniformed waged-labourers.61 Likewise 
Dziennik has argued that, in the Highlands regiments at least, the military experience was 
primarily based upon ‘contractual obligations’.62 Furthermore, this approach calls for a re-
evaluation of soldier’s actions. Military crimes such as ‘mutiny’, ‘desertion’, and ‘unsoldierly 
behaviour’, can be re-cast as acts of protest against working conditions and as attempts to 
negotiate the terms of service.63 Such an interpretation is convincing, it deepens our 
understanding, and further undermines any historical interpretation which sees armed service 
as an uncomplicated process of nationalist indoctrination.  
The work of Mansfield and Way has been extremely influential upon the theoretical approach 
adopted by this study. However, the emphasis of these writers also invites us to reconnect with 
the rich literature on plebeian resistance, and urges the historian to bring the ‘war and society’ 
study into dialogue with the Industrial Revolution. For, if we are to consider ‘soldiers as 
workers’, their experiences should be placed alongside those of other occupational groups. In 
particular the work of the Hammonds, Eric Hobsbawm, John Rule, and Adrian Randall, has 
been consulted, both as a point of comparison and as an inspiration for the direction of research. 
Studies of contemporary civilian workers, and their vacillating fates during the Industrial 
Revolution, have been used in Chapter Two, to help make sense of patterns of recruitment. In 
addition, the analytical tools used by historians to examine ‘collective bargaining’ and labour 
unrest have been adopted here, in order to deconstruct the many soldiers’ mutinies and 
disorders examined in Chapters Two and Three.64 
The history of protest, pioneered by Thompson and Rudé has also been enormously influential 
upon this study. This thesis seeks to recover the ‘faces in the crowd’, to reconstruct the actions 
of plebeian protestors, to use their struggles as a means of understanding the grievances, and 
customary expectations of the eighteenth-century poor. It also seeks to foreground the agency 
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of subaltern groups in the 1790s. As such, it is forged in the same mould as many ‘histories from 
below’. However, the intention here is to build upon several decades of scholarship, by 
subjecting military sources to a ‘history from below’ approach. Thompson made selective use of 
War Office correspondence (WO 1) and reports (WO 40) in his seminal article on the English 
food riot.65 A number of historians of protest have subsequently demonstrated the worth of this 
material for illuminating civilian disturbances.66 Yet, with the exception of Roger Wells’ study of 
the Oxfordshire Militia mutinies, there has been no systematic examination of these sources to 
reconstruct the various protests of soldiers and militiamen.67 In stark contrast to the significant 
advances made to the accessibility of criminal proceedings of the Old Bailey68, courts martial 
records remain understudied, despite their amenability to the same forms of historical 
analysis.69 This thesis is thus an attempt to apply the well-established methodological approach 
of ‘history from below’ to relatively unconsulted sources in order to shed new light on popular 
attitudes to recruitment and service in the army and militia. 
An additional aim of the thesis is to contribute to the literature on the Industrial Revolution. 
Economic historians have noted the important role played by the military in terms of drawing 
off ‘surplus’ labour.70 Chapter Two is dedicated to elaborating upon the close relationship 
between economics and enlistment. In particular it will examine how short term changes 
wrought by war and longer-term industrialisation impacted upon patterns of enlistment into 
the armed forces. However, as Way has suggested, the army was also instrumental in extending 
and consolidating capitalist relations, both at home and abroad, through the suppression of civil 
unrest and through wars of conquest.71 While British imperial expansion lays beyond the realms 
                                                   
65 Thompson, ‘Moral Economy’, pp. 101, 112-3, 116, 119, 121-30. 
66 See for example, Randall, Before the Luddites, p. 81; S. Poole, 'Popular Politics in Bristol, Somerset and 
Wiltshire, 1791-1805' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Bristol: 1992), p. 451. For some of the 
challenges presented with using military sources see R.A.E. Wells, 'Counting Riots in Eighteenth-Century 
England', Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, 37 (1978), pp. 68-72. 
67 R.A.E. Wells, 'The Militia Mutinies of 1795', in J. Rule (ed.), Outside the Law: Studies in Crime and Order 
1650-1850 (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1982), pp.35-64. 
68 Thanks largely to the work of Bob Shoemaker and Tim Hitchcock of the Old Bailey Online project 
(www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 7.2). For use of this material see their Tales from the Hanging Court 
(London: Hodder Arnold, 2006). 
69 See especially TNA, WO 71, General Courts Martial Proceedings. 
70 See for example M.M. Flinn, 'Trends in Real Wages, 1750-1850', Economic History Review, 27 (1974), p. 
408. 
71 P. Way, 'Hercules, the Hydra and Historians', Sozial Geschichte Online, 3 (2010), p. 62. 
23 
 
of this study, which has been limited solely to England, an attempt has been made in the final 
part of this thesis to contextualise the army’s role in the suppression of domestic protest.  
Forty years of scholarship on food protests and industrial unrest have hitherto deepened our 
understanding of plebeian values and cultural norms.72 However, there is still room for closer 
analysis of how the ruling elite sought to deal with social disorder. The work of Clive Emsley 
and Stanley Palmer have clearly set out the legal workings of the Riot Act, they have 
demonstrated constitutional limitations placed upon the army, and traced gradual development 
of the English police from 1829.73 However, both police and protest historians tend to portray 
military intervention in the eighteenth century as a static phenomenon.74 Further, their work 
makes only selective use of the source-material, sketched out by Hayter, for examining the role 
of the armed forces.75 Building on Hayter’s work, while simultaneously taking a broader 
diachronic view, the final part of this thesis considers the developing presence of military force 
in society during eighteenth century. In particular, it seeks to address the question raised by 
Charlesworth, over twenty years ago, of how officials perceived and reacted to disorder in 
different types of community.76 It is hoped that by revisiting this area of research the role of the 
military during a period of industrialisation will be more fully established. Moreover, such an 
investigation is worthwhile as a means of challenging the presumed stability of England’s 
‘ancien régime’.77 
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The first two chapters deal with the politics and economics of enlistment. In Chapter One the 
political controversy surrounding the early stages of the war with revolutionary France is 
outlined and the social tensions created by the process of mass enlistment is examined. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the ‘crimp riots’ (1794-5) and the Supplementary Militia Act 
riots (1796-7), and new material is used to contextualise these popular protests. Chapter Two 
considers which civilians were drawn to a life in the army and militia and what their 
motivations for enlistment were. While a myriad of private motives operated upon the minds of 
young men, in the final analysis, economic considerations are demonstrated to have been of 
overwhelming importance. 
The next part of the thesis examines the ‘experience of soldiering’. Chapter Three compares the 
standard of living of soldiers in the home garrison with that of other plebeian occupations. It 
argues that a series of mutinies in the period underscored the numerous grievances held by 
soldiers. However, it will be suggested that these protests also successfully altered government 
policy. Soldiers in England were thus one of the few occupational groups to see a net 
improvement in their material conditions during the wars. Throughout it will be argued that 
soldierly loyalty was contingent rather than unreserved. Chapter Four explores this theme 
further by examining the most common military crime; desertion. It will be demonstrated that 
even in 1803-5, at the height of the Napoleonic threat, government had great difficulty in raising 
and retaining militiamen and soldiers.  
The final two chapters examine military deployments during the periodic strikes and food riots 
of the eighteenth century. In Chapter Five, it is argued that there was an increasing intolerance 
among eighteenth-century elites towards popular disorder and a commensurate decline in the 
constitutional constraints upon the use of the army to contain popular protests. The qualitative 
and quantitative detail of military interventions during the strike waves of 1791-2 and the food 
riots of 1795 and 1800-1 are presented in order to illustrate this point. It is argued that the rise of 
popular radicalism after the French Revolution, structural changes in the English economy, and 
the influence of Smithian concepts of a ‘free market’ saw both increasing disorder from below 
and a hardening of attitudes from above. Lastly, the concluding chapter reflects upon how this 
study of civil-military relations and popular protest has contributed to our historical 




Part I – Recruitment 
1. The Politics of Recruitment. 
In the opening years of the French Revolutionary Wars there was a dramatic expansion of the 
size of the British Army and the militia. The total size of the army rose from 35,000, at the outset 
of the war in 1793, to 125,000, men by the close of 1795.1 When rates of attrition are taken into 
consideration, it is clear that 96,000 men were raised for the regular army in the first three years 
of the conflict.2 Around half of this number were recruited in England.3 It is notable that more 
men were raised for the regular army in the opening years of the conflict than were recruited at 
any other period during the French Wars.4 In addition to the army, from the mid-1790s, efforts 
were also directed towards increasing the scale of the militia. Embodied slightly before the 
outbreak of war, in December 1792, the establishment strength of the English militia stood at 
some 30,000.5 County quotas for supplying men for the militia were extended via the 1796 
Supplementary Militia Act and, by the close of the 1790s, 65,000 men were drawn into the 
English militia.6 However, despite the state’s achievement in raising large numbers of soldiers, 
in the case of both the militia and the army, recruitment figures fell consistently short of targets 
set by Parliament. By the middle of 1795 the army was twenty nine per cent under its voted 
strength and in 1799 the English Militia was similarly twenty eight per cent short of its quota 
strength of 90,000 men.7 Through the rehearsal of these figures, I intended to suggest both the 
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scale of recruitment in the 1790s, but also of the difficulties which faced the armed forces and 
the government at this time. 
The regular army, in particular, was presented with significant problems when it came to 
enticing new recruits. In part, this was due to the weight of negative popular perceptions, 
which bore down upon the regular soldiery. National security in the late eighteenth century 
was seen to rest primarily on the policy of ‘clear blue water’.8 Hence the navy was lauded as the 
principal protector of ‘English liberty’ and the ‘noble tar’ was feted as a paragon of manly virtue 
and bravery.9 In sharp contrast, the land forces were associated with ‘standing armies’, 
continental autocracy, and Catholicism.10 The British Army was therefore denounced by 
‘Country’ ideologues as a threat to ‘liberty’ and the soldiery themselves fared little better.11 
‘Redcoats’ were condemned by radicals and conservatives alike. The former portrayed the 
soldiery as grovelling automatons, little better than slaves, while the latter felt them to be no 
more trustworthy than the criminal classes from which they were perceived to have been 
drawn.12 In the colourful vernacular of eighteenth-century London, soldiers were known on the 
streets as  ‘Bloody Backs’ – in reference to their subjugation under military law – and as ‘Free 
Booters’ – due to their perceived penchant for plunder.13 Respectable workmen tended to keep 
their social distance from, and even looked down upon, the lowly private soldier. Francis Place, 
for example, complained that soldiers in the capital invariably associated with ‘vagabonds’, 
‘common women of the lowest description’, and behaved in a manner which was ‘excessively 
gross’.14 Likewise, the radical tailor, Thomas Carter, commented that many soldiers in 
                                                   
8 D.A. Baugh, 'Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce: The Uses of 'a Grand Marine Empire'', in L. 
Stone (ed.), An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815 (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.185-223. 
9 M. McCormack, 'Citizenship, Nationhood, and Masculinity in the Affair of the Hanoverian Soldier, 
1756', Historical Journal, 49 (2006), p. 978; K. Wilson, The Sense of the People : Politics, Culture and Imperialism 
in England, 1715-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). p. 196. 
10 For the seventeenth-century origins of this perception see: L.G. Schwoerer, 'No Standing Armies': The 
Anti-Army Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974) I. 
Roots, 'Swordsmen and Decimators - Cromwell's Major-Generals', in R. H. Parry (ed.), The English Civil 
War and after, 1642-1658 (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 87; J. Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious 
Revolution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), pp. 1-14. 
11 H.T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property : Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Birkenhead: Wilmer 
Brothers, 1977)., pp. 184-5. 
12 See for example, ‘Albanicus’, Letters on the Impolicy of a Standing Army (London, 1793), pp. 59-60; A. 
Young, Annals of Agriculture and other Useful Arts, Vol. 18 (Bury St Edmunds, 1792), p. 490-1. 
13 See entries in F. Grose, A Classical Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue 3rd ed. (London, 1796). 





Colchester Barracks used ‘disgusting language’ and engaged in ‘degrading actions’ which he 
felt were too depraved to describe in his memoir.15 As Roger Wells has suggested, the soldiery 
were considered to be drawn from ‘the sweepings of the street’, and were therefore abhorred in 
many working-class circles.16 
By contrast, the militia, as an institution, did not suffer from the same high political criticisms 
that were levied at the army. Those same eighteenth-century ‘Country’ politicians, who 
denounced large standing armies as a threat to ‘liberty’, tended to support the concept of a 
national militia made up of soldier-citizens.17 In contrast to the army, which was under the 
control and patronage of the king and his ministers, the remodelled ‘New Militia’ of 1757 was 
designed to be administered and commanded by country elites in order to curtail the undue 
extension of executive power.18 Furthermore, to avoid excessive taxation and corruption, men 
were to be raised relatively cheaply by local ballots which drew a proportion of adult males 
from each community into the county militias. As quotas of men were theoretically drawn at 
random from each locale, and, as service was limited to the home garrison, the militia was 
intended to be a defensive force drawn from a broad cross-section of society. However, in 
reality, the English militia did not match up to the idealised vision presented in eighteenth-
century political rhetoric. Each of the Militia Acts, passed from 1757 onwards, included an 
important clause which allowed balloted men to pay a fine, or to provide a substitute, in order 
to avoid personal service.19 The clause was intended to differentiate the militia ballot from 
conscription by ensuring that gentlemen were not compelled to serve against their will.20 Yet 
the substitution clause was taken advantage of by a much greater social range of individuals 
than was originally anticipated and few men drawn by ballot served in person. The vast 
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majority of militiamen were therefore either paid substitutes or men too poor to purchase 
exemption.21 
Englishmen of all social ranks thus tended to hold similar prejudices against the militiaman as 
they did against the regular soldier. Although there were important differences in the terms of 
service in the militia and in the army, there were also many similarities between the two.22 
Militiamen wore the same long red coats as the regular soldiery, they shared the same barracks 
and camps as the regulars, and, their lifestyle, like that of the common soldier, was seen as one 
of moral laxity and of vice.23 Similarities in the social composition of the army and militia also 
caused their personnel to be conflated in the popular psyche. Arthur Young, for example, felt 
privates in the army and militia were ‘taken from dregs of the people’ while many of John 
Reeves’ correspondents agreed that, in the wake of the French Revolution, the lowly status of 
the British soldiery made them a potential threat to the social order.24 Furthermore, negative 
perceptions regarding the militia extended down the social scale. There is much evidence to 
suggest that working men were often as unenthusiastic about service in the militia as they were 
about service in the army. For example, it was common practice for shopkeepers and artisans to 
invest in insurance schemes in order to avoid being drawn for the militia.25 Similarly, workers in 
Birmingham were suspected of using phony apprenticeship indentures in order to fraudulently 
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claim an exemption from militia duty.26 Moreover, journeymen often chose to slip away at the 
time of a ballot, by going ‘on the tramp’ in order to avoid having their name included in the 
militia lists.27 Indeed the rank-and-file militiaman was commonly portrayed, not as an eager 
soldier-citizen, but as a broken-down artisan or a down-at-heel labourer, compelled by poverty 
and misfortune into service.28  
The impact of longstanding popular prejudices against soldiers and soldiering were often 
acknowledged by senior officers. Throughout the period military commanders lamented the 
‘Contempt which really exists amongst the lower orders … for a soldier of the Line’ and 
claimed that such prejudices were a bar to the recruitment of a wider cross-section of the 
working classes.29 Contributing to the instinctive aversion of Englishmen to armed service were 
the relatively low rates of pay in the army and the militia, the harsh discipline, and long terms 
of service. Military commanders recognized that these realities ensured that service in the army 
and militia was an unattractive prospect to much of the civilian population.30 In Chapters Two 
and Three the economics of enlistment and the changing material conditions of the private 
soldier over the period will be examined in more detail. However, here, it will be emphasized 
that the fortunes of the state, in terms of recruiting, hinged, not just upon economic and social 
considerations, but also upon contemporary political debates regarding the war with France.  
1.1.  Recruitment and the ‘War of Ideas’  
As Macleod has pointed out, the political debate surrounding Britain’s war against France was 
almost as intense as the ‘revolution debate’ from which it emanated.31 For conservatives in 
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Britain the French Revolution represented an apocalyptic event. Arthur Young, for example, 
saw the triumph of ‘popular tyranny’ in France as a ‘catching phrenzy [sic.]’, one which the 
propertied classes were compelled to unite against.32 The political rhetoric of the French 
revolutionaries themselves tended to exacerbate this feeling in England. In 1791 Brissot had 
called for ‘a new crusade, a crusade of universal freedom!’, and in 1792 the National 
Convention issued the ‘Edict of Fraternity’, offering assistance to all peoples wishing to topple 
tranny and to ‘recover their liberty’.33 The perceived danger of the French revolution spreading 
to England’s shores ensured that many conservatives viewed the war with France as one of 
national survival. For Edmund Burke, there could be no lasting peace between Britain and the 
‘Jacobin Empire’. Burke argued that the future stability of Europe therefore relied upon a two-
pronged policy, of allied defeat of the French, followed by the reestablishment of monarchy in 
France.34 In the early stages of the conflict, the primary war aim of the Pitt ministry, in line with 
Burkean arguments, was overturning ‘Jacobinism’. 35 Over time, as defeating the French on the 
continent proved to be an impossible task, the British government adopted more pragmatic 
goals. Pitt’s stated aims became gaining overseas territory from the French, as an ‘indemnity for 
the past’, and containing French aggrandizement on the continent, in order to provide Britain 
with national ‘security for the future’.36 
However, not all Britons shared Burke’s view of the French revolution nor did they universally 
support Pitt’s war aims. Elite opposition Whigs, middle-class nonconformists, and working-
class radicals were each critical of the struggle with France. In the early stages of the conflict, 
nonconformists, who made up a substantial part of J.E. Cookson’s liberal anti-war faction – the 
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‘Friends of Peace’ – questioned the legitimacy of an aggressive war against the French. 
Informed by rational theology, they argued that only a war of self-defence, in response to an 
immediate threat of attack, was justified in the eyes of God.37 Political arguments were also used 
to scrutinize the origins of the war. It was argued from various quarters that Britain should not 
interfere with the right of the French people to choose their own form of government.38 
Moreover, to those conservatives who pointed out that the French had first declared war on 
Britain, Foxites and reformers argued that the French revolutionaries had been backed into a 
corner; first by a Bourbon tyrant, and then, by a coalition of European despots and counter-
revolutionaries. The cause of liberty, they argued, was squarely on the side of the French.39 
Furthermore, as the war progressed, these same groups criticized the deleterious economic and 
social effects of the war. The ‘Friends of Peace’, for example, many of whom were involved in 
manufacture, pointed to the detrimental effects of war upon British commerce and to the 
burden of war-time taxation which, they argued, fell unevenly upon the middle classes.40 
During the scarcities of 1795 and 1800-1, as well as during periodic slumps in industry, pro-
reform newspaper editors claimed that declining living standards among the poor were the 
consequence of the ‘ruinous war’.41 By the middle of the 1790s, war weariness, and the cry of 
‘peace and plenty’, were gaining considerable ground amongst the working-classes, particularly 
in London and the North of England.42  
Even in the first years of the war, before economic distress had really set in, political debates 
surrounding the conflict with France, had an effect upon, and interacted with, the recruitment 
process. In radical strongholds, for example, the strength of anti-war sentiment was such that 
attempts were made to obstruct the business of recruitment. Within two months of the outbreak 
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of war, in March 1793, ‘near 500 of the Norwich Rabble’ gathered in that town and assailed a 
captain of an Independent Company and 30 of his new recruits. They reportedly used 
‘improper language’, damned the king, and ‘exerted their Rhetoric to persuade the Recruits to 
mutiny and [to] return into the City’. When Captain Allen resisted the efforts of the crowd, they 
threw stones and attempted to physically prevent the troops from marching on.43 Similarly, in 
Sheffield, a local butcher parodied the recruitment process, and underscored the catastrophic 
loss of life occurring during the Flanders campaign, by publically driving a cow – styled as ‘a 
new recruit’ and adorned with a cockade – through the town and toward the slaughter-house.44 
By 1794, regular open air meetings were being held in ‘the enlightened city’ of Sheffield, 
advocating for equal representation, the abolition of the slave trade, and an end to the war.45 
After one meeting, copies of a persuasive anti-recruitment handbill were ‘pasted upon walls 
and Posts’ in several parts of town, quite possibly by members of the extremely active Sheffield 
Society for Constitutional Information.46 Addressed ‘To Young Men’, the author points out the 
dangers inherent to soldiering and further argues that, before enlisting in a time of war, men 
should consider ‘whether or not that war is just’. According to the anonymous writer, Britain 
and her allies fought, not to defend the ‘rights of poor and labouring men’ in England, but ‘to 
crush the infant Liberty of France, and to establish the old barbarous tyranny there’.47 As was 
commonplace in contemporary radical works, the handbill appealed to a universal 
humanitarian form of patriotism, which saw the French as ‘fellow creatures’ engaged in a sister 
struggle for their rights.48  
It is difficult to ascertain the precise impact of these radical activities upon the progress of 
recruitment. Certainly some working men adopted internationalist republican arguments and 
were steadfastly against enlisting to fight the French. Thomas Elston, a London weaver, for 
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example, boldly declared his sentiments in a letter which was intercepted by the Home Office in 
1794: 
Let the King or his arm’d Banditti ask me to go for a soldier, what says I to support 
tyranny and injustice [-] no [-] I [know] better, if I go for a soldier it shall be to rid the 
world of tyrants and to banish those monsters called Kings from the Face of the Earth!49 
In the capital, during the first years of the war, the London Corresponding Society (hereafter 
LCS) grew fitfully in membership and occupied a powerful anti-war platform.50 From 1793, LCS 
leader John Thelwall gave a series of twice-weekly lectures, to increasingly large audiences, 
which often reflected upon the ‘detestable traffic in blood’ associated with the ‘present 
calamitous war’.51 By 1795 the LCS was influential enough to stage two large open-air meetings 
which were extremely well attended and which pressed the government for peace as well as 
reform.52 The anti-war activities of the LCS must surely have had a dampening effect upon 
recruitment and pro-war propaganda within the capital. Certainly the work of the Sheffield 
Society for Constitutional Information was feared to have been effective. According to the 
town’s chief magistrate, Reverend Wilkinson, radical anti-recruitment propaganda had quickly 
become the talk of the workshops and alehouses. The ‘Address to Young Men’ was said to have 
been received in some quarters ‘with applause’. Moreover, locally-stationed military officers 
were clearly displeased with the state of affairs in Sheffield and were concerned about the 
detrimental impact of radical agitation upon their ability to recruit. One officer urged Wilkinson 
(against his better judgement) to have the reformers’ meetings forcefully broken up.53 However, 
it must be acknowledged that anti-war activists had considerably less popular support outside 
of Norwich, Sheffield, and London. Attempts to obstruct recruitment either with direct action, 
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or by political suasion, seem to have been confined to solely to England’s most incurable 
‘Jacobin cities’. 
Loyalist activists, on the other hand, had considerably greater resources at their disposal and, 
from the outset, pursued a broad-based campaign to bolster the war effort by promoting 
recruitment in the armed forces. In large part, this was a financial effort. Across the nation 
loyalist associations promoted public subscriptions to augment the bounty money offered to 
seamen for naval service.54 Interestingly, patriotic public subscriptions to incentivise the 
enlistment of militia substitutes and army recruits do not appear to have been set up on the 
same scale, perhaps pointing to the privileged status of the Royal Navy in the eyes of the public. 
However, there is evidence of loyalist campaigns to raise bounty money for army recruits in 
both Surrey and Rochdale.55 In Essex, a county-wide initiative led by the gentry, raised £13,000 
in order to encourage 320 militia substitutes to come forward.56 Loyalists committees also 
oversaw charitable campaigns to provide for the orphans and widows of seamen and soldiers 
‘who may fall in glorious defence of their country’.57 Moreover, when the British army was 
found to be woefully underequipped during the Flanders campaign, charitable donations of 
£32,000 were raised over the winter of 1793-4 to provide warm clothing for the British army.58 
Additionally, loyalists expended considerable efforts in producing a ‘legion’ of patriotic 
commodities, including songs, plays, pamphlets, and prints, much of which was dedicated to 
promoting the war effort and the armed forces.59  
As Frank O’Gorman has noted, in terms of personnel and organization, there was strong 
continuity between the earlier loyalist movement in England (1791-2), led ostensibly by John 
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Reeves’ Association for the Preservation of Liberty and Property Against Republicans and 
Levellers, and subsequent wartime loyalist activity.60 As Philp has demonstrated, a key aspect 
of this earlier campaign, in response to the success of Paine’s Rights of Man (1791-2), was an 
attempt to engage the masses in the revolution debate and to appeal to the people with a 
popularly accessible (‘vulgar’) form of conservatism.61 This attempt at ‘popular instruction’, 
continued into the war years, most notably in the form of Hannah Moore’s Village Politics (1793) 
and Cheap Repository Tracts (1795-8), which sought to convince ordinary Englishmen that they 
had the ‘best laws’, the ‘best religion’, and as ‘much liberty as can make us happy’.62  
However, it should be noted that conservative writers rarely sought to use political argument as 
a direct means of encouraging recruitment into the armed forces. The ideal soldier was seen to 
be apolitical – ‘a solider has nothing to do with politics’ – and the army, as an institution, also 
claimed to be above politics.63 Hence a separate strand of loyalist output emerged during the 
war years which was less overtly conservative in tone and more nationalistic. Unlike radical 
anti-recruitment texts, pro-war propaganda avoided discussing the precise origins of the war or 
the more ideological aspects of the conflict. Instead they focused upon more emotive themes. 
The French were portrayed as the traditional enemy, a rallying cry was made for the ‘unity’ of 
the nation, and the perception of the ‘nation in danger’ was encouraged.64  
Those propagandist works which specifically focused upon the armed forces attempted to 
increase the attractiveness of enlistment by associating military service with a valiant 
commitment to ‘King and Country’: 
Britons, To Arms – To Arms!  
Valour each bosom warms 
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New fame to sing - 
On Land and Over the main 
Fresh Laurels we will gain – 
GOD SAVE THE KING!65 
As Cookson has suggested, soldiers were encouraged to think of themselves as the protectors of 
society itself.66 The possibility of sharing in the ‘glories of war with France’ were also repeatedly 
emphasised.67 Even men balloted for the militia, who were unlikely to partake in battle with the 
enemy, were encouraged to see their ‘sacrifice’ in these nationalistic terms: 
I was a Plough-boy tall Sir 
My name was honest Dan 
But at my country’s call Sir 
I’ve turned Militia Man.68 
Furthermore, there was a considerable effort made by propagandists to present the process of 
recruitment in a picturesque fashion and to highlight the many private advantages of 
enlistment. The elegance of the soldiers’ uniform – ‘In Regimentals bright, Sir… Of Scarlet I do 
shine’ – was a recurrent feature of loyalist pamphlets and particularly prominent in 
contemporary prints.69 Scholars working closely with the latter source have argued that 
historians must attend closely to their ‘narrative pattern, recurring formal devices and visual 
analogies’.70 Within the popular prints of the 1790s, one can certainly identify a well-rehearsed 
genre which depicts the ‘ritual’ of recruitment. Rowlandson’s Soldiers Recruiting is a prime 
example of this visual trope (Print 1).71 In these images, the rustic would-be recruit is gently 
convinced to enlist by the appeal of army life. The affections of women are commonly part of 
the attraction and are usually associated with the soldiers’ eye-catching uniform and the 
bravery and patriotism associated with his service. The availability of music and drink are also 
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set forth as advantages of military service. Implicit in Rowlandson’s print, and others like it, is 
the latent loyalty and foundational nationalism of the would-be recruit.  
 
Print 1 - BMSat 9316, T. Rowlandson, Soldiers Recruiting (London, 1798). 
The precise effects of these loyalist representations of armed service and recruitment are just as 
difficult to gauge as those produced by the anti-war factions. As Philp has pointed out, 
‘patriotic publications were directed at the populace, but they were not, for the most part, 
produced by them’.72 Nevertheless, we know from surviving soldiers’ memoirs that some 
recruits were certainly taken in by this romantic image of enlistment and, perhaps, also by the 
appeal to monarchy and nationalism.73 Allen Davenport, for example, although latterly a 
convert to Thomas Spence’s radical land reform scheme, was a staunch ‘Church and King’ man 
in his teens. In his youth, Davenport believed that ‘everything that was undertaken by England 
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was right, just and proper; and that every other nation that opposed her was wrong and 
deserved chastisement’, hence he enlisted in a Fencible regiment with little hesitation. 
Moreover, Davenport claimed that ‘nine tenths’ of the English population were firmly behind 
the war with republican France around the year 1794, suggesting that the loyalist attempts at 
rousing the nation were effective indeed.74 However, even in 1794, ‘patriotism’ was rather fluid 
and meant different things to different groups.75 We should therefore be cautious of 
Davenport’s assessment and avoid making the easy connection between military service and an 
overarching sense of patriotism and identification with the nation.76 
Indeed, when one considers the fair number of surviving soldiers’ memoirs, and the fact that 
they were often commissioned or patronised by conservative officers, it is surprising how few 
private soldiers articulated a deep sense of patriotic duty or nationalist sentiment as a 
motivation for enlisting into the army.77 Davenport appears to have been rather exceptional in 
his willingness to act upon his evolving political commitments by taking up arms.78 Very few 
plebeian ‘Church and King’ men left a record of their having enlisted for political reasons. What 
evidence there is, however, overwhelmingly suggests that economic circumstances were 
paramount in terms of the decision to enlist.79 Moreover, we must recognize that the vision of 
the recruitment process portrayed by Rowlandson and other printmakers is a propagandist one. 
The image of the recruiting party effortlessly drawing upon the loyalty of the nation has been 
taken at face value by some historians.80 However, recruitment was rarely as romantic and 
unproblematic as these sources would lead us to believe. What military historians describe as 
‘ordinary recruitment’, where small detachments from experienced regiments, paraded into 
town to with tales of gallantry and with eye-catching uniforms did, of course, go on.81 However, 
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the Secretary-at-War’s in-letters reveal that recruiting parties were often extremely disruptive of 
civic harmony and therefore unwelcome by the authorities. ‘Ordinary’ recruiting parties were 
known to cause confusion in small towns by loudly ‘beating up’ for men, even doing so late at 
night, ‘with a number of Drums … and Lighted Torches’.82 Competing regiments were also seen 
poaching recruits from one another and might engage in pitched battles over the ownership of 
willing enlists.83 Furthermore, for all their bluster, the itinerant recruiting party was often found 
to be an inadequate means of supplying the army with men.84 The vast majority of recruitment, 
in the early stages of the French war, was therefore performed, not by ordinary recruitment, but 
by newly-formed, poorly disciplined, and often unscrupulous independent regiments. In order 
to get a better understanding of civil-military relations and the popular experience of 
recruitment during the early years of the French wars we must, therefore, explore the workings 
of independent army regiments and the recruitment techniques they pursued. 
1.2.  The Impact of Independent Regiments 
In addition to expanding the size of established army regiments, in 1793 the British Government 
allowed the formation of 100 new independent companies of 100 men each.85 By the beginning 
of 1794 the Secretary-at-War claimed that 11,000 men (sixty-five per cent of the total men raised 
in the previous year) had been recruited by these means.86 Given this promising start, further 
permissions were granted for the formation of whole independent regiments. The Army List for 
1794 shows 85 such regiments were in existence and most were tasked with raising 600 men.87 
Although some units probably fell short of this target, others raised considerably more and 
produced multiple cohorts of men year on year. Captain MacDonnell of the 113th Regiment, for 
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example, had 733 recruits accepted in June 1795.88 Unfortunately, the inspection returns which 
survive for 1794-5 are inadequate to tell us the precise contribution of the independent 
regiments. However, by the summer of 1795, five regiments whose returns do survive show, on 
average, that they produced 668 recruits.89 It would not be unreasonable to suggest that the 
independent regiments contributed at least 50,000 men between 1794-5 or sixty-four per cent of 
the total manpower raised for the army in that time period.90 
In electing to rely upon newly formed independent regiments, the government may well have 
been drawing upon the experiences of the American Revolutionary War. As Conway has 
demonstrated, it was recognized in the late 1770s, that ‘ordinary recruitment’ was a very 
sluggish means of increasing the size of the armed forces.91 Officers were rarely found to exert 
themselves while on ‘ordinary recruiting’ duties. They stood to gain little in terms of promotion 
and were actually likely to lose out financially due to the costs associated with raising men.92 
Therefore, during the American conflict, government experimented with the creation of new 
independent regiments whose officers were given permission to ‘raise men for rank’. 
Commanding officers were at liberty to dispose of commissions within these regiments and 
could bring in anyone who could help them reach their targets. If and when the regiment was 
complete, each officer was rewarded with a permanent step in rank which was calibrated to 
reflect the number of recruits he had secured. Through these incentives, it was found that 
independent regiments could be filled up much more quickly than the established corps.93 
As steps in army rank were usually purchased, or earned by long years of service, the option of 
raising for rank was extremely attractive.94 Eighteenth-century army commissions could be 
prohibitively expensive. A Lieutenancy in a light horse regiment could be bought for £1,600 
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while a Majority in a foot regiment went for £2,900.95 On the other hand, an Ensigncy worth 
£400, could be obtained in an independent regiment in exchange for just 18 recruits.96 Even 
gentlemen, such as Sir George Napier, saw the opportunity to exchange a few-score recruits for 
a promotion as unmissable.97 Officers who took their chances could make extraordinary 
advances in their career. John Henry Loft, for example, rose from a Lieutenant in the Foot 
Guards to Lieutenant-Colonel of his own independent regiment in the space of twelve months – 
a career progression which took Wellington six years to accomplish.98 Furthermore, civilians 
wishing to enter the army with the status of a commission, or who wished to obtain a much-
coveted ‘half-pay’ pension, could also do so by engaging to raise men for an independent 
company. For the government, the plan was also attractive financially. The Treasury paid out 
fifteen pounds per recruit raised, but only after they had been examined by a surgeon, 
approved by a Field General, and drafted into the regiments of the line.99 The scheme also had a 
pecuniary appeal for staff in the War Office, as each new commission was signed off by a clerk, 
for a small fee. As Harling has pointed out, in 1796 the Chief Clerk of the War Office earned six 
times the annual salary of the Secretary-at-War through these fees alone.100  
However, for all these ‘advantages’, military historians are agreed that recruiting for rank 
encouraged corruption to such an extent that it represented ‘one of the major military abuses of 
the Georgian period’.101 Certainly some contemporaries were critical of a scheme which allowed 
inexperienced men to be promoted over the heads of veteran officers. The Opposition Whig, 
General Tarleton, objected to the rapid elevation of ‘purse-proud schoolboys’ but also to the 
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cost to the public of ‘multiplying commissions’.102 Military historians have also shown that 
independent regiments produced a lower ‘quality’ of recruit – men who were aged, infirm, or 
under the regulation height.103 The inspection returns of the 126th regiment, for example, reveal 
that some recruits were rejected as being ‘above seventy years’ of age.104 However, the main 
problem with the independent regiments was that they introduced an increased level of 
competition into the recruitment process.105 It is true that at the outset of any war there is always 
a struggle for manpower. However, the new corps raised the stakes considerably. Each 
independent officer was conscious that, if he did not raise the requisite number of men, he 
would lose both his desired step in rank and any private capital laid out as bounty money. 
Hence many independent regiments can be seen operating in a desperate manner. Furthermore, 
competition between army regiments, and with the other arms of the military, led to a 
proliferation of various abuses of the recruiting service and the Secretary-at-War’s in-letters in 
the period 1793-5 resound with complaints about the behaviour of recruiters.106 
Corrupt practices within the recruiting service were in fact endemic in this period. Contrary to 
the Mutiny Act, recruits enlisted in pubs were often brought before a magistrate, while still 
drunk, to swear to their willingness to enlist.107 The independent companies were particularly 
noted for recruiting drunken civilians. Lieutenant Wheatley of the 117th Regiment, for example, 
was a publican turned recruiter, who allowed would-be recruits to run up large drinking bills 
before encouraging them to enlist in order to repay the debt.108 Likewise, Major Leeson’s 
independent company operated out of the Little George pub in Chatham where a magistrate 
noted that ‘Women of the Town are kept for the purpose of decoying young men who by that 
means are entrapped into the service’.109 It was found that recruiters were also willing to sell 
their wards on to other officers to turn a profit, thus deceiving the recruit about the regiment he 
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was to join, and denying him the full value of the bounty money.110 The Mayor of Norwich 
perceived this practice to be, ‘disgraceful to the military Character, and if not checked, will 
materially injure the recruiting service’.111  
Furthermore, reports from parishes in Lincolnshire, Warwickshire, and Herefordshire, suggest 
that it was common practice for desperate recruiting parties to force a coin into the hand of an 
unwitting villager, to claim the man had accepted the ‘King’s shilling’, and to carry him off as 
an enlisted soldier.112 Other recruiters rejected even this level of subtlety and simply illegally 
impressed, or ‘crimped’, their prey. A black servant was forcibly removed from the home of a 
gentlemen in Cheltenham by a party of dragoons in 1794.113 While several high profile cases of 
illegal impressment by independent companies are recorded in the provincial press. At Long 
Itchington (Warwickshire) a Dissenting minister, Joseph Gronow, was forcibly enlisted while on 
his way to chapel, he was confined for three hours and forced to pay a guinea to be released. As 
one editor commented, the case revealed that ‘the trade of crimping is not confined to London 
and its environs’.114 In a similar case, John Liversage was illegally confined by a party of 125th 
Regiment in Newcastle-under-Lyme. Despite refusing to enlist, Liversage was claimed as a 
deserter, ‘placed in … irons’, and marched to Buckingham Goal, where he languished for 
upwards of eight weeks. Only after applying for a writ of Habeas Corpus from the Court of 
King’s Bench was he freed and awarded damages of £145.115 Less fortunate was John Meal, a 
labourer from Slaithwaite (Yorkshire), who got into conversation with Sergeant Charles Elliott 
and Private Joseph Barber of Colonel Cameron’s Wakefield Regiment at a local public house. 
After failing to convince him to enlist, the two soldiers attacked Meal, and forced him to march 
with them to Huddersfield. The pair beat Meal viciously along the way and, on the outskirts of 
Huddersfield, he collapsed and was declared dead shortly after.116 Elliot was subsequently 
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sentenced at the York Assize and was hanged for murder.117 It is important to acknowledge 
cases such as these, both to give balance to the more propagandist images of recruitment, 
discussed above, and in order to understand the tensions involved in manning the armed forces 
in the 1790s. 
In addition to the malpractices of the independent companies, the intense competition for 
recruits inevitably attracted middlemen, also known as ‘crimps’, who sought to profiteer from 
the recruitment process. In some cases these men were self-employed fraudsters who were 
entirely unconnected with the army. Military commanders, from the established regiments, 
considered these men to be a scourge. Crimps often impersonated legitimate recruiting parties 
in order in impose upon naïve villagers or to gain credit from shopkeepers. A ‘set of sponging 
crimps’ were reported to be roving the Yorkshire countryside in 1793, for example, ‘enlisting’ 
labourers and releasing them only for a fee.118 While a man styling himself ‘Captain’ Brown 
extorted clothing and cash from a shop in Kent while posing as a recruiting sergeant.119 In other 
cases, crimps were known to instruct soldiers of the best ways to desert and re-enlist 
undetected, taking a cut of the bounty money as their remuneration.120 The Commander of 
Chatham barracks complained that this kind of poaching was common in the Medway towns, 
with crimps targeting disgruntled soldiers due to embark for foreign service.121 Complaints 
about the poaching of recruits were also reported to the Secretary-at-War from Windsor, 
Sheffield, and Newcastle-under-Lyme, all places where, it was said, there were ‘a number of 
crimps collected’.122 
However, it should also be recognized that the crimping trade was given encouragement by the 
independent regiments who relied upon the trafficking of men to supply them with recruits. 
While military historians have sometimes made this connection, the case can put more 
forcefully, by examining the available evidence.123 Advertisements posted by independent 
regiments, for example, show that they actively encouraged middlemen to come forward with 
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potential recruits by offering a ‘finders’ fee’.124 Furthermore, crimping was encouraged by the 
subcontracting of recruitment to unscrupulous civilians. In 1794, for example, Major Blatch 
complained about a discharged drummer from the Essex Militia who marched about Colchester 
in a sergeant's coat, ‘which he has, by some means, procured’. The ‘sergeant’ attempted to 
seduce men from Blatch’s regiment and sent all his recruits by stagecoach to ‘Lieutenant’ 
Napper in London.125 It was later established that Napper was promising recruits high pay and 
high bounties which he never handed over. Napper instead fed his recruits into the 106th 
Norwich Regiment.126 When confronted by the War Office, Major Earle Bulwer of the 106th, 
simply replied that he had gained ‘several good recruits’ by these means.127 Similarly, the 
extraordinary recruiting ability, and rapid career advancement, of John Henry Loft must, in 
part, be attributed to the help of crimps. In 1795 Loft was given permission to raise 4,000 men 
for general service.128 However, he was accused by the High Sherriff of Lincolnshire of running 
a ‘Licenced Crimping Office’ in Grimsby ‘where all his men come to him by stage coaches’.129 
On three separate occasions Loft was reprimanded by the Secretary-at-War for allowing 
improper subordinates to recruit on his behalf.130 One crimp raising men for Loft was found to 
be a London coiner – ‘a most infamous character’. The East London magistrate, Patrick 
Colquhoun, was astonished to find such a man engaging recruits and warned that the 
‘nefarious practices’ of crimps were ‘constantly bringing odium upon Government’.131  
Indeed, the tricks and coercive practices perpetrated by the independent regiments, and the 
crimps with whom they were closely associated, were widely considered to be an outrage to 
‘English liberty’. As E.P. Thompson has argued, the ‘birthright’ of every Englishman was seen 
to be a set of negative rights which protected the individual and his property against arbitrary 
interference. ‘English liberty’ consisted of freedom from arbitrary arrest, trial by jury, equality 
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before the law, freedom to travel, to trade, and to sell one’s own labour. For the most part, 
authority upheld these rights and recognized that there was a limit beyond which the common 
man could not be pushed.132 While the impressment of skilled sailors for the navy was, 
controversially, deemed to be legal, the trepanning of unwilling recruits for the army was 
certainly not.133 Where crimping was seen to go on, it was universally condemned as 
detrimental to the image of the recruiting service.134 In Lincolnshire, for example, the effect of 
such ‘infamous practices’ was said to have ‘entirely stopped all recruiting in this County’.135 
While several conscientious provincial magistrates warned the Secretary-at-War about the 
activities of crimps. A Birmingham magistrate referred to crimps as ‘Locusts’, in Manchester 
their activities were seen as ‘scandalous’, while in Herefordshire the authorities warned that the 
‘Populace … are extremely incens’d … and consider [a party of the 113th Regiment] in the light 
of a Press-Gang’.136 The evidence clearly suggests that, in the opening stages of the war, the 
activities of crimps and independent companies became ‘infamous’ in many regions of the 
country and that enlistment became increasingly linked in the popular psyche with coercion 
rather than consent. 
1.3.  London Crimp Riots Revisited, 1794-5 
The growing national scandal of crimping was magnified within London. Crimps and 
recruiting parties were invariably drawn to London due to its large working-class population. 
By 1801, over one tenth of Englishmen resided in the capital, a larger proportion of the 
population than in any other contemporary European capital.137 Moreover, there were two other 
advantages which attracted unscrupulous recruiters. Firstly, the capital was awash with public 
houses. Colquhoun estimated in 1794 that there was one public house to every 26 private 
dwellings. Considering the competition between alehouses, Colquhoun suspected that many 
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publicans fenced stolen goods as a means of supplementing their income.138 Additionally, 
during the war, many of the capital’s publicans were enticed, or forced, to convert their taverns 
into recruiting headquarters known as ‘rendezvous’ houses. Some of London’s rendezvous 
houses were said to be equipped with cells and underground passages to assist in the secret 
traffic of unwilling recruits.139 A second form of encouragement for crimps in London was the 
existence of a numerous set of ‘trading justices’. These were impoverished magistrates who 
would issue legal writs for a small fee.140 The services of venal justices were crucial to the 
crimping trade, allowing for drunken or unwilling recruits to be ‘legally’ attested. 
In this fertile climate, it is unsurprising that the most outrageous instances of crimping emerged 
in the capital. Foremost for its notoriety, was the case of George Howe, who in August 1794 was 
reportedly trepanned, taken to a house in Johnson’s Court, Charing Cross, and confined in an 
upstairs garret. On the 15 August Howe, who was often described as a simpleton (‘better sent to 
Bedlam than to a regiment’), was found dead outside the property of Mrs Hanau after falling 
from the rooftop.141 As John Stevenson has argued, this was the spark which ignited the London 
crimp riots.142 On the morning of 15 August, crowds gathered around the body of Howe, they 
witnessed constables and magistrates searching properties in Johnson’s Court, and saw a man 
in the later stages of smallpox being removed from a contiguous property occupied by John 
Jacques. Both Hanau and Jacques were then arrested before the ill-tempered crowd and lodged 
in a watch-house. At the subsequent coroner’s inquest, it was established that both Hanau and 
Jacques were engaged by independent regiments in the ‘recruiting business’. Specifically, 
Jacques had beating orders for Earl Bulwer’s Norwich Regiment.143 The crucial connection, 
between the independent regiments and London’s ‘crimp houses’ was made explicit in prints 
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produced by Cruikshank (Print 2), but has been overlooked in Stevenson’s analysis.144 ‘Fired by 
indignation’ crowds gathered a second time on the evening of 15 August and gutted the 
properties of both Hanau and Jacques before being dispersed by the Horse Guards.145 On the 
evening of 16 August the coroner’s inquest heard a variety of contradictory evidence and 
delivered the equally confused verdict of ‘accidental death in endeavouring to escape from 
illegal confinement from a house of ill fame’.146 Hanau and Jacques were then released without 
charge.147 Early the following morning, crowd attacks resumed, this time in neighbouring 
Craig’s Court, where the King’s Head, owned by William Ostliff was targeted. At the time, 
there were a number of recruits from the Norwich Regiment housed in Ostliff’s tavern.148 
Crowds of 2-5,000 people shouted ‘blast their eyes we will have them out’, the front door of the 
house was taken off its hinges, and its sign ‘removed in triumph’.149 For over a week, rioting 
continued, with attacks upon recruiting houses taking place in the vicinities of Charing Cross, 
Fleet Street and Shoreditch (Map 1). 
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There is some debate amongst historians regarding how the 1794 crimp riots should be 
interpreted. For both Gilmour and Linebaugh these disturbances were primarily instigated by 
London’s radical societies.150 The evidence for this interpretation rests largely upon the opinion 
of Patrick Colquhoun who claimed that the ‘Corresponding Societies [were] at the bottom of the 
whole’.151 Colquhoun arrived at this judgement after discovering a seditious anti-war handbill, 
which condemned the ‘villains who kidnap and impress the poor’.152 Although the bill had 
evidently been printed and circulated by 8 August, this does not seem to be sufficient evidence 
to justify Colquhoun’s claims that the death of Howe, and the rioting outside Hanau’s house, 
were somehow premeditated by the LCS.153 In any case, as a Middlesex JP, Colquhoun was 
somewhat removed from the early stages of the protests which took place in the jurisdiction of 
Westminster.154 The involvement of radicals was rather more complex than Colquhoun allowed 
for. 
Officially, the LCS executive committee set their faces against the violence of the crowd and 
denied any involvement in the crimp riots.155 However, some ultra-radicals were prepared to 
capitalize upon the disorders, by attempting to influence the riots in a revolutionary direction.156 
On 19 August, for example, inflammatory handbills were circulated outside the White Horse, 
Whitcomb Street, encouraging the crowd to ‘Strike’ and ‘be avenged of the Murderers’.157 While 
on 20 August, the most destructive day of rioting, spy reports claim Dr Robert Watson and 
‘young [Henry] Eaton’ had incited the crowd in Shoe Lane.158 From their beginnings in Shoe 
Lane, a series of attacks on recruiting houses commenced in the east of the city with several 
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rendezvous in Holborn and Shoreditch being totally ‘destroyed’ (Map 1).159 On 22 August, after 
rioting had largely subsided, seditious bills were found in Grubb Street160 and on 23 August, 
Watson and two other men were apprehended in Smithfield, ‘with pen and ink’ before them, 
composing further revolutionary bills.161 One of these men, Robert Scott, turned informant, 
while Watson and Barrow were convicted for attempting to reignite the disturbances.162 We 
know from Scott’s reports to the Lord Mayor that Barrow, Watson, and Henry Eaton, were 
founding members of a shadowy ‘new formed’ political club with a more revolutionary bent 
than the LCS.163 However, it is clear that much of the subversive activity of these ultra-radicals 
took place after the riots had commenced. Stevenson’s interpretation that radical handbills were 
merely ‘fuel to a fire that was already raging’ is therefore convincing. However, his conclusion, 
that the crimp riots were, ‘in the main … the outcome of rumour during a period of intense 
recruitment’, requires considerable revision.164 
Rumours were often an important ingredient within the complex matrix of riot, and 
exaggerated claims of crimping, certainly surfaced in the radical press at this time.165 However, 
as George Rudé has argued, it is important to distinguish between the apparent ‘trigger’ and 
the underlying cause of popular tumult.166 In the case of the crimp riots, Stevenson has 
dramatically underestimated the reality of coercive recruitment practices in the capital, and the 
close connection between crimping and the independent regiments. The death of Howe 
exposed this connection clearly in Johnson’s Court. However, further evidence can be found in 
the Secretary-at-War’s letters. In the vicinity of Whitechapel, for example, William Wickham 
voiced his concerns about crimping as early as January 1794.167 In May, Wickham reported that 
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two men, Higginbottom (or Inkingbottom) and Noble were running a notorious recruiting 
house168  ‘in [a] most cruel and disgraceful manner’. Cries were heard from the building, which 
alarmed the neighbourhood, and caused crowds to gather. Before constables could be 
dispatched, three men were seen being ‘forced into a coach and carried off’. Three further men 
were left behind who, under examination, claimed to have been ‘trepanned’, imprisoned in the 
house, and, through the use of ‘threats’, were forced to sign attestations in front of ‘Colonel 
Whitfield’ at the White Horse in Whitcomb Street. Prior to this report there had been ten 
different complaints lodged against Higginbottom, but he had evaded conviction by paying off 
his prosecutors. This evidence points to the sophistication of the London crimping trade but it 
also suggests that popular hostility against crimping was based on more than mere rumour. 
Wickham clearly took these reports seriously and stated that he was under ‘infinite pains to 
satisfy the Neighbourhood that these practices were not countenanced by Government’.169  
Indeed, an important source of legitimation for the crimp rioters, was the belief that the 
magistracy and the government had done too little to curtail the crimping trade. This can be 
inferred from the determined purposefulness of the crowd during the disorders. More than one 
commentator noted that the violence of the crowd was directed exclusively towards the 
destruction of houses of rendezvous.170 As the editor of the Morning Chronicle reported, ‘in no 
instance … has the mob shown the least disposition to do anything more than put a stop to the 
atrocious abuse which they erroneously think the magistrates are not inclined to punish’.171 The 
belief that London’s magistrates were prepared to countenance crimps was encouraged by the 
fact that both Hanau and Jacques were released without charge. However, radical authors also 
vigorously championed the notion that the crimps were in league with those in power. In one 
satirical play, which heavily insinuated the government’s complicity in Howe’s death, the 
principle protagonist, ‘Captain Cut-Throat’, proclaimed ‘we are well protected by those in 
power, and e’en the justices will not be much inclined to punish us for our activity in raising 
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men’.172 Both the LCS and the anonymous authors of revolutionary handbills claimed that 
‘crimps, kidnappers, and manstealers [sic.]’ enjoyed the protection of ‘venal courtiers’ and the 
civil power.173 London’s authorities vociferously denied these claims. Sergeant Kirby, of the 
Queen’s Square Police Office, insisted that both magistrates and ministers ‘held an abhorrence 
towards crimping and kidnapping’.174 However, the fact remained, that there were few high-
profile prosecutions of crimps.175 Moreover, only in March 1795, after the Duke of York was 
appointed Commander-in-Chief, did the army issue a General Order forbidding the use of 
civilian middlemen and rendezvous houses.176  
Despite this edict, crimping and popular hostility to the practice spilled over into 1795. This 
continuity has rarely been recognized by historians.177 However, the evidence is plentiful. In 
January 1795 a crowd gutted a house on London Road, St George’s Fields, where magistrates 
found several recruits handcuffed inside.178 Spontaneous outbursts also occurred in April 
against crimps based at the Rising Sun in Westminster.179 Much to the annoyance of the 
magistracy, radical agitators continued to argue that crimps had official sanction.180 ‘Remember, 
Citizens, these dungeons of crimping-houses could not exist … if there were not police officers 
in league with the wretches who committed these depredations’.181 By the summer, however, 
the political situation in London was significantly altered. The LCS had grown in strength 
helped by increasing war weariness and the rapid inflation of food prices.182 Moreover, as E.P. 
Thompson has argued, the attempts of the Pitt ministry to prosecute the LCS leadership in 1794 
discouraged many moderate reformers and gave succour to the revolutionary wing of the 
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club.183 By 29 July, the LCS was sufficiently confident to hold a large open-air meeting in St 
George’s Fields, pressing the government for peace and reform. John Gale Jones addressed the 
crowd of 10,000, stating ‘if they could not find relief for their grievances by legal and 
constitutional representation, they should take the law into their own hands’.184 A fortnight later 
(12 August), protests were again seen outside William Ostliff’s tavern in Craig’s Court. 
Curiously, this disturbance seems to have been entirely fomented by a Guardsman, John Lewis, 
who was ejected from the King’s Head for his unruly behaviour. Lewis raised a mob with the 
cry of ‘crimps’ and, despite a constable searching the building and finding no evidence of 
kidnapping, the crowd continued to pull down the house.185  The attack on the King’s Head 
sparked several days of rioting (13-16) with crowd actions occurring primarily south of the 
river, in St George’s Fields, but also in Clerkenwell, Soho, and Moorfields (Map 1). 
London’s radical underground had a much greater influence upon the course of the riots of 
1795. Revolutionary handbills, rather than appearing after the event, as they had done in 1794, 
were quickly produced and ‘the most violent and inflammatory papers’ were said to have been 
‘stuck up everywhere with impunity’.186 At the height of rioting on 14 August, the High Sherriff 
of Surrey reported that a carefully prepared handbill was passed to soldiers policing protests in 
St George’s Fields.187 The bill was a persuasive call to the cause ‘liberty’, as well as an attempt to 
seduce the soldiery from their duty, ‘let soldiers protect the Rights of Citizens and Citizens will 
avenge the wrongs of soldiers’.188 Furthermore, the targets of the crowd were also more overtly 
political in this year. Downing Street was twice assailed by the crowd (on 13 and 14 August), 
and several of Pitt’s windows were smashed, leaving one undersecretary in fear of bloody 
revolution.189 John Hartland, who was later hanged, headed the crowd in St George’s with cries 
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of ‘No King, Damn Pitt’.190 However, the issue of crimping was still foremost, with known 
rendezvous houses, such as the Sash (Moorfields) and the Royal George (Southwark), being the 
principle targets. In both 1794 and 1795 the crimp riots were born of Londoner’s instinctive 
hatred of soldiers, their increasing disenchantment with the war, and their first-hand 
knowledge of coercive recruiting. The protests were encouraged by a popular sense that 
crimping was closely connected to the officially sanctioned independent regiments and was 
carried on with the ‘avowed connivance of those in power’. This sense, moreover, was carefully 
nurtured by the radical societies.191 The curtailed liberty of the ‘crimped’ recruit was used by 
radicals as the perfect allegory for a people denied their full rights. In both the particular case of 
the kidnapped recruit, and in the broader struggle for universal suffrage, radicals argued, that 
government was responsible for devaluing English ‘liberty’. 
1.4.  Supplementary Militia Riots Revisited, 1796-7 
Evidence of crimping and coercion declined dramatically from the autumn of 1795 when the 
independent regiments were discontinued and their recruits were drafted into established army 
regiments. During the remainder of the war, recruitment figures for the regular army never 
exceeded those of 1794-5. In 1796, as we have seen, the government instead turned its attention 
to increasing the size of the English Militia by raising a ‘supplementary’ force of 59,441 men.192 
This plan was, however, greeted with hostility from various quarters. Unlike crimping, which 
primarily affected the poor young men who frequented the pothouses of the metropolis, the 
Militia Acts were felt most deeply in the countryside. The settled rural poor and the small 
farmer, could not easily escape the militia ballot by absconding, in the same way that the 
youthful journeyman could.193 Neither could they afford the time off to train as a militiaman.194 
Their only means of evading personal service was to buy into militia insurance schemes. Thus, 
even the existing militia legislation, according to Major Drinkwater, was widely considered to 
be ‘an oppressive money bill’.195 When the supplementary militia scheme was announced, the 
Act was seen as an ‘upper-class plot’ to finance the defence of the nation by taking from the 
                                                   
190 HO 47/20, ff. 166, Summary of Evidence in case of Rex vs. Hartland, Williams, Webb and Maxey, [April 
1796]. 
191 Anon., Reflections on the Pernicious Custom of Recruiting by Crimps, (London, 1795), p. 19. 
192 37 Geo. III cap.3 amended by cap. 22, Supplementary Militia Acts (1796). 
193 Western, The English Militia, p. 283; Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p. 174. 
194 Randall, Riotous Assemblies, p. 168. 




pockets of the lower strata of society, and by forcing the poor to fight in defence of the rich.196 In 
parliament, Fox and his supporters, such as John Curwen, criticised ministers for hiding behind 
‘the bugbear of invasion’, and opposed the new levies as unjustified.197 After the Act was passed 
in early November, the Deputy Lieutenants were called upon in the counties to draw up lists of 
adult males eligible to serve. In opposition to this process protests erupted in the English 
countryside. In Penrith, Cumberland, for example, the magistrates overseeing the 
administration of the militia ballot at the George Inn were interrupted by a well-armed crowd 
formed from the surrounding villages of the Northern Pennines. The protestors banged their 
bludgeons on the door, shouted ‘No New Militia’, seized the militia lists, tearing some, and 
consigning others to the fire.198 
A number of historians have examined these tumults, and the earlier anti-militia riots of 1757, 
of which they are said to have been a ‘carbon copy’.199 However, some of the arguments 
surrounding their meaning requires updating. It is frequently repeated, in line with the 
arguments of John Western, that the anti-militia riots were ‘mainly’ the result of 
‘misunderstanding’ on the part of the protestors. It is argued that the rioters were motivated by 
the erroneous fear that, if their name was drawn in the militia ballot, they would to be sent into 
the army and, from thence, to their death in the West Indies. Scholars have set these rustic 
rioters straight, by pointing to the Militia Acts themselves, which only ever required service in 
Britain.200 However, this is a far too literal reading of the militia laws. In the 1750s, recruits had 
been systematically deceived into enlisting in the regular army, with the same promise that they 
would only be required to serve at home.201 Furthermore, in the period under investigation, and 
particularly between 1796 and 1802, militiamen were often officially encouraged to transfer to 
the army.202 Usually bounties were offered as an incentive, however, it was not unknown for 
militia companies to be ‘drilled to death’, their privates given ill-fitting clothing and their lives 
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made a misery, until they relented and agreed to transfer to the regulars.203 The English Militia 
was also called upon to fight in Ireland during the 1798 rebellion. Thus to claim that opponents 
of the Militia Acts had misunderstood what these laws meant is rather condescending. 
Contemporaries were keenly aware of the abuses to which the militia could be subjected and 
they were justly sceptical about the purported limits placed on militia service. 
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Map 2 - Anti-Militia Riots in England and County Militia Quotas per 1,000 of the Population (October 1796 - 
January 1797).204 
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A second point which needs reviewing is the geographical distribution of these protests. Using 
assize records, Home Office sources, newspapers and some county archival material, it is clear 
that reported instances of rioting fell predominantly in the counties of Lincolnshire and 
Northamptonshire, with a further concentration in Cumberland and Westmoreland (Map 2). 
Charlesworth’s map has, therefore, overlooked the concentration of protests in the Northwest of 
the country.205 Furthermore, by comparing population density with the county militia quotas, it 
can be shown just how unevenly the burden of service fell across the country.206 In the 
populous, and rapidly growing, counties of Warwickshire and Staffordshire, for example, after 
the Supplementary Militia Act was introduced, just seven men per 1,000 of the population were 
required to serve in the militia. While in Lincolnshire the number was fifteen and in 
Cumberland and Westmoreland it was twelve and fourteen respectively.  Therefore, these 
relatively sparsely populated counties were expected to contribute around twice the number of 
militiamen per head of the population. A contributing factor to the distribution of protests was 
the manner in which the Act was administered at a local level. In Nottingham, for example, 
there were fears that radicals would use the militia ballots as a means of fomenting 
disturbances, as they had done in Norwich.207 Nottingham’s urban elites, however, formed a 
subscription which provided bounty money enough to secure seventy willing substitutes. There 
was therefore no compiling of the militia lists and no balloting to resist.208 Similarly, in Essex, 
where a relatively large levy of 2,700 men was demanded for the supplementary militia, the 
Militia Act was ‘so unpopular, that justices and Deputy Lieutenants in some subdivisions 
declined balloting for the men’. In Essex, the supplementary militia was raised slowly and 
                                                   
205 Certainly rioting in Penrith, mentioned above, does not appear to have been included. J.N. Caple, 'The 
Militia Riots', in A. Charlesworth (ed.), An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain; 1548-1900 (London: Croom 
Helm, 1983), p. 128. 
206 Colley has also pointed to the uneven distribution of the militia levies. However, the full extent of the 
disequilibrium is rarely discussed in relation to the anti-militia riots and can now be demonstrated using 
the county data produced by Wrigley. Colley, Britons, p. 293-4; E.A. Wrigley, Early English Censuses, Table 
4.1. 
207 For fears of disorder in Nottingham see HO 50/26, Newark – Portland, 22 November 1796. Radicals in 
Norwich did contribute to anti-militia disturbances see Western, English Militia in the Eighteenth Century, 
p. 295; Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p. 146; Thale (ed.), Selections, p. 376. 




gradually.209 Therefore many areas of the country were unaffected by rioting because local 
rulers and private individuals conspired to mitigate the effects of compulsion.210 
Finally, a word should be said about the status of the anti-militia protestors. In Lincolnshire a 
number of historians have noted that it was workers from the fens who descended upon the 
towns to destroy the militia lists.211 In the Northwest, a similar scenario emerged, with the 
‘miscreant mountaineers’ from the Pennines invading Penrith and Ulverston to disrupt the 
meetings of the Deputy Lieutenants.212 Historically, labourers from the marshes of Lincolnshire 
were renowned, both for their ability to live off the fenlands, and for their spirited defence of 
those common lands.213 While in Penrith, crowds were reportedly led by a number of skilled 
workers, including two blacksmiths and a joiner from the mountainous village of Croglin.214 
When Frederick Eden visited the tiny parish in December 1794 he reported the existence of only 
two blacksmiths and four joiners. The protestors were therefore highly valued members of an 
isolated community, precisely the kind of workers which the inhabitants of Croglin could ill 
afford to lose to the militia ballot. Eden also noted that there was not a single pauper residing in 
Croglin.215 This suggests that the ‘mountaineers’ of the Pennines, and the anti-militia rioters in 
general, rose in opposition to the Militia Acts in order to defend their economic 
independence.216 Like crimping, the militia bill was resented as an infringement upon the 
‘freeborn’ Englishman’s right to sell his labour as he pleased. Moreover, there was a strong 
sense amongst rioters that they were supported by certain ‘great men’. In Ulverston, the 
protestors confronting the magistracy quoted Curwen’s speech in the Commons and referred to 
the MP as ‘their friend’.217 While in Lincolnshire, protestors claimed to have the backing of large 
farmers, who were opposed to the increased parish rates which inevitably followed an 
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extension of the militia quotas.218 Far from ‘misinformed’, the anti-militia protestors appear to 
have closely considered the potentially detrimental effects of the Act for their communities. 
Particularly in thinly populated areas of the country, the poor responded with hostility to the 
unequal burden of service which the Acts entailed, and sought to use landed objections to the 
quotas as a further justification for their actions.   
1.5.  Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has demonstrated that the political controversy surrounding Britain’s 
involvement in the French Wars was reflected in the government’s struggle to raise men. 
Radical groups strongly opposed the war and, in some places, were in a position to discourage 
enlistment. Conversely, loyalists emphasized nationalistic pride and the glory of British victory 
over the French. A host of patriotic productions were therefore aimed at creating an idealized 
image of enlistment within the popular psyche. Undoubtedly this loyalist effort had some 
impact, though its effects upon recruitment are difficult to discern. What is clear, however, is 
that there was a darker side to the recruitment process which also impressed itself upon the 
minds of the poor. To a much greater extent than is often recognized by historians, tricks, 
frauds, and coercion were employed, particularly by the officially sanctioned independent 
regiments, to compel men to serve. Where concrete evidence of ‘crimping’ came to light it 
produced scandal and, in London at least, the headquarters of unscrupulous recruiters became 
targets for popular violence. Similarly, government’s attempts to extend the scope of the Militia 
Acts were also seen as unjust. The protests seen in this period, against recruiting agents and the 
militia quotas, therefore confirm the existence of an instinctive aversion to armed service within 
the ranks of the working classes. More specifically, anti-recruitment riots point to a strongly-
held belief that military service should be entirely voluntary. Any attempt to compel men to 
serve in the army or the militia was seen as an infringement upon popular morality.219  Ideally, 
the individual, ‘the freeborn Englishman’, should be left unimpeded to make his own decision 
about whether or not to enter the armed forces. As it will be seen in the following chapter, this 
decision was most often made on the basis of economic considerations. 
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2. Economics of Enlistment, 1793-1805. 
Government and its agents undoubtedly employed elements of coercion and compulsion to 
man the army and militia. However, popular protests against crimping and the militia ballots 
ensured that compulsive measures could not be relied upon by the British state. We know that 
the numbers of balloted men serving in the militia were only ever a small fraction of those who 
volunteered as substitutes. In terms of the regular army, we may never know the number of 
men illegally impressed or tricked into the service. However, the evidence suggests that most 
regular soldiers ‘volunteered’ their service. In this chapter the pre-enlistment status of the 
typical army recruit will be investigated and their motives for enlistment examined. It will be 
argued, contrary to the traditional view of the military, that army recruits tended to be a fairly 
representative cross section of the working classes. Furthermore, by using working-class 
autobiographies, recruitment statistics, and the correspondence of officers, it will be shown that, 
while enlistment motivations were often personal, in general terms, economic considerations 
were of preeminent importance. Finally, this assertion will be reinforced through an analysis of 
the grievances which provoked several mutinies among independent army regiments in 1795.  
2.1.  ‘Scum of the earth’? The Pre-enlistment Status of Army Recruits 
Wellington’s infamous characterization of the rank and file within the British army as ‘the mere 
scum of the earth’ has coloured many traditional accounts of the Georgian soldiery.1 In the first 
half of the twentieth century military historians tended to wholeheartedly endorse the Iron 
Duke’s remarks. Glover, for example, refers to ‘drunken thugs’, while Fortescue and Oram 
point to the ‘irreclaimable’ criminal element within the army.2 Over time, views on the British 
soldier have softened slightly, but we may still find in more recent historical accounts, a 
Georgian army composed of the ‘very lowest class of men’, ‘desperate individuals’ and ‘social 
outcasts’.3 In part the ‘scum of the earth’ portrayal has persisted because, beneath the obvious 
class bias of Wellington’s appraisal, their lies a grain of truth. There is evidence that criminals, 
                                                   
1 P.H. Stanhope, Notes on Conversations with Duke of Wellington, (New York: Longmans, 1888), p. 14. 
2 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, p. 175; Fortescue, A History of the British Army Vol. 3, p. 518; C. Oman, 
Wellington's Army, 1809-1814 (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), pp. 212, 213. 
3 Respectively, McGuffie, 'Recruiting the Ranks’, p. 50; S. H. Myerly, British Military Spectacle, (London: 




beggars, and Irish rebels were all drawn into the ranks of the British army.4 In short, the army 
did contain a certain number of men who, in the eyes of the upper and middle classes, would 
have been seen as the ‘dregs’ of society.5  However, it is important to evaluate the social 
complexion of the army as a whole and to place the ‘scum of the earth’ portrayal in a broader 
historical context. The numbers of felons and vagrants to be found within the ranks of the army 
are not significant enough to justify the many exaggerated claims which are often made about 
the eighteenth-century soldiery. 
For their part, historians of crime have often encouraged the ‘scum of the earth’ portrayal of the 
British army by placing heavy emphasis upon the impressment of criminals into the armed 
forces.6 For Radzinowicz, the practice of enlisting criminals represented, an ‘integral part of the 
penal system’.7 Certainly, the highly discretionary nature of the eighteenth-century criminal 
justice system provided a number of channels through which criminals could be transferred 
into the army. Criminals could petition the Home Secretary for a royal pardon on condition of 
serving in the armed forces, they might be given the option of serving in lieu of punishment by 
a magistrate sitting at the Quarter Sessions, or offenders could be given the choice, by a 
prosecutor, of enlisting instead of facing trial. 8 Clearly the impressment of criminals was an 
important judicial resource, which operated at several levels of the legal process. However, we 
should be careful not to exaggerate the extent to which offenders were used to fill the ranks. 
Although contemporaries frequently claimed that, during wartime, the prisons were drained by 
the army, petitions for the release of criminals appear to have been closely scrutinized by the 
Home Secretary. Careful consideration was given to the age and health of the would-be recruit 
as well as his former crimes and the extent of his contrition.9 While at the level of the Quarter 
Session, there was also highly selective filtering of offenders. Between 1790-99, the 
Hertfordshire Quarter Sessions, for example, permitted just four criminals to enlist as soldiers in 
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lieu of punishment.10 It was therefore only a minority of offenders who were given the option of 
enlistment and the wholesale drafting of prison populations was never resorted to. 
Furthermore, as Stephen Conway has argued, in ‘military terms’, the numbers of offenders 
accepted into the army was ‘miniscule’. During the American War of Independence, for 
example, Conway found that as few as 500 conditional royal pardons were handed down.11 In 
our own period, comparable figures can be mustered. Between 1799-1802, for example, 1,200 
prisoners were sent from Britain to serve as soldiers in the West Indies.12 This figure pales in 
comparison to the 70,000 men recruited in total by the army over the same period.13 
Furthermore, this data points to the practice of ghettoizing impressed criminals within certain 
‘penal’ regiments who were constantly on service overseas. Regiments such as the New South 
Wales regiment and the Royal African Corps were partly recruited by these means.14 However, 
even in the regiments serving in the West Indies, where Buckley suggests many, if not all, 
prisoners were sent, the criminal element constituted, at most, one fifth of the whole.15 In part, 
internal opposition from within the army itself, limited the degree to which convicts were used 
as a military resource. Military commanders believed that too many impressed convicts would 
be detrimental to discipline, morale, and to the image of the army.16 A further limitation was the 
fact that, due to the unsanitary conditions within England’s hulks and goals, and due to 
prisoners ‘concealing every kind of bodily infirmity’, some pardoned convicts were found to be 
unfit by army surgeons and were simply released.17 
Similar problems were also attendant to the impressment of vagrants. The vagrancy laws of 
1711, 1744, and 1792, permitted magistrates to send itinerant men without ‘visible means of 
support’ or without ‘lawful employment or calling’ into the army and navy.18 However, in 
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London, where the problem of vagrancy was believed to be most acute, justices appear to have 
provided a trickle of vagrant recruits rather than a flood.19 The majority of ‘sturdy beggars’ and 
vagrants appear to have been sent for short spells in the Bridewell and then passed to their 
parish of origin rather than being turned over to the armed forces.20 Partly this was because 
many of the capital’s vagrants were physically unsuitable for military service. In a survey of 
2,000 London beggars, conducted by the Mendicity Society in 1803, ninety per cent were found 
to be women, a fact which may reflect the paucity of female employment in the capital.21 Of the 
remaining male vagrants, eighteen per cent were found to be discharged veterans.22 While the 
young male vagrants of Marylebone were characterized as ‘blind, sick, or disabled’.23 These 
difficulties are reflected in the statistics produced by Colquhoun between 1794-5 which relate to 
all offenders (both criminals and vagrants) incarcerated by the higher and lower courts of the 
metropolis. These returns reveal that of 4,462 offenders discharged from prisons in London, 
Middlesex, and Surrey, just 216  inmates (4.8 per cent) were released into the army and navy in 
that year.24 If we calculate that half of these men went into the army (108) and that the rest of the 
England turned over a similar proportion of offenders per head of the population (x10), then the 
resulting national figure of 1,080 impressed convicts and vagrants represents just 5.3 per cent of 
men recruited in England in 1795.25 The criminal and vagrant element within the army was a 
therefore a small but significant minority of the whole. 
Recent military histories have rightly been sceptical of the ‘scum of the earth’ stereotype. For 
Edward Coss, and others, such a damning assessment of the common soldier is difficult to 
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square with the relative efficiency with which the British army performed on the battlefield.26 
Economic historians interested in the study of ‘anthropometry’, have also sought to probe more 
deeply into the height, health, and pre-enlistment status of the ordinary recruit.27 Working from 
regimental descriptions books, which record the personal details of each new recruit, several 
studies have found that the men who made up the regular army were a rather more 
heterogeneous group than is often allowed. From these sources Coss has recently demonstrated 
that just over half of the army’s recruits in the Napoleonic period were drawn from England, a 
third were Irish-born and fourteen per cent were Scottish with the remainder made up of 
foreign recruits. The majority of soldiers were found to be less than twenty-five years of age.28 
Upon enlistment recruits were sworn before a magistrate and were asked not only for their age 
and place of birth but also for their trade or calling. Within certain regiments, regimental 
descriptions books survive and are of sufficient quality to allow the historian to reconstruct 
these pre-enlistment trades. Both Kevin Linch and Floud et al conclude from their own analyses 
of this data that, while recruits for the army were certainly working class, they were ‘not drawn 
from a particularly unusual section of that class’.29 Brumwell has argued along similar lines, for 
an earlier period, that the composition of the mid-Georgian army ‘mirrored that of the 
workforce in general’. The most common occupational designation recorded for the rank and 
file is that of ‘labourer’. Many historians have read this to mean that, in England’s 
predominantly rural economy, most recruits were farm hands.30 However it is notable that, 
alongside these unskilled wage-earners, the skilled artisan trades are similarly well represented. 
By sampling a number of regiments, Linch suggests that army recruits were drawn roughly 
equally from waged labourers on the one hand and skilled artisans, with some degree of 
independence, on the other.31 
There are some difficulties with repeating studies from the Napoleonic period for the 1790s due 
to the patchy survival of regimental records. However, an attempt has been made here to work 
from the records of the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards and the Royal Artillery. Neither regiment 
can truly be considered to be representative of the army as a whole, but both corps left behind 
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fulsome documentation of enlists which are worthy of investigation.32 A database was created 
of all recruits attested between 1790-1802 and born in either the predominantly rural counties of 
Lincolnshire, Sussex, and Gloucestershire or in the urban areas of London, Sheffield, 
Nottingham, and Manchester. The intention being to capture a roughly equal number of urban- 
and rural-born recruits. Each recruit’s pre-enlistment trade was then recorded and categorized 
following the modified version of the Booth-Armstrong economic classifications used by the 
authors of the Westminster Historical Database. Given their preponderance in the regimental 
records, an additional category of ‘generic labourer’ was added, as well as one for ‘unclassified’ 
for those whose occupation was left blank.33 The pre-enlistment occupational breakdowns for 
both regiments bolster the findings of Linch and Floud et al. (Figure 1). Not only are men from 
manufacturing sectors present but, in the case of the Royal Artillery they actually predominate.  
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Figure 1 – Graph Showing Pre-Enlistment Trades of English Soldiers Attested, 1790-1802 
 
The Royal Artillery drew a large number of men from the tool manufacturing sector, 
particularly the Sheffield cutlery trade, into the ranks of the regiment. In fact, manufacturers 
born in Sheffield (n.170) were more numerous within the Royal Artillery than all the ‘labourers’ 
born in the counties of Gloucestershire, Lincolnshire, and Sussex combined (n. 150). It may be 
the case that men with skills in metalwork were actively sought to serve as gunners in the 
artillery. However, even in the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards, where there was no such 
requirement, we can still see significant numbers of skilled men from the dress manufacturing 
sectors (framework knitters, shoemakers, and breeches makers) as well as workers involved in 
the manufacture of woollen and cotton materials. Those included in the ‘other sectors’ include 
dealers, shopkeepers, and domestic servants, all of whom are present in both regiments, but 
only in very small numbers. The army clearly drew men from various parts of the economy. 
The suggestion that soldiers were drawn solely from the dregs of society is therefore impossible 
to substantiate. The remainder of this chapter will therefore seek to examine the motivations 
which drove these ordinary men to enlist in the army.  
2.2.  Personal Motivations for Enlistment 
After the defeat of the French at Waterloo there was a strong appetite in England, particularly 
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contributed to Britain’s success.34 Both David Vincent, and more recently, Emma Griffin, have 
clearly demonstrated the potential of autobiographical sources for reconstructing the lives and 
experiences of the English working classes during the Industrial Revolution.35 A handful of 
these life writings reflect upon long careers, or short spells, in the military and can be used to 
reconstruct the various reason which motivated ordinary citizens to join the armed forces. 
Alongside these autobiographies, many popular prints from the period explore the narrative of 
‘going for a soldier’ and these too provide a valuable insight into the motivations for enlistment. 
Historians who have worked with these sources have found that the reasons behind enlistment 
were often as varied as army recruits were themselves. Both Colley and Linch have emphasised 
a tangle of personal reasons, both ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors, which operated upon men who 
enlisted into the armed forces.36  
Autobiographical accounts often emphasize the perceived excitement and adventure of 
soldiering as an important lure for recruits.37 Allen Davenport, for example, in addition to his 
political convictions and patriotic sentiments, left his work as a veterinary surgeon’s assistant 
and joined the Windsor Foresters, in order to satisfy his desire to see more of the world.38 
Similarly, John Vine Hall stressed that joining the colours was alluring to his ‘restless spirit’.39 
Edward Costello enlisted in 1806 after ‘imbibing martial ardour’ from an old veteran who told 
him tales of ‘glory’.40 As we have seen, conservative propagandists attempted to capitalize upon 
the heroic image of the common soldier and particularly focused upon the appeal of the 
military uniform. As part of the ‘military spectacle’, officers were required to wear their finest 
uniforms while on the recruiting service, and they were often accompanied by musicians.41 
Even Joseph Cottle’s anti-war poetry acknowledged the persuasive sartorial display of the 
recruiting party: 
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No rustic rags are we compell'd to wear 
We dress like Princes, and like Princes fare; 
Behold our cloaths [sic.], gay as autumnal trees 
Behold our plumes nod to the passing breeze.42 
Both John Shipp and Joseph Mayett were drawn to military service partly due to the ‘finery and 
shrill music’ of a recruiting party passing through their villages. It is perhaps significant that, at 
the time of their enlistment, both men were young farm hands, unused to the colour and 
clamour provided by the cleanly presented soldiers.43 It may be that the success of this kind of 
pageantry was confined to the rural setting. 
In addition to the spectacle of the military, Lynn has powerfully argued that young men were 
often drawn to the ‘sexualized libertine lifestyle’ of army life.44 Certainly, contemporary 
printmakers frequently encouraged the association between the wearing of a uniform and the 
attentions of young women.45 Ballad writers also played upon the theme, by suggesting that the 
‘jolly soldier’ was in a position to make a cuckold of the ‘silly ploughman’: 
For when we come into a town 
We make ourselves be known 
We hug and kiss the pretty girls 
And call them all our own.46 
Few ex-soldier’s autobiographies explicitly mention enlisting for sex. However, more than one 
of these sources is written in the form of a ‘confessional ‘ in which the author’s early years, 
including those spent serving in the army, are referred to obliquely as a time of sin, before they 
found religion and moral rectitude.47 Beyond the sexual appeal of soldiering more respectable 
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notions of gender might also induce a man to enlist.48 As Charles O’Neil described, during the 
Napoleonic Wars, ‘the fair young damsels of our dear Island … were scarcely willing to regard 
any young man as honourable or brave who did not enlist’.49 However, the association between 
soldiering and manly qualities, such as honour and bravery, was not universally upheld. As we 
have seen, there was a strong dislike for the profession amongst sections of the working class 
and this was not the sole preserve of men. Joseph Mayett’s mother was extremely disappointed 
when she found her son had enlisted and asked repeatedly for an explanation.50 Similarly, Allen 
Davenport found the romance he attempted to strike up with one ‘Highland Jane’ was undone 
by her parents being ‘strongly prejudiced against the profession of arms’.51 For private soldiers, 
at least, the sex-appeal of the uniform had limits. We should therefore be cautious about making 
generalizations from the fanciful and middle-class accounts of sexual and civil-military relations 
presented in the works of Jane Austen.52  
For some men enlistment in the army might represent a means of escaping an unwanted 
relationship. Kent has used eighteenth-century Westminster settlement records to argue that 
poor men often enlisted in the army as a means of abandoning their families. In St Martin-in-
the-Fields, Kent found that over ten per cent of ‘abandoned’ wives examined by parish officials 
claimed their husbands had joined the army and a further five per cent had joined the navy. The 
true figure may be somewhat higher as a further fourteen per cent of these women reported 
their husbands to have simply ‘gone abroad’ or ‘gone to sea.53 Snell also found that soldiers 
headed the list of deserting husbands and claimed that enlistment was the ‘institutionally 
accepted form of familial desertion’.54 This research is supported by one light-hearted 
contemporary print, accompanied by a brief song, in which a rural labourer finds himself 
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enlisting with a recruiting sergeant in order to end the ‘eternal disputes’ which he and his wife 
engage in.55  
However, Jennine Hurl-Eamon has challenged the ‘fiction of female dependence’ and argued 
that enlistment by married men was not always the result of marital disharmony. Some married 
men might enlist as part of a family survival strategy.56 In Lancashire, for example, William 
Rowbottom noted that a stream of men enlisted in the early 1790s leaving their wives and 
children behind them.57 Economic historians have noted that the introduction of large-scale 
technologies, such as the spinning jenny, in Lancashire created work for the women and 
children while simultaneously suppressing the wages of men.58 In the face of protoindustrial 
reorganization the enlistment of married men was often seen as beneficial to the household 
economy. In Wigan it was noted that soldier’s wives  ‘turn[ed] Weaver’ and ‘lived better’ after 
their husbands enlisted than before.59 Thus not all married men showed a casual indifference to 
their families and their fate. Enlistment could be both consistent with, or contrary to, familial 
obligations.60 
The personal stories penned by recruits emphasize the competing meanings of soldiering and 
frequently suggest mixed motives for enlistment. Mayett enlisted, not just because of the draw 
of the dashing ‘Corporals and music men’, but because of a feud between himself and his 
master’s wife, who accused him of an improper ‘correspondence’ with one of her 
maidservants.61 Likewise, John Shipp was amenable to the charms of the recruiting party, 
primarily because he was looking to escape the cruelty of his master, who frequently beat him 
with a ‘long hunting whip’. Although the army was technically forbidden from accepting 
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apprentices like Shipp, he was accepted aged thirteen, after telling a sergeant he was a 
labourer.62 The eighteenth century was an era when masters had a ‘general right of correction’ 
over their apprentices.63 It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, to find many apprentices 
attempting to escape their indentures by enlisting as soldiers.64 Apprentice boys may also have 
been attracted by the belief that soldiers lived a life of leisure. As Brumwell points out, ‘in an 
era when it was not unusual for craftsmen to toil for fourteen hours a day, the sheer drudgery 
of civilian life should not be dismissed as a motivating factor’.65 One ex-soldier admitted to 
being enticed by, what he perceived to be, the ‘soldier’s holiday life’.66 Another simply disliked 
the trade of a nail-maker.67 Many military commanders believed the army absorbed large 
numbers of men ‘idle in their Disposition’. Arthur Young concurred, claiming that the ‘truly 
industrious’ do not enlist, only the feckless.68 As we shall see, the army certainly did tap into 
pools of surplus labour within the English economy. However, we should be careful not to 
repeat contemporary prejudices and presume that all recruits were work-shy, nor should we 
accept that life in the military was entirely without toil.69 
Furthermore, as historians we should seek to move beyond anecdotal evidence and towards a 
general conclusion about soldier’s motives for enlistment. Compiling the enlistment motives of 
soldier-autobiographers is one step towards this goal. By doing so we find that most recruits 
were influenced by more than one motive. However, even among the highly self-selecting 
group of literate military autobiographers, many of whom were writing for an audience 
expecting tales of glory and gallantry, we find that the majority of recruits experienced some 
unfortunate private circumstance which pushed them into the army. Indeed, it is quite 
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surprising how few of these writers articulated a deep sense of patriotism or nationalistic 
sentiment. Most frequently, the issues of work, pay, and unemployment were advanced.70 Thus 
the relationship between recruitment and economics needs to be carefully examined. As Kevin 
Linch has pointed out, most soldiers left no explicit account of their motives for enlistment.71 It 
is important therefore that we make use of what evidence is available. Below, the statistics 
provided by both the War Office and economic historians, as well as contemporary accounts 
from newspapers, and informed observers  have been analysed. This evidence suggests that the 
real value of civilian wages, short-term fluctuations in the economy, seasonal, and structural 
unemployment each had an important impact upon levels of recruitment into the army.  
2.3.  Economics of Enlistment 
John Cookson, in part informed by the traditional view of the common soldiery as the ‘scum of 
the earth’, has argued that the army recruited a fairly consistent number of men annually, 
‘family mavericks, bastard-getters, adventurers, and so on’.72 However, contrary to Cookson’s 
suggestion, it is worth attending to the variations in levels of recruitment, which, at times, could 
be quite dramatic. To a certain degree, as Floud et al. have argued, the army had to compete 
with other working-class occupations in the labour market.73 Military life, at least in theory, 
guaranteed men ‘minimum security’ in the form of food, clothing, shelter, with a not 
insignificant amount of bounty money.74 We should not preclude the possibility that men 
considered the cost-benefits of enlistment. With this in mind, it is logical that the army would 
recruit more effectively at times when the real value of civilian wages was in decline. This 
hypothesis can be tested by taking the real wages of artisans and labourers, who together made 
up the bulk of the rank and file75, and comparing them against annual returns of levels of 
recruitment.  
In order to achieve this comparison, two real wage indices, one to give an impression of the real 
wages of rural labourers and one of urban artisans, have been taken from the work of 
Richardson and Tucker for the years 1793-1805. The real wage index for rural labourers has 
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been produced by taking an average from Richardson’s studies of Essex and Lincolnshire. In 
both studies Richardson constructed cost-of-living indices and combined these with indices of 
monetary wages of agricultural labourers to produce a single real wage index for labourers.76 
Similarly, Tucker charted fluctuations in the contract price of consumables in London and 
compared this with the monetary wages of a range of artisans in the capital.77 Although neither 
series gives us a truly national picture, nor can they be said to supply a complete measure of the 
economic welfare of these two broad groups, they do provide a point of reference for changes in 
real wages over time. These series can then be placed alongside annual returns from the War 
Office for recruitment (Figure 2).78  
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The years in which the army was most successful at procuring recruits were also those years 
when inflationary prices suddenly reduced the ability of both artisans and labourers to 
purchase commodities. The years 1795 and 1799, for example, were exceptional periods in terms 
of recruitment, but they were also moments in which the value of real wages had taken a steep 
dive. Conversely, when real wages were recovering from a slump, as they were in 1796-7 and 
again in 1802-5, the army had relatively little success in enticing recruits.79 The failure of the 
army to capitalize more effectively on the period 1800-1, when real wages were at their lowest 
point of the decade, however, may have been be the result of peace negotiations with France, 
which created the general expectation of a contraction in the strength of the army. Alternatively, 
after seven years of intensively recruiting for the army, the militia, and the navy, Britain may 
have been pushing at, what Cookson has described as, ‘the manpower ceiling’.80 A further point 
to note is the close correlation between movements in the real wages of unskilled labourers and 
levels of recruitment. In 1798, for example, labourer’s wages were relatively buoyant and 
recruitment levels relatively poor. The Duke of Gloucester complained, whilst travelling 
through Kent after the harvest of 1798 had been gathered, that he saw a ‘prodigious number of 
idle able bodied men’ while the country suffered from a ‘want of regular troops’.81 The 
following year, however, labourers’ real wages, according to Richardson’s data, dropped 16.5 
points, the most dramatic yearly fall of the decade. At the same time, 1799 was found to be the 
single most fertile year for army recruiters. This suggests that rural labourers, who were 
generally paid less than their artisanal counterparts, were less equipped to absorb falls in real 
wages and therefore more amenable to enlistment when inflation ate away at their purchasing 
power.  
However, one weakness of the above graph is that it relies upon real wage indices which 
assume that workers were in full employment. In reality, during the French Wars, only a 
minority of manufacturing sectors, such as the armaments trade in Birmingham and the Royal 
Dockyards of Portsmouth and Plymouth, could guarantee steady employment to their 
                                                   
79 Real wages were higher in 1806 than they were in 1801 according to A.D. Gayer, W. W. Rostow and A. 
J. Schwartz, The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790- 1850: An Historical, Statistical and 
Theoretical Study of Britain's Economic Development Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 81. 
80 Cookson, Armed Nation, p. 95. 
81 Frederick, Duke of Gloucester – Windham, 31 October 1798 in L. Melville (ed.), The Windham Papers: The 





workforces.82 According to Rule the war closed all overseas markets except for those in the Far 
East.83 For the majority of artisans, whose employment was uncertain the best of times, the war 
with France therefore created the conditions for under- and unemployment. This was especially 
true in the ‘grand industrial towns’, where larger manufacturing operations reliant upon the 
export trade, were conducted. Frederick Eden’s observations on conditions in Manchester, in 
the opening stages of the conflict, are worth quoting at length: 
  The stagnation of business, since the war, has induced many  
  thousand manufacturers to enter his Majesty’s service … It must be 
  confessed that, at present, constant and regular employment cannot 
  be procured by all who are inclined to work. The town would have 
  suffered much more severely than it has done, by the stagnation of 
  business, had not the Navy and Army carried off those superfluous 
  labourers, who, had they remained in Manchester without   
  employment, must have ultimately fallen on the parish ... 84 
It was not only Eden who recognized this dynamic. The satirist ‘Pasquin Shaveblock’ calculated 
(not improbably) that 60,000 button-makers and weavers from the towns of Birmingham and 
Manchester had enlisted between 1793-5 from ‘want of work’.85 Likewise, in Sheffield, radical 
writers lamented seeing ‘thousands’ of their fellow citizens ‘brought to the necessity of 
enlisting’ merely ‘from want of employ’.86 Working-class writers also provide evidence. William 
Rowbottom, for example, noted the propensity around Oldham for distressed weavers, and 
even ‘heads of families’, to go for soldiers while Thomas Jackson of Walsall reported that the 
steel buckle industry was badly affected by the loss of overseas trade. According to Jackson, 
wartime recession caused a ‘sort of periodical panic … with much privation and distress[.] [I]n 
consequence … it has driven many of my fellow townsmen to enter into the army, who under 
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fairer circumstances, would never have enlisted’.87 Certainly, in the northern industrial towns, 
economic recession at the outset of the war, and the unemployment which it generated among 
manufacturers, was intimately linked to the bumper crop of recruits produced for the army. 
Military commanders well understood the gains to be made by mopping up surplus labour in 
the industrial districts. In 1793, the Whig reformer, David Erskine, observed that the ‘populous 
manufacturing towns’ were the ‘hotbeds for recruiting the Army’.88 The Black Country was 
similarly referred to by one magistrate as a ‘grand Nursery for Soldiers and Sailors’.89 
Recruiting parties certainly tended to focus their efforts in the densely populated regions of 
England and not without reason. In Wakefield, for example, the 95th Regiment raised 500 
infantrymen at the same time that Colonel Beaumont of Bretton Hall recruited 360 light 
dragoons. Both regiments were said to have been complete within a matter of months and their 
success due to a combination of liberal bounties and ‘the extreme bad Trade’ in Yorkshire.90 The 
methods used by recruiting parties stationed in large towns are also instructive. Sergeant Bull, 
of 113th Regiment, had his party march around Birmingham, ‘sporting a pig on a spit’ and the 
editor of the Sheffield Register claimed that recruiting parties parade ‘every night with turkeys, 
geese, ducks, flitches of bacon … elevated upon poles … to attract and entice the male part of 
the swinish multitude, (who are starving for food) into the service’.91 The aggressive tactics of 
the urban recruiting party again refutes the idealized and bucolic image of recruitment 
portrayed in contemporary prints. By the Napoleonic period, the profitability of urban 
recruitment was so well established that the Duke of York could write that ‘[a]ll Recruiting is 
carried on in the large Manufacturing or Market Towns, where the lower class of people 
periodically and frequently Assemble, and not in the Country at Large’.92  
Furthermore, even when the economy was relatively stable, England’s large towns continued to 
provide the best opportunities for recruitment. Workers striking for higher wages, for example, 
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could provide the army with men. It has been observed that, during the eighteenth century, 
artisans often engaged in strikes during economic upturns, in order to enhance their chances of 
success.93 An unintended consequence of strikes, however, was that they often left workers 
vulnerable to economic distress and to legal prosecution. John Brown, for example, earned a 
guinea a week as a London shoemaker, but was left penniless during a ten-week strike and, 
unwilling to become a ‘scab’, he enlisted instead.94 Similarly, in 1796, a relatively good year 
nationally, the Royal Artillery recruited thirty per cent more than the usual number of men 
from the Sheffield cutlery trade.95 It is no coincidence that in the summer of that year, the 
journeymen cutlers of Sheffield were engaged in an acrimonious strike for higher wages. In 
response, the master manufacturers set up a fund in order to suppress ‘the conspiracy’.96 
Enlistment was an attractive option for those who wished to avoid prosecution and for those 
struggling to survive on dwindling strike funds.  
English towns also provided the army with a steady trickle of failed retailers and dealers. 
George Fraser, for one, set up business as a grocer in London in the early 1790s but ran into 
debt. He was forced to sell all of his property and having ‘no other resource, and poverty 
approaching with rapid strides, [he] enlisted as a private soldier … and began [his] march with 
light purse and heavy heart’.97 Similarly, James Turner, had been ‘in a very respectable line of 
life’ as the keeper of the Crown Inn in the London parish of St Pauls. Falling on hard times, 
however, he was confined as a debtor in Newgate and, upon his release, ‘having no money or 
subsistence’, was obliged to enlist in the 34th Regiment to avoid being further pursued by his 
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creditors.98 As soldiers were exempt from prosecution for any debt of less than twenty pounds 
the army could be something of a refuge for the debtor.99  
In addition to insolvency and short term fluctuations in the economy, structural unemployment 
has been posited, by both Sylvia Frey and Peter Way, as an important factor contributing to 
army enlistment. Frey’s sample of two army regiments suggests that, between 1759 and 1800, 
twenty per cent of soldiers were textile workers, mainly weavers from the Midlands and South 
West. Frey argues that the high proportion of these workers reflects the fact that their wages 
and employment options were adversely affected by the introduction of labour-saving 
machinery.100 Brumwell has been sceptical of these claims, however, suggesting that large 
numbers of weavers were present in the mid-Georgian army simply because weaving was a 
common trade among the population at large.101  
However, we should not dismiss the relationship between socio-economic change and patterns 
of recruitment. In the period under investigation, Frey’s analysis seems pertinent. We can infer 
from Floud’s data, for example, which sampled 5,000 recruits per decade, that the proportion of 
textile workers in the army dramatically increased between the American and  the French 
Revolutionary Wars, from 13.9 per cent in the former conflict, to 23.2 per cent in the latter.102 
Over the same period, as Adrian Randall has demonstrated, the woollen weaving trade in the 
South West of England, was in decline. It suffered both from competition with the woollens 
produced, partly by outworkers and partly by factories, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, and 
from competition with the rapidly industrialising cotton industry of Lancashire.103 At the same 
time, as we have seen, the reorganization of the weaving trade in the North, with the 
introduction of more detailed division of labour, created work for women and children, whilst 
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simultaneously dispensing with traditional skills associated with male workers.104 The 
increasing proportional presence of textile workers in the rank and file, therefore tends to 
support Peter Way’s assertion, that the army was the ‘unwitting beneficiary’ of the Industrial 
Revolution.105 Conversely we may note that miners and foundrymen are considerably 
underrepresented within the ranks of the army.106 These workers were notoriously well paid, 
and their employment prospects were well-protected in this period, as England continued in 
the transition from an ‘organic’ to an ‘energy’ driven economy.107 Hence we find only small 
numbers of workers from the iron and coal industries in the ranks.  
Figure 3 - Graph Showing Monthly Recruitment Figures for 'Labourers' Born in Gloucestershire, 
Lincolnshire, and Sussex, 1790-1801. 
 
 
Unlike the textile worker, farm labourers were not threatened by machinery in this era, nor 
were his employment prospects chained to the boom and bust of the trade cycle. Instead, the 
weather and, more especially, the season governed the amount of work available for labourers. 
Over the winter months, hired farm labourers were routinely subjected to seasonal 
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unemployment when as much as seventeen per cent of the workforce could be laid off.108 This 
lull in employment prospects provided further opportunities to army recruiters. If we examine 
the months in which unskilled labourers, born in the predominantly rural counties of 
Gloucestershire, Sussex, and Lincolnshire, were ‘attested’, or sworn in as soldiers, this becomes 
apparent (Figure 3). In the South-East, peas were harvested in the latter part of July, followed by 
wheat in August, and other grains in September.109 Eden noted that in Sussex the labourer could 
earn three pounds above his ordinary wages during the hop season, which picked up at the end 
of August.110 It follows therefore that September was by far the least fertile month for obtaining 
recruits as it was precisely when wages and demand for agricultural labourers were at their 
highest. Conversely the majority of labourers appear to have enlisted in the winter-spring 
months, and often immediately after the harvest, in late October. Agricultural labourers 
therefore appear to have enlisted, both in those years when their real wages were in decline, but 
also at those times of year when they were most likely to be out of work. 
2.4.  Enlistment, Unemployment, and the Role of the Parish 
For both skilled artisans and unskilled labourers, financial desperation resulting from a period 
of unemployment, appears to have been the most common prelude to enlistment. This fact 
raises questions about the role of the parish and the poor relief system and its impact upon 
levels of recruitment during wartime. Famously, during the French Wars, the ‘Speenhamland 
system’, was first conceived of and introduced. This system was intended to relieve agricultural 
labourers and their families suffering from the effects of inflation and underemployment, by 
granting doles which rose incrementally in relation to the number of dependents a labourer had 
and the going rate of bread. Throughout the period, parish officials could also provide the 
temporarily unemployed with ‘occasional relief’ or, for those experiencing a longer period 
without work, the parish could offer a certain amount of employment by ‘farming out’ men to 
employers at a contracted rate. We might ask why men facing the prospect of enlistment due to 
economic hardship did not simply take advantage of such welfare provision. 
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Firstly, it should be emphasized that young able-bodied men largely fell outside of the poor law 
system, which was primarily aimed at providing provision to four other groups; single mothers 
and their dependents, orphaned children, the elderly, and the sick. Places in workhouses, for 
example, were exclusively filled by these groups, and able-bodied men were legally excluded 
from being sent to the workhouse, by the terms of Gilbert’s Act.111 Regular ‘outdoor relief’ was 
likewise primarily directed toward women, the aged, and the infirm. Secondly, it should be 
noted that the relief which was accessible to able-bodied men was extremely limited. 
Agricultural labourers could turn to the parish if they were out of work. However, the prospect 
of being ‘farmed out’, their bed and board provided to them by a farmer, and their labour 
harnessed for less than the market rate, was an unattractive prospect for single men, and of little 
help to those with families to support.112 Furthermore, the generous provision for labourers 
embodied in the much-vaunted ‘Speenhamland system’ were by no means universally 
upheld.113 Even in Berkshire, where the system was devised, it was adopted by few, if any, of 
the county’s overseers.114 Irregular payments of cash or kind certainly were provided to able-
bodied men, particularly those with large families to support. These payments, along with 
charitable donations, undoubtedly went some way toward mitigating the effects of declining 
real wages seen over the 1790s.115 However, as King has pointed out, nowhere in England did 
these payments represent a ‘comprehensive welfare package’. Moreover, King’s research 
highlights that expenditure on poor relief was geographically uneven. Labourers in the South 
and East of the country, who generally lived closer to the subsistence level, were relatively well 
provided for. However, in the North and West, poor relief expenditure per head of the 
population, was relatively parsimonious. Particularly in the urban districts, in the North and 
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West, able-bodied men could expect little in the way of support from the parish and many 
individuals fell through the numerous ‘holes’ in the welfare system.116   
Therefore, men suffering the effects of unemployment or low wages could not guarantee that 
the parish would come to their aid, nor could they be certain that relief would be sufficient for 
the subsistence of themselves and their families. A number of historians have emphasized the 
‘micro-politics’ of poor relief and have shown that a ‘complex web of considerations’ operated 
on overseers when they came to decide who constituted the deserving, and the underserving, 
poor.117 An aspect of this ‘micro-politics’ which has been overlooked, is the claim, made by 
political radicals in the 1790s, that parish overseers actively discriminated against men 
sympathetic to the cause of reform. John Baxter, of the LCS, for example, wrote that ‘it is 
notorious that, among the numerous applications for relief, those only have been supplied who 
were the Abettors of Administration’.118 While the editor of the Sheffield Register, Joseph Gales, 
and John Harrison, the president of the Birmingham Society for Constitutional Information, 
provided anecdotal evidence (from Manchester and Birmingham respectively) that loyalist 
officials refused to grant relief to the families of working-class reformers, unless they enlisted in 
the army.119 Certainly such claims are plausible. Parish overseers had the double incentive of 
ridding themselves of ‘Jacobins’ and of filling recruitment quotas. In addition to administering 
the militia ballots, the Recruiting Act of 1796 required English parishes to raise 5,764 men for 
the army.120 This mode of recruiting for the army was reintroduced on a much larger scale in 
1803-5, via the Army of Reserve and the Additional Force Acts, which ‘turned parish officers 
into recruiting sergeants’. How parish officials went about meetings these quotas remains 
                                                   
116 King , Poverty and Welfare, pp. 158, 170, 209, 215. 
117 P. Sharpe, 'Malaria, Machismo and the Original Essex Man: The Limits of Poor Relief in the Early 
1830s', in J. Cooper and M. Holland (eds.), Essex Harvest: A Collection of Essays in Memory of Arthur Brown 
(Chelmsford: Essex Record Office, 2003), p. 57. 
118 J. Baxter, Resistance to Oppression, the Constitutional Right of Britons Asserted in a Lecture Delivered Before 
Section 2 of the Society of the Friends of Liberty, on Monday, November 9th (London, 1795), p. 6. 
119 Sheffield Register, 3 May 1793; J. Harrison, A Letter to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas (London, 1794), pp. 
20-22. 
120 ‘Report of the Committee to Enquire into Certain Questions Which Have Arisen With Respect to the 





largely opaque.121 Although it should be stressed that most enlists, in both the militia and the 
reserves, were hired substitutes and non-natives of the parishes for whom they served.122   
The question of whether radicals were maliciously denied relief is also difficult to substantiate. 
Overseers accounts and vestry minutes, tend only to reflect on those who were granted relief, 
they rarely record the names of those who were denied or the reasons why they were rejected.123 
However, we know that the army was officially used as a means of siphoning off small 
numbers of vagrants and criminals and that political dissidents did not escape impressment. In 
1793, for example, six sailors, arrested for riot during a labour dispute in Ipswich, were sent into 
the navy.124 While in 1799 undersecretary John King offered to send army recruiting parties into 
Lancashire in order to mop up the unemployed and the increasingly-politicized cotton weavers 
around Manchester.125 There is no reason why similar punitive measures, against radicals and 
unionists, couldn’t have been taken by parish officials.126 However, as with other aspects of 
‘Pitt’s reign of terror’, establishing the extent to which radicals were harassed, and 
demonstrating that such harassment was systemic, is the crucial difficulty.127 Unfortunately, 
poor law records may not be adequate to demonstrate conclusively whether parish relief was 
systematically denied in order to force men into the armed forces. 
What poor law records do tell us, however, is that the families of military men were generally 
treated far better by the parish than their civilian counterparts. During the period, the Militia 
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Acts granted the wives of militiamen 1s 6d every week for their support, plus an additional 1s 
6d, for every child born in wedlock and under the age of ten.128 However, overseers often went 
beyond the letter of the law to assist military families. The experiences of Ann Sherborn, of 
Wisborough Green, West Sussex, demonstrate this well. Between 1795-7, Ann’s husband, James, 
was working as a labourer. During this time Ann gave birth to two children (both of whom died 
shortly after birth) and, during her second pregnancy, she was granted 4s, presumably to cover 
the additional costs incurred from childbirth.129 In 1798, however, James enlisted in the militia 
and Ann began to receive her weekly allowance. After becoming pregnant for a third time, Ann 
was granted the much more generous sum of £1.0.6 ‘lying-in money’ in March 1798. As the wife 
of a militiaman Ann Sherborn was clearly considered part of the ‘deserving poor’.130  In the 
spring of 1800, she was given a further £3.7.4 for clothes and 7s towards an outstanding debt for 
flour.131 Here the overseers of Wisborough Green went beyond what was required of them by 
the Militia Acts.  
The families of regular soldiers were not legally entitled to weekly allowances. The ideal soldier 
was seen to be a single man and, on this basis, the army officially discouraged marriage among 
the rank and file, and the state offered no specific financial support to soldier’s dependents. 
However, many regulars were in fact married. A recent ‘conservative’ estimate suggests twelve 
per cent of British soldiers had wives. Some of these women were allowed to ‘go on the 
strength’ and followed their husband’s regiments, even going on campaigns with the army. At 
least half, however, remained at home.132 There is some evidence to suggest that parish officials 
prioritised the relief of soldier’s wives and their dependents. Eden noted that in Colchester the 
widow of a soldier with three children was in receipt of poor relief to the value of three shillings 
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six pence whilst a labourer’s widow with four children received just two shillings.133 The 
dramatic increase in poor relief expenditure in St Mary’s Nottingham, which rose 196 per cent 
between 1790-4, was also explained by Eden in terms of money allocated to the dependents of 
militiamen and soldiers.134 Nor was Nottingham unique. In St Margaret’s Westminster, twenty 
per cent of indoor and outdoor poor relief recipients were said to be the dependents of 
soldiers.135 Moreover, nationally poor relief expenditure grew dramatically during the wars.136 
Over the same period Patricia Lin has argued that there was a decisive redefinition of the 
‘deserving poor’. National initiatives, to allow seamen to allocate their wages to their wives, 
and for the children of soldiers to enrol in the Royal Military Asylum (est. 1803), according to 
Lin, demonstrate that notions of the ‘deserving’ woman or child were increasingly defined, not 
solely in terms of need, but in terms of their relationship to men serving in the forces.137 At the 
level of the parish, it seems likely that these conceptions of ‘deservingness’ also had an 
influence, and that payments to military families partly explain the significant rises in wartime 
poor law expenditure. 
Thus, for unemployed men with families to support, enlistment could be a means of making 
their kin appear more ‘deserving’ in the eyes of the parish. This was surely an important 
calculation within the economics of enlistment. Moreover, there was a certain amount of social 
stigma which might prevent any man from approaching his parish directly, even in times of 
distress. For the skilled artisan, accepting poor relief was considered to be the ‘grave of all 
independence’.138 While even the lowly West Country weaver could find himself ‘rejected by all 
men’ as a consequence of becoming ‘troublesome’ to his parish.139 This social stigma was likely 
to operate more forcefully upon young men without dependents. Younger members of trade 
unions, for example, were expected to go ‘on the tramp’ in times of localized economic distress, 
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in order to leave more work for older and more settled members.140 For non-journeymen, ‘going 
for a soldier’ provided a similar means to relieve the community of the burden of supporting 
them. Moreover, for those struggling to make ends meet, the enormous sums offered as bounty 
money could often prove to be irresistible.  
2.5.  Bounty Money and Mutiny in the Independent Regiments 
 
 
Finally, the attraction of the bounty money offered to the would-be recruit must be considered. 
Bounties are a recurrent theme in the popular prints of the period (Print 3). Cruikshank’s A 
Recruiting Party was based upon a group of Grenadier Guards which the humourist, George 
Moutard Woodward, encountered in Cirencester. The rustic subjects of the piece gawp in 
amazement at the bounty money on offer for enlistment, as a purse is held aloft by the 
recruiting sergeant.141 Amusing though the print is, the sums offered in the period, really were 
astonishing and grew more inflated as the war progressed. Heated competition between the 
colonels of the independent regiments between 1794-5 raised the rate of bounties to between ten 
and sixteen guineas per man, while established regiments were offering as much as fifteen 
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pounds.142 The latter figure was the equivalent of nine months’ pay for an Essex labourer.143 
Government attempted to get a handle on spiralling bounties between 1795-6 by disbanding the 
independent companies and fixing cash bounties at £3.13.16 for a light cavalryman and £7.18.17 
for an infantryman.144 However, as more men were captured by the army, competition for 
militia substitutes became increasingly fierce. Between five and ten guineas were offered to 
militia substitutes in 1793, rising to at least twenty-five pounds, in 1803.145 The rapid increase in 
the price of substitutes in the period after the Peace of Amiens was largely a result of the 
introduction of the Army of Reserve, which created a second ballot, and therefore doubled 
demand for substitutes. Fortescue suggests that prices paid for substitutes in the Army of 
Reserve varied by region but, on average, the cost fell between thirty and sixty pounds.146 The 
Army of Reserve proved hugely costly to the government and, again, attempts to rationalize 
were made. Pitt’s Additional Force Act (1804) replaced the older legislation and fixed bounties 
at sixteen guineas for army volunteers and offered twelve guineas for reservists. A further ten 
pounds was offered for those who transferred from the reserve into the regular army and 
sixteen pounds to those who transferred from the militia.147 Thus, by the Napoleonic period, 
men who took advantage of a combination of the available bounties, could secure well over the 
annual income of a common labourer.148 
The importance of these bounties to new recruits should not be underestimated. Although some 
of the ‘levy money’ was reserved for the purchase of clothing and other ‘necessaries’ new 
recruits expected to receive a sizeable windfall.149 We can infer the significance of recruitment 
bounties from the actions of those unfortunate soldiers whose prizes went unpaid. In the course 
of 1795, for example, a year of soaring prices and widespread food rioting, at least nine newly 
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raised army regiments stationed in England mutinied in protest against the non-payment of 
bounties. Social historians have often focused upon the best documented of these protests, the 
mutiny of Colonel Cameron’s Loyal Regiment of Foot.150 On 4 August 1795 Cameron’s regiment 
was paraded at Stewards Croft, Norfolk Street, Sheffield, but refused to return to their quarters 
when ordered. Word was sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Athorpe, of the Loyal Sheffield 
Independent Volunteers, and his regiment was summoned. By the time of their arrival, 
however, a large crowd of civilians had gathered on Norfolk Street. Athorpe attempted to 
disperse the crowd by reading the Riot Act. However, the people remained, inciting Cameron’s 
men to violence, and throwing stones at the volunteers. Athorpe resorted to charging into the 
crowd with his sword drawn, in a vain attempt to seize ringleaders, and an hour after reading 
the proclamation, ordered his men to fire, killing two people, and scattering the rest.151 
In addition to the use of lethal force at Sheffield, historians have noted that the mutiny was 
remarkable, in terms of the level of radical agitation which surrounded it.152 Sheffield’s 
publicans were accused of attempting to seduce the soldiery from their duty in the days leading 
up to the riot.153 Certain men in Cameron’s regiment were also feared to be mixing with ‘the 
disaffected among the lower orders of the People’. Rumours of a concerted effort, between 
soldiers and inhabitants, to seize the town’s corn supplies, were also aired.154  Most notably, on 
the day of the riot, an anti-war handbill accusing the government of conspiring to ‘starve the 
poor into the army’, was published. This handbill demonstrates the continuation of Sheffield’s 
radical anti-recruitment campaign, noted earlier.155 However, at the root of the original mutiny 
was the issue of the non-payment of bounty money. 156 In this regard, the disturbances were far 
from unique.  
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At least eight other protests occurred in 1795, all of which played out in a different context to 
the Sheffield mutiny, but which shared similar origins. In each case the mutinous regiments 
were newly raised independent corps. Many of them had recently received orders that they 
were to be disbanded and drafted into regiments of the line. However, these orders exposed 
underlying frictions. The men of the Londonderry Regiment were unhappy about being drafted 
into the 43rd, as they had sworn oaths ‘to defend their own colours’,  and resented being broken 
up and separated from their comrades.157 In addition, the men refused to obey orders until their 
accounts had been settled. The 125th Regiment at Buckingham, the 127th Regiment at Chester, 
and the 114th Regiment at Chelmsford, all refused to be transferred until they had received their 
bounties.158 While three Irish regiments at Birmingham, Exeter, and Pill (near Bristol) went 
further and broke out in armed rebellion. At Birmingham the men were immediately promised 
the balance of their accounts and, in the dead of night, the town’s constables toured their 
quarters and secretly secured the men’s arms.159 At Pill and Exeter, violent clashes occurred, 
with a number of recruits receiving sabre and bayonet wounds from the cavalry and militia 
units ordered against them.160 During the mutiny at Pill, Sir John Carden of the 30th Light 
Dragoons, had his horse killed beneath him, after receiving several bayonet blows from the 
mutineers.161 While at Newcastle,  after ‘various meetings’, the private men of the Ulster Light 
Dragoons resolved to break open the arms store, forcing General Smith to call for military aid, 
and to personally reassure the men that their bounties would be granted.162 Many of these 
disputes, therefore, represented serious outbursts of disorder, and demonstrate the determined 
commitment of the men involved. 
Admittedly, many of the regiments concerned were Irish. Upon inspection, the War Office often 
found the finances of these regiment to be poorly administered. The regimental accounts books 
of the 114th Munster Regiment, for example, were left behind in Ireland, and no certainty about 
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who in the regiment had been paid could be achieved.163 While the 122nd regiment was lacking 
‘regularity and attention’ in regard to the settling the men’s accounts.164 Further, as with their 
English counterparts, serious claims of corruption were also levelled at the officers of the Irish 
independent regiments. Large numbers of troops arrived at Bristol in a state of ill health, having 
been subjected to ‘close confinement’ and crowded conditions before and during their passage 
from Ireland. Worse still, some of the Irish troops at Bristol, as well as those in Birmingham, 
told the inhabitants they had been crimped, forced to attest before corrupt J.Ps, and then denied 
any bounty money.165 These mutinies further demonstrate the disruptive nature of the 
independent regiments and the dubious methods which were used to recruit them. It is likely 
that corrupt recruitment practices were even worse in Ireland than they were in England. 
However, we should not assume that mutiny, arising from the non-payment of bounty money, 
was a uniquely Irish problem. Some of the regiments concerned had been raised primarily in 
England.166 Further, as McGuffie has shown, more than one of the English independent 
regiments, sent over to Ireland in 1795, mutinied in equally dramatic fashion when called upon 
to be drafted. These mutinies therefore clearly demonstrate the perceived importance of bounty 
money to both British and Irish recruits.167 
To conclude, the manner in which the independent mutinies were conducted is evocative of the 
‘collective bargaining by riot’ which Hobsbawm observed within many eighteenth-century 
labour disputes.168 Recently enlisted men clearly saw their agreement to serve as a contractual 
arrangement and resented and resisted any infringement by their superiors upon the perceived 
terms. These mutinies therefore reinforce the calls of labour historians who urge us to recast the 
common soldier as ‘worker’.169 This call is also consistent with the findings of the chapter as a 
whole. Some recruits were impressed from prisons, coerced by parsimonious parish officials, or 
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inveigled by crimps into the army. However, demand for recruits was such that, inevitably, a 
military labour market emerged in this period. The fortunes of that market were closely tied the 
wider English economy. It has been established here that, the majority of enlists for the army 
carefully weighed their employment prospects, and the value of their wages, against the costs 
and benefits of entering the army. Enlistment therefore had profoundly economic roots and, as 




Part II – Experience of Soldiering 
3. The Experience of Soldiering, 1790-1801. 
Military historians tend to agree upon the ‘wretched’ condition of the common soldier at the 
beginning of our period.1 Most would also acknowledge that the alterations made to the pay of 
the soldiery, and particularly the pay rise granted in 1797, were of great significance to the rank 
and file.2 However, it is notable how little work has been done by military historians to place 
these reforms in context. The reforms of 1792 and 1795 are rarely mentioned in the military 
histories of the period. Even the origin of the 1797 reform, despite its widely-accepted 
significance, is usually treated in a perfunctory manner.3 The main contribution to our 
knowledge in this domain, has come not from military historians, but from historians of protest. 
Both John Stevenson and Roger Wells, whose work this chapter takes as its starting point, have 
produced research which suggests that the pay reforms of the 1790s were the result of 
considerable pressure from below, to which the government was forced to yield. In short, 
mutiny in the militia, the army, and the navy produced, on more than one occasion, concessions 
from above.4 
However, these findings sit awkwardly with the overarching narrative of the French Wars 
which many military historians have sought to construct. Typically, military histories of the 
period seek to explain how a weak and ineffective British army, which was decisively defeated 
in Flanders (1793-5), was ‘rehabilitated’ and ‘transformed’ into the effective fighting force which 
won the day at Waterloo.5 Following the lead of Sir John Fortescue and Richard Glover, military 
histories tend to take a top-down and institutional approach, and focus on the development of 
new weaponry, stratagem, modes of military organization, and on the introduction of greater 
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professionalism within the bureaucracy of the armed forces.6 Particularly in Glover’s influential 
work, certain key politicians and military men are seen as the driving force behind these 
‘transformations’. The Duke of York, despite his involvement in a notorious corruption 
scandal7, is praised by Glover, and by many subsequent historians, as the architect of a number 
of farsighted and thoroughgoing reforms.8 It is not the intention here to entirely dismiss these 
findings or the research agenda which traditional military historians have set out to address. 
However, it will be argued that the approach which has been adopted by many military 
histories is one which is overly deterministic.  
It will be demonstrated that the alterations made to the provisioning and pay of the troops in 
the 1790s were not programmatic. If anything, they ran contrary to the instincts of a number of 
high-ranking officials. Perhaps for this reason they have been side-lined in many accounts of 
this period. Yet, viewed from below, this seems like an unjustifiable omission. The pay and 
conditions attached to soldiering surely had an equal bearing, if not a greater significance, for 
the rank and file than the drill manual from which their officers worked, or the line formation 
they learned on the parade ground. Moreover, as has been demonstrated by subsequent 
research, the improvements witnessed in this period were hard fought for. This chapter will 
pursue this theme further by investigating the standard of living of soldiers in the home 
garrison by comparing it to that of the civilian population. Firstly, this chapter will reconstruct 
the often complex arrangements for the pay and provisioning of the soldiery in England. 
Secondly, the circumstances surrounding the several successive reforms to the common 
soldier’s pay and subsistence will be investigated, and the impact of these changes will be 
weighed. Thirdly, and finally, the social world of the common soldier will be investigated. 
Again, a comparative approach will be taken and the losses and gains involved in enlistment 
will be scrutinized. An emphasis upon soldiers’ protests will be maintained throughout. The 
‘mutinies’ which soldiers engaged in are often the best means we have of accessing the attitudes 
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and experiences of the regulars and the militia, the vast majority of whom, left no written 
account of themselves. 
3.1.  Standard of Living of the Common Soldier, 1790-2 
On 17 August 1790 two Coldstream Guardsmen approached Henry Sharpe of Covent Garden 
and demanded he buy them a drink. When Sharpe asked the pair why he should ‘treat’ them, 
James Templeman replied, ‘everyone knows soldiers’ pay is very small, such as they cannot live 
by, and we will have money somehow’. We have a record of this exchange because both 
Templeman, and his accomplice Platt, were sentenced to death for extorting money from a 
stranger, by threats of violence, and false accusations of ‘unnatural crimes’.9 While 
Templemen’s actions were drastic and unusual, his candid assessment of the material 
conditions of the common soldier was a fair one, which many literate contemporaries endorsed.  
The pay of the soldier was set in the reign of Queen Anne at the same rate as that of the day 
labourer. However, after remaining unaltered for much of the eighteenth century, the 
comparative value of the soldier’s wage had degraded significantly.10 At least from the mid-
century, commentators pointed to the relative poverty of the ordinary soldier. In 1772 it was 
claimed that common labourers earned three times the pay of the ordinary soldier, while a 
tailor in London in 1768, could earn five times as much as a redcoat.11 During the last quarter of 
the eighteenth century, economic historians tend to agree that there was a thirty to forty per 
cent rise in the price of commodities. While the wages of workers, over the same period, tended 
to lag behind price increases, they did at least begrudgingly follow a similar upward trend.12 
The soldier, on the other hand, received no increase in pay. By the 1790s, when the ‘prices 
affixed to each article of living’ began to rise even more steeply, informed observers, such as 
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Henry Sinclair of the 57th Foot, questioned how the common soldier could expect to meet the 
cost of his substance while stationed at home.13 Even the Secretary-at-War, looking back to the 
early 1790s, admitted that ‘it was a matter of general surprise how [the soldier] could exist’ on 
his limited pay.14 
Such concerns were justified. The soldier’s nominal wage of eight pence a day had to meet a 
long list of demands before it could be extended to his sustenance. Firstly, there was a 
customary daily charge of two pence known as ‘off reckoning’, which was granted to the 
soldier’s colonel, to cover the cost of uniforms. From the remaining three shillings and six pence 
a week a further ‘stoppage’, amounting to one shilling weekly, was reserved for the purchase of 
various items known as ‘necessaries’ (equipment such as stockings, foraging cap, gaiters etc.) 
which had to be replaced throughout the year. Finally the private soldier, who was expected to 
be cleanly turned-out with powdered hair, had to keep an additional day’s wages aside for 
laundry and hair-powder. Further annual fees known as ‘poundage’ were also taken from the 
soldiers wage for the Paymaster General, for the upkeep of Chelsea Hospital, and for the 
regimental surgeon.15 Although accommodation and ‘small beer’ were provided gratis, the 
demands on the soldier’s wages left him at best with two shillings a week with which to buy 
food (Figure 4a). At this point it should be stressed that there was some variation between 
regiments. Although colonels were expected to make a healthy profit on the men’s clothing 
allowance, the amount of ‘off reckoning’ taken from the men was, to some degree, contingent 
upon their commander.16 Some colonels might charge their men inflated prices for low quality 
garments, while others might subsidize the cost of uniforms, by reducing their own profit 
margin. The system was open both to exploitation and to paternalism.17 However, the figures 
quoted below are based on a strict reading of the regulations.  
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Figure 4 - Weekly Wages of a Soldier 1791-2. 
a) Weekly Wages of Soldier, 1790:18 
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Figure 5 - Soldier’s Weekly Expenditure on Food, c. 1791.
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Even in this (perhaps optimistic) assessment, the pay of the common soldier appears relatively 
scanty. When David Davies, the rector of Barkham, compiled his famous survey of agricultural 
labourers (1787-95), the average male wage was generally reported to be between five and eight 
shillings a week. The lowest return was from Keddlestone in Derbyshire where one labourer 
earned just four shillings eight pence weekly. This was still twice that of the common soldier’s 
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net wages.21 Unlike Davies’ labourers, soldiers were usually (but not always) single men free 
from the expense of dependents. Soldiers may also have benefitted from ‘economies of scale’. 
William Cobbett, when serving as a private soldier in 1784, recalled how the majority of his 
regiment’s pay was ‘expended for us at market’, suggesting that officers were entrusted to buy 
the men’s food in bulk.22 However, it should be noted that the prices which soldiers paid for 
food, while in quarters, were still market prices.23 Moreover, any benefit derived from the bulk 
purchase of food does not appear to have amounted to much.  
The estimates compiled by the Duke of Richmond, of the weekly subsistence which a soldier 
could afford in 1791, suggest an extremely rudimentary diet (Figure 5). The average soldier was 
reported to consume 9.5 pounds of bread. This was actually slightly more than the average 
eight pounds which George Rudé calculated was purchased by most labourers in the mid-
century.24 However, soldiers could only afford ‘second bread’, the kind of coarse fare which was 
provided in the workhouse, and which Arthur Young remarked even ‘beggars’ refused to buy.25 
Indeed, among the few social groups who endured a more meagre diet than the soldier, were 
prisoners and workhouse paupers. On board the prison hulks, for example, a man’s diet 
consisted primarily of ‘soup’ (twenty-five pints a week) with only small rations of bread (six 
pounds) and meat (four pounds).26 While in the workhouses visited by Eden, although 
conditions could vary quite dramatically27, where the diets of individuals can be discerned, 
inmates appear to have received six to seven pounds of bread and between one to two pounds 
of meat weekly.28 Soldiers certainly did better than both of these groups. However, it should 
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remember that in this period, the workhouse was geared primarily at supporting children, the 
aged, and the sick, not young men.29 Further, with a large proportion of his wages laid out for 
bread, the soldier had to forgo other items of consumption. Middleton’s survey of the 
provisions consumed in Middlesex, for example, suggests that labourers consumed an average 
of eight pounds of meat per week, more than double what soldiers could afford.30 Similarly, the 
family budgets, examined by Davies, included small proportions of ‘luxury’ items, such as salt, 
butter, tea, and sugar. The soldier’s basic weekly diet, by contrast, appears to consist solely of 
meat, vegetables, and bread.  
Somewhat controversially, Sylvia Frey has argued that the economic status of the common 
soldier was slightly higher than that of the country labourer, in the mid-eighteenth century.31 By 
1790, however, the evidence clearly shows that the comparatively poor pay and diet of the 
soldier, placed him well above the workhouse pauper but decidedly below the rural labourer. 
The soldier’s unenviable position in the social structure sheds light upon the strength of 
working-class scorn which was often directed towards military men. It also helps us to 
understand the revulsion which ordinary Englishmen felt at the thought of being ‘trepanned’ 
into the armed forces.32 Within the army itself, some advanced military men recognized the 
detrimental effects of the declining living standard of the soldier. The Adjutant-General, Sir 
William Fawcett, for example, diagnosed that hunger and distress in the ranks retarded 
recruitment: 
  Each individual can now calculate too accurately to offer  
  himself for a soldier, when he can be so much better paid in 
  every other Species of Labour and Industry.33 
Therefore, from 1787, Fawcett advocated for improvements to be made to the provision of the 
soldiery, forwarding his recommendations to William Pitt, who was simultaneously Prime 
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Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer. However, Fawcett’s arguments fell on deaf ears and 
neither the Chancellor nor the Secretary-at-War backed Fawcett’s suggestion for additional 
allowances.34 Neither was there any interest in more modest proposals, presented in 1788, such 
as supplying the private soldier with an additional pair of shoes, in order to relieve his 
‘necessitous situation’.35 In fact, the policy of improving the living-standards of the common 
soldier was not seriously considered by government until after the advent of the French 
Revolution (1789).   
3.2.  Mutiny in the Queen’s Dragoons and the Pay Reforms of 1792 
It is well rehearsed fact that the French Revolution energised and polarised English politics. As 
well as encouraging indigenous working-class radical organizations, the revolution provoked 
an equally powerful loyalist backlash, which sought to promote ideological hegemony, by 
rallying the populace under the banner of ‘Church and King’.36 The French example also 
focused the loyalist mind upon the military as a bulwark against revolution. It was common 
knowledge in England that the Gardes Françaises had played a pivotal role in bringing down the 
French ancien régime.37 Further, the financial grievances of the French soldiers who stormed the 
Bastille, were emphasized by Burke, who cynically suggested that ‘the King of France [was] 
sold by his soldiers for an encrease [sic.] in pay’.38 In the early 1790s, and throughout the 
decade, there were widespread fears of an English insurrection on the French model.39 Cookson 
has argued that the pay rise granted to British soldiers in 1792 was the direct result of this tense 
political climate.40 Undoubtedly, the French Revolution, and elite fears of insurrection, were an 
important backdrop to the changes. However, Pitt did not grant an expensive addition to the 
soldier’s pay on the basis of abstract fears alone. Entirely overlooked within this story is the 
mutiny of the Queen’s Dragoons at Taunton.  
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On the 5 July 1791 Captain Gordon’s company presented their colonel with a petition 
complaining of their unfair punishment for appearing ‘slovenly’ while on parade. They claimed 
their appearance was not a reflection of their ‘character’ but of their ‘oprest’ [sic.] state.41 When 
Lord Herbert ordered the arrest of the author of the petition, his comrades ‘broke their Ranks’ 
and resisted his being taken-up, swearing, ‘they were as much in fault as he was’ . The 
mutinous soldiers were ‘encircled’, by Captain Crawford’s troop in the market-place, but by 
that time a ‘Great Mob’ from the ‘suburbs’ of the town had amassed and had commenced 
abusing and throwing stones at Crawford’s men, in an attempt to prevent the arrest of the 
mutineers. It was only with great difficulty, and with the assistance of the town mayor, that the 
crowds were dispersed and eleven ringleaders were placed in confinement.42 Historical 
accounts of July 1791 tend to focus upon the much more destructive and politically-charged 
‘Birmingham riots’ of 14-17 July.43 However, the mutiny of the dragoons was also significant. 
Reflecting on the subversion of military discipline that had occurred in Taunton, and the 
involvement of numerous civilians, the Secretary-at-War proclaimed that, such disturbances 
‘are to me, much more alarming than any other’.44  
Included in the soldiers’ petition was a requested to be engaged on foreign service. This 
suggests that the soldier’s primary grievance was the high cost of living while stationed in 
England.45 Newspaper editors also interpreted the mutiny as a demand for higher pay. 
Simultaneously, many news reports articulated concerns about the circulation of ‘new-fangled 
political doctrines’ in the South West and noted that that a group met in Taunton, a week after 
the mutiny, to celebrate the second anniversary of the storming of the Bastille.46 In the course of 
the subsequent court martial, Colonel Vyse identified one man, William Madden, as a principle 
ringleader and ‘a dangerous Incendiary’.47 Madden was given 775 lashes and drummed out of 
the regiment. The other prisoners were pardoned after signing their names to a statement of 
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loyalty.48 The relative leniency of the sentences may have had something to do with rumours 
that any attempt to execute the culprits would be strongly resisted by Taunton’s turbulent 
labouring classes. Troops at neighbouring towns were held in readiness, with ‘powder and 
ball’, to counter any disruption to Madden’s punishment,49 while Lord Herbert pondered 
whether anything could be done to stop the ‘Contagion’ of disaffection spreading throughout 
the army.50 
It was as a direct result of the mutiny at Taunton that the issue of a pay rise for the military was 
returned to in August 1791, with Fawcett advocating for a generous increase in soldiers’ pay 
and a reduction in the cost of ‘necessaries’.51 The government, however, rejected Fawcett’s plan 
on the advice of the Duke of Richmond: 
  [S]o direct an increase of Pay … to the Soldier, may put it into his  
  head, that Government stands in need of his Assistance, and …  
  [h]e will consider the addition … an admission that it was too low, 
  that you have been driven to do something for him by the fear of  
  what has happened in France, happening in England. 52 
Instead, it was agreed that soldiers would be supplied with certain articles (gaiters, breeches 
etc.) gratis and an additional ‘allowance’ for bread (Figure 4b). Fawcett also standardized the 
prices paid by soldiers for ‘necessaries’, which could vary widely from regiment to regiment, 
and banned colonels from charging their men for ‘useless ornaments, and superfluous expense 
in dress’.53 By January 1792 these alterations were implemented, not by Parliament, but via 
Royal Warrant, in order to frame the increase as ‘gift’ from the Crown.54 Thus the soldiers’ 
weekly subsistence rose to three shillings and five pence, which brought him, temporarily at 
least, slightly closer to the standard of living of the day labourer. 
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Politically, however, the move was a failure. Opposition Whigs railed against the use of the 
Royal Warrant as an unconstitutional circumvention of Parliament.55 Even more concerning was 
the intervention of William Cobbett. Inspired by Part One of Rights of Man, and appalled at the 
level of corruption he had witnessed while serving in the 54th Regiment, Cobbett penned a 
powerful attack on the pay reforms.56 The Soldier’s Friend portrayed the Royal Warrant as a farce. 
Cobbett argued that the Mutiny Act did not condone the common practice among officers of 
overcharging for ‘necessaries’, and pointed out that all soldiers were gaining by the ‘King’s 
Bounty’ was that which was granted them ‘by Act of Parliament’ –  three shillings a week 
without deduction.57 Government considered the pamphlet a dangerous work of sedition.58 In 
conjunction with the widespread circulation of Part Two of Rights of Man, Cobbett’s work 
ensured that concerns about disaffection in the military actually grew between January and 
December 1792. A flood of anonymous tips came into the Home Office claiming that soldiers 
were engaging with the works of Paine, that they were clamorous for a real rise in pay, and ripe 
for rebellion.59 Such reports are difficult to substantiate and are addressed in more detail in a 
subsequent chapter.60 However, Emsley’s assessment of the limited nature of political 
disaffection within the ranks fits with the fact that there is little or no evidence of open mutiny 
in the War Office files for this period.61 Nevertheless, as Philp has pointed out, ‘a consistent 
concern’ among conservatives in the early 1790s was the question of the military’s reliability.62 
This stemmed, in part, from the soldiers’ continued impoverishment.63  
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3.3.  Militia Mutinies and the Pay Reforms of 1795 
In the period 1793-5, it was not the regular army, but the militia who gave greatest cause for 
concern. In terms of pay and conditions, there was little to distinguish the militia from the army 
serving at home. The Militia Act dictated that, once embodied, militiamen were to be paid at the 
same rate as the regular soldiery.64 However, there were a few key difference between the two 
forces. The family allowance granted to the dependents of militiamen suggest that they were 
more likely to be married men.65 This is underscored by the requests made by certain militia 
officers, to have their units stationed near their home county during the winter months, to 
facilitate family visits.66 Arguably, therefore, the militia had a stronger bond with civilian 
society. Congruent with their status as family men, service in the militia was also limited to the 
home garrison, and to a certain number of years of duration. While in the army, service was for 
life and was likely to involve overseas campaigns. Due to their relatively light duties, 
militiamen were often goaded as ‘featherbed soldiers’.67 The limited nature of the militiaman’s 
commitment led George III to diagnose that ‘ties’ of deference and obedience, between officers 
and their men, were more fragile in the militia than in the army.68 In one sense, a weaker form 
of discipline was consistent with the contemporary political view of the militia, as a citizen-
army staffed by amateurs.69 However, senior militia officers were often criticized for taking 
extended leaves of absence, and for allowing standards of drill and discipline to drop too low.70 
For these reasons the militia, particularly in the early stages of the conflict, was viewed as less 
reliable than the troops of longer standing.71 
Immediately after the militia was embodied for permanent duty in December 1792, there were 
‘murmurs’ and disobedience over the issue of ‘marching guineas’. Militiamen were entitled to 
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one guinea before being marched out of their home county, and some regiments refused to 
budge until payment was forthcoming.72 Rather more serious protests occurred in the summers 
of 1793 and 1794, when most militia units were encamped on the southern coast, to ward off a 
French invasion.73 At Warley Common in Essex, for example, privates of the Cambridgeshire 
Militia complained of being cheated out of their pay by officers who supplied them with sub-
standard shoes in order to enrich themselves. This injustice was compounded by the relative 
generosity displayed by the officers of the Derbyshire Militia, who allowed their men an extra 
hour in the evenings before curfew.74 Open rioting broke out in the camp on 22 July 1793. One 
hundred and fifty men of the Cambridgeshire refused to return to their tents, shouting ‘every 
Man for his Right’, and headed for the armoury in order to seize their weapons. Three men 
were later sentenced by court martial to between 300-500 lashes.75 Vertical relations within the 
militia were not much improved the following year, when Captain Farmer, Adjutant of the 
Leicestershire Militia, was ‘designedly shot’ during firing practice at Danbury Camp.76 It was 
presumed that the incident was an act of personal revenge for an earlier flogging.77 However, 
upon investigation, a wider consensus among the men revealed itself. One witness from the 
Leicestershires remarked, ‘there was not a man that liked [Farmer] and now the redgiment [sic.] 
does as well again’.78  
Evidence from newspapers and courts martial records reveal that a great deal of disorder 
emanated from the militia units based in the southern encampments.79 There was inter-
regimental fighting between the 12th Dragoons and East York Militia in June 1794, for example.80 
Further, the illegal appropriation of private property, particularly fencing and trees to provide 
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firewood, appears to have been a perennial problem.81 Yet, while soldiers in camps were often 
lacking in sufficient fuel, they were at least provided with six pounds of subsidized 
‘ammunition bread’ every four days. A charge of five pence was ‘stopped’ from soldiers wages 
and the remaining cost was made up by government, who purchased vast quantities from 
contractors.82 When camps were broken up in the winter months, however, the army and militia 
were sent into towns to live in barracks or, more usually, public houses until the following 
spring. Over the winter of 1794 most militia regiments were sent into southern coastal towns.83 
Here they were expected to group together in small ‘messes’ and to purchase their own food at 
market prices.84 However, this proved difficult after the poor harvest of 1794 precipitated 
nationwide price increases in the spring of 1795.  
Inflationary food prices were exacerbated in the South by the high concentration of troops. Not 
only was additional bread needed to feed the soldiers themselves, a surprising amount of flour 
was also consumed by regiments in the form of hair-powder, supplies of corn were required to 
feed cavalry horses, and prodigious quantities of biscuit and fresh foods were loaded each day 
onto warships, by order of the Victualling Office.85 In the southern maritime counties, where 
both troops and naval vessels were stationed, prices rose faster than they did in the country as a 
whole.86 Although both soldiers and citizens felt the effects of price movements, the troops were 
particularly vulnerable, as they could not take advantage of the charitable subscriptions, and 
parish relief schemes, which supplemented the wages of the civilian poor.87 Their sensitive 
economic situation, their strength in numbers, combined with the lax discipline noted above, 
explains why militiamen were among the first groups to resort to food rioting in the spring of 
1795. From March there were a series of food riots, starting in Devon and Gloucestershire, and 
later occurring in Kent and Sussex, in which soldiers, and primarily militiamen, took an active 
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role in market interventions and price fixing.88 In all there appear to have been protests at 
twelve locations involving militia units, and a further two involving Irish independent 
companies.89 
The principal target of the protesting troops was upon the two main constituents of their diet, 
bread and meat.90  Where we have sufficient detail regarding their actions, the consistency with 
which riotous soldiers set a ‘just price’ is quite remarkable. The price of butcher’s meat, for 
example, was set by militia-crowds at the rate of four to four and a half pence by several 
different militia units stationed at Canterbury, Portsmouth, Chichester, and Seaford.91 There 
was a similar consistency in terms of bread, which was set at six pence per quartern loaf, at both 
Canterbury and Chichester, towns ninety miles apart.92 Soldiers were typically outsiders to the 
communities in which they were stationed and therefore relatively alienated from the local 
‘micro-politics of provisioning’ emphasised by John Bohstedt.93 However in the majority of 
these food riots, soldiers can be seen championing the ‘moral economy’ on behalf of the local 
inhabitants. In Plymouth, for example, the assistance of locally stationed troops was actively 
sought by dock-men wishing to lower prices in the marketplace. Likewise at Chichester ‘the 
soldiers and the Towns People [were] united in requiring of the Bakers to deliver them Bread at 
Six pence’.94 Furthermore, on a handful of occasions, it was the traditional enemy of the ‘moral 
economy’, the withholder of locally-grown foodstuffs, who was the target of the crowd’s 
animosity.95  
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However, the actions of the militiamen suggest that their grievances lay beyond market 
malpractice and local ‘community politics’. The highly consistent levels at which prices were 
regulated by different units, at different times and places, sets them apart from other crowd 
interventions. Both Bohstedt and Stevenson have emphasized the importance of ‘face-to-face’ 
community relations and have suggested that a ‘just price’ was usually ‘dictated by local 
circumstances and the conditions of the market’. 96 The militiamen, by contrast, seem to have 
formulated a ‘just price’ which reflected what they could afford to pay, and what they 
customarily received in camp, rather than one which mirrored the agreed worth of the produce 
in the context of the local economy. By mid-April it was clear that troops ‘from Plymouth all 
along the coast … [were] in a state of Commotion on account of the high Price of Bread and 
Provisions’.97 Serious rioting was witnessed at Chichester with the Hereford Militia 
overpowering the civil authorities, releasing rioters in custody, and stoning the windows of a 
tavern in which the magistrates had taken shelter.98 However the climax was undoubtedly the 
infamous rioting amongst the Oxfordshire Militia on 16-17 April. Wells has documented in 
detail their extensive mutiny, however, the original cause of their actions bears repeating. 
Matters came to a head when the price of meat pushed up above the rate of four and a half 
pence per pound, with the soldiers complaining that, at that price, they would have nothing left 
to pay for washing, and that they would sooner be ‘revenged of the butchers’.99  
In the two-day mutiny which followed, the Oxfordshires lowered the price of numerous articles 
in Seaford, and seized large quantities of corn for resale at Newhaven. The seriousness which 
government attached to these events can be inferred from their swift reaction. Three separate 
military units converged on Seaford including the Horse Artillery equipped with cannon. After 
the mutiny was suppressed four men were put to death under the authority of a Court Martial 
and a hastily assembled Special Assize.100 Moreover, as a direct result of the increasing 
frequency and intensity of the militia mutinies, government was forced to alter the manner in 
which troops were provisioned. Again reluctant to raise wages, orders were given on 18 and 25 
April for colonels to enter into contracts with bakers and butchers to supply bread at five pence 
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per loaf and meat at four and half pence per pound to their soldiers. Where contractors’ charges 
exceeded the set rate for bread and meat, government would make up the shortfall, and the 
soldier’s subsistence would be protected.101 It is notable that the government-approved prices 
for bread and meat were almost identical to the rate at which the militiamen themselves had 
been enforcing sales. 
Although justified by Pitt as ‘a mere temporary relief’, subsidized bread and meat remained a 
feature of military provisioning at the end of the decade.102 For government the reforms were an 
immediate success. By purchasing from contractors, officers could place a distance between 
their men and the marketing of food and, as a result, troop-led food rioting quickly 
evaporated.103 A lone private of the North York Militia was prosecuted in Sunderland for riot 
and theft from a butcher in August 1795, and it was claimed that the Somerset Militia had 
incited food rioting at Weymouth in April 1801.104 However, in the main, the reforms effectively 
ended the militia’s involvement in food rioting. Some units were even trusted to suppress 
civilian food rioting in the summer of 1795.105 Having said this, we should not overestimate the 
generosity of the provision provided. Young soldiers with ‘sharp appetites’ continued to 
complain of their hunger and of the quality of the ‘ammunition bread’ supplied by 
contractors.106 It remained common for farmers to find soldiers, ‘on the turnip rounds’, plucking 
up root vegetables lying near their barracks and camps.107 However, subsidized bread and meat, 
did at least secure to the soldier a baseline of subsistence which was protected from inflation. In 
a decade in which the cost of living rose by sixty-five percent, this was a significant concession 
from government, and an important victory for the men.108  
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3.4.  The Menace of Mutiny and the Pay Increase of 1797 
The reform of soldier’s pay and provisioning did not follow a premeditated program. The 
government was responsive to the political situation on the ground, and sought to stem the 
growth of disaffection in the armed forces where it appeared. The substantial pay rise granted 
in 1797 followed a similar pattern to the earlier reforms but took place in a more heated political 
context. By 1797 the repressive ‘Two Acts’ (1795) had cowed many moderate radical leaders 
into silence and inactivity, and had destroyed overt extra-parliamentary opposition in England. 
In the absence of a legal arena in which to organize, committed radicals were increasingly 
drawn towards a ‘revolutionary underground’.109 At the same time, from April 1797, there were 
a series of mutinies in the navy. E.P. Thompson saw the naval mutinies of 1797 as a 
‘revolutionary moment’ which, for over two months, created an opening for a French invasion, 
and exposed ‘how precarious was the hold of the English ancien régime’.110 Certainly, the 
government was afraid that the mutinies were instigated by French agents or Irish 
revolutionaries. Recent revisionist histories have demonstrated that such concerns were 
overdrawn.111 The United Irish societies did not awaken to the possibility of systematically 
infiltrating the navy until after the 1797 munities. Likewise, the French Revolutionary 
government had no information on the mutinies until after they were concluded.112 The initial 
Spithead mutiny (16 April – 15 May) is now seen primarily as a protracted labour dispute 
which won important improvements for the seamen. From mid-May the wages of able seamen 
were increased to thirty shillings per month.113 
However, it is undeniable that during the sequel mutiny at the Nore, there were concerted 
efforts by English ultra-radicals to communicate with the fleet and that a minority of 
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revolutionary sailors had some bearing upon events.114 Robert Watson, who was goaled for his 
attempts to reignite the crimp riots of 1794, for example, was in communication with the 
figurehead of the Nore mutiny, Richard Parker.115 There is also evidence that a handful of 
United Irishmen were present in the sailors’ delegations.116 The fact that one vessel sailed to 
France, in order to evade capture, also suggests a revolutionary impetus among a minority of 
the mutineers.117 The government was unwilling to accede to the more radical demands of the 
men at the Nore, and suppressed the mutiny by intercepting the seamen’s correspondence, 
curtailing their supplies, and eventually, by court-martialing, and hanging their presumed 
leaders. 
At the same time as these potentially revolutionary events were unfolding, as Stevenson has 
suggested, the government was also dealing with the ‘tremor’ of mutiny in the land forces.118 
Once the demands of the Spithead sailors were conceded by government (23 April), ultra-
radicals resolved to inspire jealousies and copycat mutinies among the militia and the army. At 
Newcastle on 14 May, for example, troops were encouraged by anonymous handbills to 
assemble en masse ‘in order to demand an increase of pay’.119 Concurrently, bills were left in the 
sentry boxes of Hyde Park and Westminster for the Foot Guards to find.120 While an agent, 
‘wicked Williams’, was sent by persons unknown, to ‘inflame’ the soldiers barracked in 
London. The man was found to be an impoverished preacher, who went about ‘reading aloud 
proposals’ for a pay rise which he claimed had been endorsed by William Wilberforce.121 
Emsley has suggested that the leaders of the LCS were instrumental in publishing the seditious 
pamphlets which sought to seduce the soldiery.122 It is plausible that the same men were 
connected with Williams. While it remains unclear how the soldiers themselves reacted to these 
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attempts123, we know that the government was extremely alarmed, and responded quickly to 
developments in London. On 13 May, Williams was arrested and questioned, and Pitt called a 
meeting to consider the pay of the soldiery.124 The following day, the Duke of York issued 
general orders for the Guards to be kept in their ‘orderly rooms’, and for the men to be 
informed that, ‘in consequence of the advantages granted to the Navy, Government would take 
their situation into consideration so as to render it more comfortable’.125 On 16 May these 
intentions were made public by Pitt in the Commons.126 The government thereby removed 
much of the sting from the radical agitation. 
In the following week, handbills continued to be thrown into barrack yards, notably in 
Norwich, Newcastle, and particularly around the Medway towns, where committed 
revolutionaries, such as Watson and Henry Fellows, had gravitated. These attempts at 
subversion were a complete failure. Soldiers in London burned the handbills while, elsewhere 
in the country, several regiments offered a week’s pay as a reward for the arrest of their 
author.127 Partly, this reflected on the faulty logic of the radical argument which was held out. 
As Miller has argued for the Chartist era, English revolutionaries could not easily reconcile the 
plebeian status of the common soldier with his position as an agent of unelected authority. 
Seditionists therefore frequently struggled to make a convincing appeal to the soldiery without 
veering into anti-militarist abuse.128 For example, the handbill found in Henry Fellows’ 
possession at Maidstone, which made appearances elsewhere, effectively isolated a number of 
hardships connected with soldiering; low pay, long marches, harsh discipline, and being 
confined in barracks. However, in the same breath, the author accused the soldiers of being 
‘slaves’ and questioned their manly independence.129 Soldiers in the Chatham Marine Barracks 
published a strongly-worded repost to the handbill which suggests they were greatly ‘insulted’ 
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by its contents. As well as being unimpressed by allusions to their subordination, it is important 
to note that the marines rejected the radicals’ case on the grounds that they were ‘satisfied’ with 
the government’s ‘declared intentions in our favour’.130 The ‘satisfaction’ among the troops is 
further evidenced by the successful deployment of regular and militia regiments to the coasts of 
Kent and Essex, where they assisted in the apprehension and processing of the Nore 
mutineers.131  
However, the authorities did face worrying signs of mutiny within the Royal Artillery, although 
this was largely the result of a political bungle, rather than radical subversion. Pitt’s pay 
increase, for the army and militia, passed the House on 24 May but the Prime Minister had said 
nothing about the Royal Artillery, which was under the separate jurisdiction of the Ordnance 
Office. The London press reported that on 25 May, during the evening parade at Woolwich, 
there was a ‘disagreeable altercation’ between an artillery gunner and an officer, followed by a 
‘spirit of insubordination’.132 A great deal of ‘noise and improper proceedings’ followed, and 
Pitt was awoken early on 26 May with news of a ‘riot’ among the artillery gunners.133 A Cabinet 
meeting was hastily convened and Marquis Cornwallis, as Master General of the Ordnance, was 
dispatched to Woolwich.134 The authorities clearly feared the prospect of a violent confrontation. 
Dragoons were marched in from Croydon, the East London Militia was sent to Greenwich Park, 
the Light Horse Volunteers were assembled on Blackheath, and the Foot Guards were held in 
readiness at St James’.135 At 7am Cornwallis successfully paraded the 900 privates and NCOs of 
the Woolwich Garrison and heard their grievances. The men complained that they had been 
subjected to unnecessary drilling, to ‘severity and contempt’ from certain officers, and, most 
tellingly, they suffered from a ‘want [of] increased pay’.136 General Orders were therefore hastily 
issued which confirmed that the artillerymen would be granted the same raise as the army.137 
                                                   
130 Norfolk Chronicle, 3 June 1797. 
131 London Evening Post, 23 May 1797; Nottingham Journal, 24 June 1797. 
132 Whitehall Evening Post, 25-7 May 1797. 
133 Whitehall Evening Post, 1-3 June 1797; Wilberforce, The Life of William Wilberforce Vol. 2, p. 219. 
134 St James’ Chronicle, 25-7 May 1797. 
135 HO 50/399, Herries –King, 30 May 1797; London Evening Post, 27-30 May 1797; St James’ Chronicle, 25-7 
May 1797. 
136 Whitehall Evening Post, 25-7 May 1797. 




By the suggestion of the men themselves, declarations of contentment on the part of the 
artillerymen, were signed and issued to the public.138 
Thus the soldier’s pay was increased by two shillings and a half pence, giving him a gross wage 
of seven shillings a week. From this total, four shillings were allocated for food, two shillings 
for necessaries and washing, leaving the soldier with, a not inconsiderable, one shilling a week 
net pay.139 This contrasts favourably with the two pence weekly which Cobbett claimed he was 
left with as a private in the 1780s.140 Moreover, when taken alongside the provision of free 
accommodation, small beer, and partly subsidized food, it is clear that the new terms placed the 
soldier on par with Davies’ labourers, for the first time in decades. This is further borne out by 
orders that soldiers were to receive seven pounds of better-quality ‘household bread’ and five 
pounds of meat, both at pegged prices. The Duke of York was confident that his orders would 
‘rivet that affection for the King and Country, which has ever been the pride of British 
soldiers’.141 Indeed, the substantial rise was met with some elation. Artillerymen at Porchester, 
for example, left their posts to go drinking, they abused local farmers, and broke windows, ‘all 
[in] consequence of the King’s bounty’.142 Such behaviour is testament to the generosity of the 
pay increase. Yet, it must be acknowledged that the raise was largely won by the men 
themselves. The menace of mutiny in the Foot Guards and the Artillery was enough, in the 
shadow of the naval mutinies, to force government’s hand.  The adjustments to pay and 
provision seen in this decade must, therefore, be seen as a process of negotiation between the 
soldiery and the authorities. However, soldiers did not live by bread alone. It is now necessary 
to consider his social existence. His duties, his labours, his leisure activities, his health, and his 
living conditions. 
3.5.  Social Conditions of Soldiering: Work and Leisure 
The primary task of the soldier in the home garrison was to learn his ‘drill and exercise’. In 
camp, soldiers were drilled, for eight hours every day, except Thursdays and Sundays. The men 
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learned formations, manoeuvres, and how to handle their weapons.143 Given that the barrel of 
the soldier’s musket weighed over two and a half kilos, performing manoeuvres without 
‘sloping’ one’s arms was physically exerting.144 Thomas Jackson describes the particularly 
painful ‘porcupine drill’ which was used as punishment for ‘incorrigible bad characters’. The 
men were made to march up and down, with their muskets held constantly in the firing 
position, for ‘eight hours’ at a time.145 Unsurprisingly, many new recruits were shocked at the 
relentlessness of their training and struggled to acclimatize to the ‘eternal drill’.146 Once 
mastered, however, soldiers were occasionally called upon to demonstrate their skills at 
reviews and mock-battles which were open to the public. These events were undoubtedly 
intended to inspire public confidence in Britain’s military might and thereby heighten national 
sentiment.147 These were intensely physical spectacles, with huge distances covered by the 
troops, in which injuries, and even deaths, were not uncommon.148 Soldiers may well have 
enjoyed the performative aspect of these parade days, however, their duties were usually more 
mundane.  
As Linebaugh has pointed out, eighteenth-century soldiers ‘were as familiar with the spade as 
the musket’.149 At the beginning of each summer encampment, for example, troops were 
expected to clear the ground and set up their tents.150 ‘Ordinary duties’ saw soldiers digging 
entrenchments to strengthen defensive positions, and mending roads to facilitate the marching 
of troops.  While ‘extraordinary duties’ included the construction of public works, such as forts 
and Martello towers. In the latter case, soldiers were paid as day labourers between eight pence 
to one shilling eight pence, depending on their level of skill.151 Soldiers were looked upon as an 
extremely cheap source of labour for these projects.152 However, they were known for shirking. 
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The stipendiary magistrate Aaron Graham reported that, convict-labourers did ‘double the 
quantity performed by an equal number of Labouring Soldiers’, and advised that troops were 
better placed in a supervisory role.153 As ‘overseers’ of convict labour from the hulks, soldiers 
were paid a shilling on top of their wages.154 The Board of Ordnance relied on this combination 
of military and convict labour to build a number of defensive structures, including the vast 
Cumberland Fort at Portsmouth.155 Soldiers were also called upon to guard French prisoners of 
war held in prisons like Norman Cross. This duty could be arduous, as troops were often 
considerably outnumbered by prisoners bent on escape. Sixteen Frenchmen escaped from 
Norman Cross in 1804 and two were shot attempting to do the same at Porchester Castle in 
February 1797.156 Other guard duties included protecting the ‘King’s treasure’ in transit to naval 
vessels, escorting felons sentenced to transportation, and deserters en route to the Savoy prison 
in London.157 The labour of soldiers was therefore invaluable for the construction of the nation’s 
physical defences and for the daily workings of the penal system. 
By far the most visible and arduous duty the soldiery in England performed was the 
suppression of public disorder.158 Hastily dispatched troops could arrive on the scene of a riot 
lacking essential equipment.159 Even when fully accoutred, soldiers received no riot-control 
training, and were invariably outnumbered by crowds.  News that troops had been dispatched 
might disperse protestors. However, crowds often re-formed elsewhere, leading to a cat-and-
mouse scenario.160 The South Devon Militia were on high alert for seven days during the tin-
miners’ disturbances of 1793. Some of the men got no sleep and were left ‘worn out and ill with 
fatigue’.161 Five days of continuous riot duty in the vicinity of Nottingham in 1800 had a similar 
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effect upon the Horse Guards.162 In a significant minority of cases, crowds chose to confront the 
soldiers. Here the military were at risk from projectiles, fist blows, and even pistol fire. While 
the Staffordshire miners were said, on more than one occasion, to have set their bulldogs 
against the troops.163 Riot-duty was thus gruelling and intrinsically dangerous. 
However, maintaining public order could be more than just physically punishing for the men. 
Where civilian blood was spilt, soldiers invariably had to bear the odium of the populace, 
sometimes for years to come.164 For example, in 1791, the Mayor of Nottingham informed the 
Secretary-at-War, that the 15th Light Dragoons were still popularly reviled for having killed an 
inhabitant twenty-five years earlier, and that quartering the regiment in the town would be ill-
advised.165 Similarly, due to their violent suppression of the ‘Bristol Bridge riot’, the Hereford 
Militia were heckled in the streets, as ‘the bloody regiment’, every time they passed through the 
city.166 Thus the soldier became a pariah by dint of his duty. However, given the immense 
potential for fatalities, historians have noted how rarely large death-tolls accrued during late 
eighteenth-century riots.167 Out of seventy-six military interventions in the food riots of 1795, for 
example, there were just eight recorded civilian fatalities, six of which were the result of actions 
by the volunteers and yeomanry, not the regular soldiery.168 The restraint shown was partly due 
to the legal restrictions placed upon the military by the terms of the Riot Act.169 Yet equally, the 
rank and file of the army had no desire to massacre their countrymen. This was particularly 
true where regiments had a local connection with the areas they were ‘policing’. During food 
rioting at the Etruria pottery works in 1783, for example, the Staffordshire Militia refused to fire 
upon their friends and neighbours.170 Likewise the men of the Oxford Blues, who were largely 
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recruited from the industrial districts of the North171, ‘repeatedly refused to fire’ during food 
rioting in Nottingham in 1800, and were said to be ‘beloved … by all the people’ for their 
‘humanity’.172 Given these difficulties, officers tended to adopt the tactics of symbolic 
confrontation and intimidation, rather than ordering the use of deadly force.173 
The army could be used to neutralize social tensions. However, the presence of troops was just 
as likely to create frictions of its own. Publicans, for example, continually complained of having 
to provide soldiers with quarters and some simply refused to do so.174 Remuneration from the 
War Office was often unforthcoming and military lodgers reduced the amount of revenue 
publicans could make from civilian customers.175 Moreover, while in quarters, soldiers were in 
direct contact with the public, who could be antagonistic.176 Irish regiments, in particular, were 
known for eliciting civilian hostilities, but also for retaliating to insults with gang violence.177 
The High Sherriff of Gloucestershire remarked, with some justification, that Irish troops were 
likely to ‘create infinitely more Broils than they would quell’.178 The 5th Dragoon Guards, for 
example, were involved in three major clashes with civilians in 1795 alone, the last of which, at 
Stratford-upon-Avon, resulted in a civilian fatality.179 Historians often associate Irish forces with 
indiscipline.180 However, their behaviour in England also reflects the attitudes of the public, 
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who were often fiercely intolerant of the Irish.181 The Wallace Fencibles (who were largely 
recruited in Ireland) struck out at the inhabitants of Hampshire after they found that 
Englishmen everywhere ‘stigmatized’ them as ‘Rebels’.182 Indeed Anglo-Irish civil-military 
clashes were most common in the aftermath of the Irish rebellions of 1798 and 1803 suggesting 
increased tensions at these moments.183 
However, non-Irish regiments could also be ill-treated by their host communities. Hayter 
asserts that, in the mid-century, ‘soldier baiting was a common form of sport’.184 During our 
own period this popular recreation seems to have gained momentum. In Brentwood for 
example, two female ‘vagrants’ were apprehended by a captain of the marines for singing 
seditious ballads ‘which reflected on the military’.185 Likewise, in Manchester, the West 
Yorkshire Militia came to blows with ‘a vast concourse of unemployed artisans’, as the former 
were paraded in St Anne’s Square. The militiamen were subjected to hisses and groans, while 
performing their ‘evolutions’, and the windows of their quarters were subsequently smashed.186 
It is unclear what caused the disturbances in Manchester. However, there frequently appears to 
have been political undertones to these confrontations. For example, street battles between the 
inhabitants of Sheffield and the 6th Enniskillen Dragoons occurred in 1792, after a 
‘misunderstanding’ emerged between the townspeople and the officers of the regiment. It was 
heavily implied that radicals had been attempting to engage the private soldiers in political 
conversation at the Tontine inn.187 Similarly, radicals in York were drawn to the parading of the 
115th Regiment in order to ‘inflame the minds of the men’. Several civilians were arrested for 
shouting seditious slogans including ‘England is a country of freedom’ and ‘Damn you, why 
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don’t you lay down your arms?’.188 In an effort to reduce fraternization, political indoctrination, 
and hostilities, the War Office kept regiments in constant circulation round the country.189 Even 
well-behaved regiments were not allowed to remain stationary for long, and soldiers became 
habituated to long marches, and to a regular ‘change of scene’.190 
In between marching, drilling, day-labour, and occasional riot-duty, soldiers did get some free 
time. Indeed, as we have seen, the popular perception that soldiers enjoyed a ‘holiday’ lifestyle, 
was an important attraction for many working-class enlists.191 Upon inspection, this popular 
view appears to have been somewhat exaggerated, and was undoubtedly encouraged by 
recruiters. Soldiers were clearly put to work by their officers. Having said this, in the winter 
months, when troops were dispersed in quarters, and when the weather prevented manual 
labour and drilling, soldiers may well have had more leisure time than many other occupational 
groups. Highly-paid artisans were notorious for exercising their ‘leisure preference’ and for 
keeping alive the custom of ‘Saint Monday’. However, live-in farm-servants, and wage-earning 
field labourers, were subjected to ‘unrelenting’ work-discipline and received very little leisure 
time.192 Both agriculturalists and officers agreed that life in the militia was an ‘easier and more 
idle life’ than full-time farm labour.193 Moreover, we know from the actions of militiamen that 
their leisure time was a jealously guarded privilege. In December 1795, for example, the 
Huntingdonshire Militia ‘badly smatch’d’ [sic.] Yarmouth barracks in protest against the 
introduction of an earlier curfew. The barrack gates were shut against the men to prevent them 
from frequenting ‘low Alehouses’ and causing disturbances. However, the men resented the 
infringement upon their leisure hours and ‘broke windows, destroyed part of the building, and 
                                                   
188 Courier, 27 July 1795; Oracle, 4 August 1795; Assi 45/38/3/125, York Summer Assizes - Examination of 
Richard Walker, 18 July 1795; WO 1/1093, f. 458, Spencer – Windham, 29 June 1795. 
189 Corfield, The Impact of English Towns, p. 167; S. H. Myerly, British Military Spectacle, p. 7. 
190 See account by George Borrow, whose father was Adjutant to the East Norfolk Militia, and whose early 
years were spent following that regiment; G. Borrow, Lavengro; The Scholar, The Gypsy, The Priest (Paris, 
1851) p. 9. 
191 See Chapter 2.2. 
192 E.P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism', Past & Present, 38 (1967), pp. 73-4, 
77; Rule, Experience of Labour, pp. 56-7. 




threatened to demolish the whole’. Order was only restored by the arrival of cavalry, and by the 
artillery, who turned their cannons on the riotous soldiers.194 
As the above instance suggests, much of the soldier’s free time was spent in the alehouse. 
George has argued that drink was ever-present in eighteenth-century society.195 However, 
alcohol appears to have figured more prominently in the lives of soldiers than it did among 
other groups. As a daily minimum, soldiers in settled quarters were entitled to five pints of 
small-beer, or three pints of ‘better quality’ beer when in barracks.196 By comparison, Eden 
considered labourers who allowed themselves one pint a day, to be overindulgent.197 In camps, 
soldiers represented a captive market for itinerant retailers, known as ‘sutlers’, who sold them 
beer as well as food.198 In addition, the potential for profit-making meant that strong ‘spirituous 
liquor’ was often smuggled into camps by locals.199 Likewise, soldiers quartered in taverns were 
unavoidably exposed to conviviality and hard-drinking.200 On royal birthdays, loyalists might 
‘treat’ soldiers and urge them to join in loyal toasts.201 While on other occasions, moralizers 
castigated soldiers for their drinking-habits, and warned of the ruinous consequences which 
flowed from alcohol.202 Closely associated with his weakness for drink was the soldier’s 
penchant for gambling. Men of all ranks in the West Yorkshire Militia, for example, stayed up 
until the early hours playing cards and laying bets. One officer complained his regiment had 
become a ‘crib of low gamesters’.203 Similarly, private soldiers in Colchester barracks were 
ordered to refrain from ‘breaking the Sabbath’. They were known to gather in large numbers on 
a Sunday to play ‘pitch and toss and other games’.204 Finally, soldiers were also noted for their 
use of prostitutes. Francis Place claimed the Foot Guards habitually associated with London’s 
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‘horrible women’ and that the latter congregated round the Tilt Yard Guard House.205 
Regimental Courts Martial records tend to confirm this assertion. Privates from the Grenadier 
Guards were punished, on more than one occasion, for assaulting watchmen sent to arrest 
‘disorderly women’.206 Similarly, although prostitutes were banned from military encampments, 
demand tended to ensure supply.207 Indeed, one pamphleteer argued that, as soldiers in the 
army were discouraged from taking wives, such liaisons were inevitable.208 
Thus, there is some truth to the popular view that soldiers spent long hours in ‘idleness’ and 
‘vice’. William Cobbett, for one, claimed that all of his fellow-soldiers spent their time in vulgar 
‘dissipations’, while he bettered himself through reading and study.209 However, we should be 
cautious of accepting this account. Cobbett’s industriousness was not unique. Many soldiers 
used their free time to practice their pre-enlistment trades.  Tailors and shoemakers could 
supplement their military wages by altering soldiers’ clothing. Moreover, when new uniforms 
were issued, tailors would be excused from ‘ordinary duties’, placed in workshops, and 
employed by the regiment to make up the men’s clothes.210 Although the men were paid piece-
rates for their labour, the work-discipline was severe, with fines and military punishments for 
lateness and drunkenness.211 Farriers were likewise gainfully employed by cavalry regiments 
and were sought-after recruits.212 Even unskilled labourers could earn extra money, by working 
the harvest, so long as they had a change of clothes and permission from their commanding 
officer.213 Leisure hours could also provide an opportunity to learn new skills. Allen Davenport 
acquired the trade of a shoemaker while in the Windsor Foresters.214 This was a particularly 
shrewd use of one’s time. Once discharged, soldiers were entitled to set up trade in any town, 
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even if they had not served an apprenticeship, or earned the ‘liberty of the city’.215 Civilian by-
employment was therefore an important part of the experience of soldiering in the home 
garrison. 
In addition to being maligned as idlers, soldiers are often seen, by both contemporaries and 
historians, as politically inert.216 Yet, as in English society at large, there is scattered evidence of 
republicanism and anti-monarchism within the rank and file of the armed forces. William 
Peever, for example, while quartered in a Manchester alehouse, damned the king, cursed his 
regiment, and wished success to the French.217 While Joseph Ward proclaimed himself to be of 
equal worth to his officers, and castigated his ‘tyrannical’ commanders, for failing to pass on the 
benefits of the 1795 pay reforms.218 ‘Seditionists’, such as Ward, who articulated the language of 
‘rights’, tended to be publically punished, and ignominiously ‘drummed out’ of the regiment, to 
prevent their politics from taking root.219 Likewise, the penalties for civilians attempting to 
‘seduce the soldiery from their duty’ were ratcheted up in the period after the naval mutinies.220 
Some officers tried to inspire a countervailing loyalism in their men. Captain Crauford, in an 
attempt to recover the mutinous reputation of the Queens Dragoons, for example, laid on a 
lavish ‘Paine burning’ at Dorchester.221 Yet Crauford was admonished by the Home Secretary 
for having gone too far.222 As Cookson has pointed out, the eighteenth-century military ideal 
was to ‘compartmentalise’ political partisanship, not to encourage it. More usually troops were 
urged to identify simply with the monarchy and the nation as a whole.223 As Emsley has 
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suggested, for the most part, troops in England wore an outward face of patriotism, and appear 
to have remained loyal.224 
Only in the Foot Guards were there consistent signs of political disaffection. Historians have 
rightly focused upon the ‘Despard conspiracy’ of 1802 where as many of 300 guardsmen were 
implicated in a revolutionary plot to ‘take possession’ of the king on his way to Parliament. Two 
soldiers were hanged as traitors on the gallows with Despard in February 1803.225 However, 
signs of politicisation were in evidence much earlier. During the Flanders campaign, Lord 
Herbert described the Foot Guards as the ‘most terrible apt scholars’.226 Seditious material was 
known have been brought into their London barracks in August 1795 and, if Thomas Jackson is 
to be believed, this was not unusual.227 As a private in the Coldstream Guards, Jackson was 
exposed to numerous works of ‘republican’ and ‘immoral tendencies’ including Paine’s Rights of 
Man (1791-2), Age of Reason (1794), and Volney’s The Ruins: Or Survey of the Revolutions of Empires 
(1789).228 There was limited official supervision of guardsmen as the majority were found, 
‘scattered and left to their own discretion’, in London’s pubs.229 As the Guards rarely left the 
capital, a number of soldiers lived as ‘outlyers’ [sic.], and worked part-time civilian jobs.230 
Guardsmen were thus peculiarly vulnerable to radical indoctrination. Long before the arrest of 
Despard and his co-conspirators in November 1802, anonymous revolutionary placards, dating 
from the food crisis of 1800, heralded the Guards as the shock-troops of an impending 
rebellion.231 Likewise Spy reports suggest a regicidal plot led by the Guards was in meditation 
                                                   
224 Emsley, 'The Military and Popular Disorder’, p. 101; Royle, Revolutionary Britannia?, p. 187. 
225 Emsley, 'The Military and Popular Disorder’, p. 101; S. Poole, The Politics of Regicide in England, 1760-
1850: Troublesome Subjects (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 134-8; P. 
Linebaugh and M. Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: The Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic 
(London: Verso, 2000), pp. 250-80; Elliott, Partners in Revolution, pp. 282-97. 
226 Lord Herbert – Lady Pembroke, 26 September 1793 in Lord Herbert (ed.), Pembroke Papers: Letters and 
Diaries of Henry Tenth Earl of Pembroke, Vol. 2 (Johnathan Cape: London, 1950), pp. 493-7. 
227 WO 1/1085, f. 493, D’Oyly – Windham[?], 15 August 1795. 
228 Jackson, Narrative of the Eventful Life of Thomas Jackson, pp. 157-8. 
229 Sinclair, Cursory Remarks on the Army in General, p. 9. 
230 For example, William Graham, a private in 1st Regiment Foot Guards who was an informant in the 
Despard circle, was described in a memorandum as ‘a Cumberland Man lives at number 2 Windmill 
street, is a shoemaker’. See also the case of Thomas Humphreys, who lodged with a shoemaker as an 
‘outlyer’[sic.] from the Guards, and worked ‘dressing tripe’ in his front room. OBP, trial of Thomas 
Humphreys & Thomas Johns, 10 May 1780 (t17800510-33); HO 42/46, ff. 105-6, Examination of William 
Graham  before Richard Ford, 12 March 1799. 




as early as July 1800.232 A letter-writer claiming to be from the Foot Guards, claimed in October 
1800 that, ‘we have a great man that will join as soon as a revolt is made’, presumably an 
advanced reference to Colonel Despard.233 At least one of the key conspirators was an English-
born soldier.234 However, it was the high proportion of London-Irish found in the Guards which 
explains their readiness to engage in the regicidal plot, which was intended to coincide with 
Emmet’s Dublin rising of 1803.235 
Indeed by the Napoleonic period one third of the army’s rank and file was Irish.236 The 
significant presence of Irishmen, and therefore Catholics, complicates the notion, put forward 
by Conway and Brumwell, of a ‘military melting pot’, in which a protestant national 
consciousness was forged.237 Firstly, the mixing together of many ethnic groups within the army 
was not always a unifying experience. The English and Irish in the 81st Regiment, for example, 
‘made a game’ of Richard Flockheart whenever he spoke in his native Scottish accent.238 While 
inter-regimental fighting could break out between units with strong ethnic or regional ties.239 
Secondly, Colley has emphasized the role of the Anglican clergy in promoting a sense of 
national ‘patriotic consensus’ among the civilian public.240 Again this is difficult to apply neatly 
to the military. As Snape has argued, the there was a strong religious subculture of Catholicism 
and Nonconformity among the rank and file. Some army officers attempted to enforce 
attendance at Anglican services and even flogged Catholics who attended Mass.241 However, 
this was by no means common practice, and punishing Catholics for observing their religion 
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had been formally banned by 1811.242 There was no official campaign to suppress sectarianism 
in the army until the late nineteenth century. Rather than risk exacerbating religious divisions 
through enforced conformity, official policy allowed soldiers a surprising degree of autonomy, 
in terms of religious practice, and association.243 From 1799 Catholics no longer had to swear an 
oath of allegiance to the Church of England, for example, while  Methodists and Dissenters 
appear to have been free to associate and worship together throughout the period.244 I would 
therefore agree with the recent conclusions of Kennedy, that the army was not a ‘crucible’ for 
Britishness, as it did not strive to impose a unitary identity upon recruits.245   
Greater emphasis was placed upon regimental loyalty than upon religious conformity or 
national sentiment. Recruits were encouraged to lose their civilian ties and to see the regiment 
as their new ‘family’, with the Colonel assuming the role of the ‘father figure’.246 Cookson has 
stressed the importance of the ‘officer-soldier relationship’ and the primacy of regimental 
loyalty.247 Certainly there was great scope within the military for acts of paternalism. Officers 
could assist their men financially by granting them credit or permission to work.248 Leave was 
also contingent upon good relations between soldiers and their officers.249 The possibility of 
promotion was a further integrative device. In a sample of enlists in the Scots Guards (n. 249) 
nearly a fifth were promoted, at least to the position of corporal.250 Although illiterate men 
could not hope to progress much beyond this rank, there was at least some opportunity for 
career progression, open to all in the army and militia.251 In an era in which the gap between 
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worker and master was increasingly insurmountable, especially in trades such as weaving, this 
may well have been one attraction of armed service.252 Further, the regiment provided medical 
care. Each regiment had a surgeon, who was responsible for the health of the men253, and for the 
distribution of medical supplies.254 Soldiers were routinely inoculated against smallpox.255 Those 
who became very sick could be placed in hospitals at regimental head-quarters. Bartlett has 
emphasized that free medical care was a significant advantage of soldiering.256 In addition, 
soldiers who were maimed in service were also entitled to receive disability allowances.257 
Military units therefore offered a fairly comprehensive package of benefits, all of which 
encouraged the men to retreat from their civilian lives, and to identify with the regiment. 
However, we should not overplay the care offered by the regiment or misrepresent the nature 
of the officer-soldier relationship. The distinctions of class were firmly upheld within the armed 
forces. There were strict rules preventing officers from socializing with the men.258 Additionally, 
the medical care provided was of little consolation when one considered the terrible conditions 
in which the rank and file lived. In camps men were exposed to the weather, sleeping 
equipment was often rotten and unusable, and tents overcrowded.259 High rates of mortality 
meant that churchyards close to encampments became choked with the bodies of dead 
soldiers.260 Living conditions in barracks could also be poor. On the Isle of Wight, for example, a 
new military cemetery had to be found in 1800 as the parish graveyards had been saturated 
with the dead from the island’s military depot.261 Many barracks were half-built in the 1790s 
and soldiers generally had less space in which to sleep than in the workhouse.262 The 
insufficiency of military hospitals meant that sick troops taken from transport vessels died in 
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extraordinary numbers.263 Four hundred diseased men, including one in seven of the 40th 
Regiment, succumbed to the ‘plague’ in 1794, due to lack of hospital accommodation in 
Plymouth. The Governor of Plymouth complained that the troops had been kept too long at 
anchor awaiting for orders to embark to the West Indies. Furthermore, due to the lack of 
hospitals in the South West, the sick had to warm themselves by open fires, ‘like gypsies’, and a 
further 110 men died over the winter 1794-5.264 In Southampton 1,600 troops contracted 
‘dysentery and putrid fever’ in the course of their voyage from Ireland.265 Unsurprisingly, the 
civil authorities were often reluctant to find quarters for hordes of soldiers carrying the ‘itch’ 
and other contagious diseases. Pubs in garrison towns were frequently overcrowded. It was 
common for four to five soldiers to share a bed, and for cavalrymen to sleep in stables.266 Rates 
of mortality in England were clearly far better than the disastrous levels found in the West 
Indies.267 Yet even in the home garrison, soldiers were subjected to some of the worst living 
conditions in the country, which took a toll on their health.     
3.6.  Conclusion 
For men seeking to escape a desperate economic situation, the military was understood to offer 
a bare minimum of bounty money, food, accommodation, low wages, and some leisure time. 
Where these perceived terms of engagement were deviated from, as we have seen, soldiers 
were likely to offer up strong resistance. The protests of the soldiery, over food and pay, forced 
the government to rethink the terms of this military ‘package’ on several occasions in the 1790s. 
In the shadow of the French Revolution, the government was particularly alert to symptoms of 
mutiny and disaffection, and quick to offer concessions. As a direct result of these struggles, 
soldiers became one of the few occupational groups whose basic subsistence was provided at 
pegged prices. After many years of declining real wages, and in a decade of particularly rapid 
inflation, this was an extremely important improvement to the soldier’s lot. Moreover, with the 
pay rise of 1797, soldiers became one of the few working-class groups, along with merchant 
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sailors and workers in the Royal Dockyards, whose real wages actually rose during the 
Revolutionary French War.268 
However, we should not exaggerate the privileged position of the soldier within society. The 
experience of soldiering in the home garrison was decidedly mixed. Although the 1795 and 
1797 adjustments represented significant improvements, they merely raised the purchasing-
power of the soldier to the economic standard of the common labourer. In some aspects of his 
social existence, the soldier appears to have been better off than the farm-hand or the sweated 
out-worker. Soldiers generally worked less intensively for their daily bread and enjoyed longer 
hours of leisure. They had ample opportunity for promotion and for engaging in by-
employment to supplement their wages. They also had time for learning new trades and for 
relaxing with their comrades. On the other hand, they endured awful living conditions, which 
were hardly made up for by the free medical treatment offered to them. Moreover, outside of 
the London-based Foot Guards, the soldier’s associational activities were limited almost 
exclusively to his regimental unit. While the soldier had a degree of religious freedom, within 
the ‘regimental world’, officers sought to neutralise and contain political engagement. At a time 
when many occupational groups were becoming more organized and politicized this was an 
important distinction between soldiers and civilians.269 The alienation of the soldier from wider 
civilian society was furthered by his occasional involvement in riot-control and his contribution 
to the workings of the penal system. However, perhaps the single biggest sacrifice which the 
enlist made, was allowing himself to be subject to military law. This aspect of the experience of 
soldiering will be tackled in more detail the following chapter.
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4. ‘The Blackest Perjury’: Desertion, Military Justice, and Popular 
Politics, 1803-5. 
According to military autobiographies, adjusting to the severity of military discipline was one 
of the most difficult aspects of the transition from civilian life.1 The experiences of soldiers 
under the military justice system therefore requires close treatment. In particular, the crime of 
desertion, which was the most common offence to come before the General Courts Martial 
(GCM), will be investigated here in detail. Centring around the execution of Stephen Carroll in 
December 1803, this chapter will reconstruct the way in which the ruling elites viewed 
desertion in the home garrison. In contrast to the historiography of the early Napoleonic Wars, 
which tends to emphasize a nation ‘galvanised’ by the threat of a French invasion, this chapter 
will show that stark lines of conflict existed over the issue of desertion. From an examination of 
official correspondence, parliamentary returns, and little-used deserter bounty certificates, this 
chapter will demonstrate that, in the period 1803 to 1805, levels of desertion from the army and 
militia rose to unparalleled heights. So profound was the ‘desertion problem’ in this period that 
the recruitment initiatives of successive governments were severely hindered.  A discussion of 
how the authorities sought to control levels of desertion will therefore be entered into. This will 
be followed by a detailed consideration of the reasons why men absconded from their 
regiments and a discussion of what desertion can tell us about the experience of soldiering.  
4.1.  Desertion and the Death Penalty at Home and Abroad  
On the morning of Tuesday 6 December 1803 Stephen Carroll, a private soldier of the 70th 
Regiment, was marched under armed guard from Hilsea Barracks to Portsdown Common, on 
the outskirts of Portsmouth. Carroll was reportedly guilty of multiple counts of desertion and 
had been sentenced to the death penalty.2 At just twenty years old, he was dressed in white 
flannel and was accompanied on the three mile journey by a Catholic priest and an artillery 
waggon containing his coffin.3 Twelve thousand military personnel were drawn out to witness 
the ‘awful scene’. Additionally, crowds of civilian spectators were reported as being 
‘exceedingly numerous’.4 The condemned soldier was blindfolded and made to kneel on a truss 
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of hay as the firing-party loaded their weapons.5 Several eye-witness accounts describe how the 
doomed soldier survived the first round of rifle fire, only to be dispatched by a second volley 
from extremely close range. The assembled regiments were then given orders to march past the 
deceased ‘in slow time … in order that we all might observe the terrible example’.6 Finally, for 
the benefit of those troops stationed too distantly to attend in person, the Commander-in-Chief 
ordered that the sentence of Stephen Carroll be read aloud at the head of every British corps so 
that the army in general ‘may be aware of the fatal consequences attending desertion’.7 
In the eighteenth century, desertion was frequently punished with death. During the American 
War of Independence, for example, a quarter of British soldiers tried by GCMs were sentenced 
to death.8 Particularly in cases of desertion ‘in time of battle’, or of desertion ‘to the enemies of 
the crown’, soldiers found guilty were likely to suffer the ultimate penalty.9 In both contexts 
desertion was seen as a serious breach of masculine codes of honour.10 Hence, on the battlefields 
of Europe and in colonial postings, the firing squad was utilised with awful regularity. Outside 
of the British Isles, there were 380 confirmed executions for desertion, between 1796 and 1815.11  
In practice, however, military authorities made a distinction between these crimes and 
desertion in the home garrison. Desertion at home was viewed by officers primarily in terms of 
the great financial loss which it entailed. Fifty pounds was thought a ‘modest estimate of the 
loss sustained by each desertion’ and, as each soldier took an oath of allegiance in exchange for 
bounty money, the Secretary-at-War characterized desertion at home as an act of ‘the blackest 
perjury’.12 Nevertheless, by the late eighteenth century, in line with changing respectable 
sensibilities regarding the propriety of using public hanging to punish minor property 
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offenders, deserters tried in England were generally spared the death penalty.13 During the 
Wars of the French Revolution the firing squad was utilized only twice in England. Firstly, to 
dispatch two men of the Oxfordshire Militia, after the Seaford mutiny of 1795, and secondly, for 
the execution of two Hanoverian soldiers, tried for ‘desertion to the enemy’, after they and four 
comrades stole a boat and attempted to cross the English Channel in 1801.14 
Thereafter GCMs in England became even more selective in their use of the death penalty. In 
the first decade of the nineteenth century, alterations to the Mutiny Act granted greater 
discretionary powers to military courts by authorizing them to condemn deserters to a term of 
compulsory service in the West Indies or to transportation ‘as a felon’ in lieu of capital 
punishment.15 As a result, the majority of deserters tried by English GCMs during the 
Napoleonic Wars were sentenced to these forms of banishment.16 A large proportion of 
deserters in England were still subjected to the ‘lesser’ punishment of flogging.17 However, only 
a handful of offenders were capitally convicted and, of these, all except Carroll were granted a 
royal pardon.18 Moreover, War Office tabulations for the later nineteenth century suggest that 
Stephen Carroll was the last soldier ever to be executed for a military offence on English soil.19 
Yet, despite the obvious significance of Carroll’s death, and the richness of the source material 
surrounding his execution, there has been little interest in placing his final moments within 
their wider historical and political context. In light of prevailing sentencing patterns, and the 
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clear move away from the use of the firing squad in England, the decision to execute Carroll 
certainly requires some explanation. In particular, the question arises as to why in December 
1803, after the introduction of transportation, and while the government was attempting to 
rouse the nation to fight the French, was it deemed expedient to stage such an ‘awful’ display 
on the English coast? 
4.2.  Historiography of the Period 1803-5 
The dominant historical accounts of this period emphasise the success of the British state in 
mobilizing the nation in response to the perceived threat of a large-scale French invasion. 
Significant emphasis is often placed on the ‘volunteer movement’ which raised, at its height in 
1804, some 400,000 men for part-time civil-defence duties. Contemporary politicians and 
historians alike are fond of pointing out that the combined total of volunteers, army, militia, and 
naval personnel, some 803,700 in 1805, was equivalent to at least one in five men of serviceable 
age – the highest proportion ever before achieved by any government.20 Cookson has stressed 
that this level of mobilization was achieved with hardly any popular opposition.21 Moreover, 
Colley argues that this mass military endeavour shows us that the ‘British state rested on the 
active consent of a substantial numbers of its inhabitants’ and that collective ‘training in arms 
under the auspices of the state’ was crucial to the growth of a national identity of ‘Britishness’.22 
However, Colley’s analysis of the post-Amiens period has recently received criticism. Philp has 
suggested that the ‘popular’ mobilizations of this period were carefully ‘calculated and 
orchestrated’ by a government which was deeply uncertain about the basic allegiances of its 
own people.23 Similarly, Semmel’s analysis of the propaganda from this period demonstrates 
that there was an underlying ‘anxiety in the loyalist mind’ about the perceived complacency of 
the lower orders towards the possibility of a French invasion.24 While Linch has expressed 
doubt as to whether the raw number of men who joined the volunteers is sufficient evidence 
upon which to assert the loyalty of the nation. According to Linch, English counties raised large 
quotas of volunteers, for fear that if they did not they did not, they would be subjected to the 
                                                   
20 Colley, Britons, p. 293; Cookson, Armed Nation, p 95; Dickinson, ‘Popular Conservatism and Militant 
Loyalism 1789-1815’, p. 117. 
21 Cookson, Armed Nation, p. 100. 
22 Colley, Britons, pp. 316-8.  
23 Philp (ed.), Resisting Napoleon, pp. 2-5. 




more conscriptive measures threatened by the Levee en Masse Act.25 We may question, therefore, 
whether such numbers can be used as a gauge for loyalism or nationalism. 
A further criticism of the approach favoured by Colley is that, in order to show a linkage 
between armed service and a loyal British consensus, preference is given to evidence gleaned 
from the volunteers while the experiences of those men who served in the regular forces is 
glossed over. Nicholas Rogers has recently made the case that Colley’s account of the 
Napoleonic Wars inadequately incorporates the experiences of those who found themselves 
serving in the British navy. By examining eighteenth-century anti-recruitment disturbances 
Rogers has demonstrated that it was in the years 1803 to 1805 when popular resistance to naval 
impressment was at its most intense.26 In spite of the government’s aggressive propaganda 
campaign, and the expectation of a French landing at this time, portside communities continued 
to evade naval service and to forcefully resist impressment.27 Rogers concludes from this that 
the seafarers’ commitment to king and country was, at best, pragmatic and selective.28 
This chapter seeks to strengthen Rogers’ arguments concerning the early years of the 
Napoleonic Wars by broadening out the discussion to include the experiences of men in the 
army and militia. Although there were no anti-recruitment riots directed against the land forces 
in this period, as there had been in the mid-1790s, it will be argued that the large-scale 
desertions from the armed forces, seen between 1803 and 1805 should be considered as a similar 
form of protest.29 Using court martial testimony and newspaper sources the traditional view of 
desertion as drunken, impulsive, and essentially reactive will be challenged. Instead, the 
competing agencies of officers and their men will be emphasised. It will be argued that both 
enlistment and desertion were viewed by the labouring poor, not primarily in terms of loyalism 
or nationalism, but through the prism of the makeshift-economy.30 As Peter Way has suggested, 
desertion, in particular, was seen as a tactic for seizing control of the price and conditions of 
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one’s labour and it was this concern which coloured the way in which the lower orders saw 
armed service.31 
4.3.  The Extent of the Desertion Problem, 1803-5 
Military historians have tended to play down the problem of desertion within the British army. 
Studies of the Seven Years’ War suggest that annual British losses from desertion were around 
3.5 per cent.32 This figure compares favourably with other European armies, including those of 
Frederick the Great, where contemporary rates of desertion were nearly three times higher.33 
Similarly, in Napoleonic France, where conscription met with ‘resentment and evasion’, rates of 
desertion and non-reportage could be as high as half of all conscripts.34 By comparison, Linch 
estimates that between 1807 and 1815, the British army lost just 2.9 per cent of its rank and file 
to desertion.35 
There is a general consensus, however, that desertion was far more problematic for regiments 
garrisoned at home.36 Between 1803 and 1805, 60 per cent of the United Kingdom’s army and 
militia units were stationed in Britain with over half of this force concentrated in the South East 
of England.37 At this moment desertion from the regular army can be shown to have been 
unusually high. As early as February 1803 the Secretary-at-War revealed the extent of the 
problem when he announced that one fourth of new recruits for the regular army were being 
lost to desertion.38 Furthermore, official returns suggest that desertion peaked in 1804, with the 
regular regiments stationed in Britain, losing one in thirteen soldiers to desertion.39 Yet the 
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regular army was by no means the force worst affected by desertion at this time. Desertion from 
the Army of Reserve and the militia proved even more problematic.  
In March 1803, in reaction to the very real prospect of French invasion, Prime Minister 
Addington embodied the militia and supplementary militia for home service.40 As with the 
earlier Militia Acts, few individuals served in person.  Men drawn by ballot tended to pay for a 
substitute, or they were part of a militia insurance scheme, which provided substitutes for their 
members.41 Additionally, as members of the volunteers were entirely exempt from the militia 
ballot, it became common practice for men to enlist as ‘nominal volunteers’, purely to evade 
militia service. The Earl of Sheffield, for example, complained that ‘very many young men in 
these parts [Sussex] intend to offer themselves as volunteers merely to avoid the ballot for 
militia’. Sheffield stated that in the populous town of East Grinstead, there were only 150 men 
left, who were not claiming exemption.42 While in Liverpool, ‘one half of the persons available 
to serve’ had enrolled in the volunteers making it extremely difficult for the local authorities to 
meet their quota.43 
With large numbers of men exempt from militia service altogether the premium placed on 
substitutes rose to new heights. In Sussex, for example, a substitute for the militia could not be 
had for less than twenty five pounds.44 With such large prizes on offer, the system of 
substitution inevitably attracted fraudsters and the down-at-heel. Captain Harris attended a 
Portsmouth divisional meeting in February 1803, for the enrolment of the Hampshire Militia, 
and described the men who travelled to offer themselves as substitutes: 
  I have been at many Militia meetings before, but never see a  
  Tenth of the Confusion I see there … for your Regiment, there  
  came to offer themselves as substitutes; all my old    
  acquaintances and Friends, the Gipsies [sic.] and Chimney   
  sweepers, and I do believe, all the Rascals in the Country joined  
  and came with them.45 
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William Cobbett’s nephew, George, procured the services of such a man to serve in his room in 
the Hampshire regiment but found that his replacement deserted ‘before the officers could have 
time to look at him’. Cobbett had it on good authority that this was common in ‘one half of the 
cases of enlistment into the militia’.46 
Indeed newspaper reports show that, while men were forthcoming when it came to receiving 
enlistment bounties, many failed to join their regiments once they were embodied.47 So 
apparent was the problem of non-reportage by June 1803 that the War Office issued a 
proclamation for pardoning deserters. This granted a one month amnesty to deserters from the 
militia in the hope that men who had previously failed to join their regiments could be 
encouraged to do so. Those who remained at large would be ‘proceeded against with the 
utmost severity’.48 Although it is difficult to quantify overall levels of desertion from the militia 
it seems that the proclamation had little impact. In October the Sussex Regiment of Militia 
advertised the names of 113 deserters, most of whom were substitutes, who had ‘not joined’.49 
In London, where the anonymity of the metropolis facilitated desertion, the Lord Lieutenant 
found it ‘almost impossible to keep the persons who are sworn in’.50 Finally in Lincolnshire, 
where resistance to the militia ballot had a long history, 411 deserters were acknowledged as 
absent, representing some 20 per cent of the entire regiment.51     
Additionally, in July 1803, the Addington ministry adopted a new recruitment initiative – the 
Army of Reserve – in order to raise 50,000 men along similar lines to the militia. Eligible 
candidates were drawn by ballot to serve as reservists within the United Kingdom but were 
actively encouraged to transfer to the regular army for an additional bounty. As in the militia, a 
clause in the Act allowed balloted men to avoid personal service by providing a substitute.52 
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The plan initially met with success and 25,000 men were raised in a matter of months.53 
However, less than ten per cent of balloted men accepted personal service and competition with 
the militia meant that the price of substitutes rose precipitously. The average cost of a substitute 
for the reserves was calculated at thirty pounds.54 Coupled with this, desertion considerably 
hampered progress. The Secretary-at-War rose again in the Commons in March 1804 and 
admitted that desertion ‘had got to a very high pitch’, with the total numbers recruited for the 
Army of Reserve, in the first few months of 1804, being ‘fully balanced by the number of 
deserters’.55 In all 12.2 per cent of the men raised for the Army of Reserve deserted.56 When Pitt 
returned to power in 1804 the ballots for both the Army of Reserve and the militia were 
scrapped and a single ballot was introduced in the form of the Additional Force Act.57 While 
this simplified the administration of the levies the Act failed in its primary objective of raising 
men.58 During its two years of operation just 15,778 men were recruited in Britain and Ireland 
and some nineteen per cent of this figure was lost to desertion.59 
4.4.  Containing the Desertion Problem 
Levels of desertion were evidently acute in the period 1803-5. However, what the official 
statistics fail to show is the effort expended by the authorities in their attempts to contain the 
losses. Military commanders, for their part, attempted to limit opportunities for desertion by 
removing new recruits from large urban centres and into barracks or isolated military depots, 
such as the Isle of Wight, where the possibility of escape was considerably reduced.60 Where 
desertion could not be prevented, the identification and apprehension of runaways became 
paramount. It was commonplace for sentries to be placed on main highways, with orders to 
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detain suspect individuals.61 Furthermore, the Home Secretary made appeals to the magistracy 
for their vigilance and ‘active co-operation’ in the ‘discovery and apprehension of deserters’.62 
In London, the Bow Street Runners were called upon on several occasions to sweep buildings 
where deserters were suspected to be ‘secreted’ in great numbers.63 In this sense, desertion was 
not a purely military problem but constituted an area of considerable civil-military co-
operation. 
In order to facilitate the capture of deserters, voluminous descriptions lists of new recruits were 
kept in the War Office.64 Extracts from these lists were frequently forwarded from Whitehall to 
provincial magistrates to help identify suspicious individuals in their custody.65 
Advertisements, including a description, were regularly posted in the Hue and Cry Police Gazette 
to inform the authorities of the names and appearances of runaway soldiers and these could 
also be circulated locally to alert the public-at-large.66 Although the descriptions were often 
vague or subjective, soldiers were peculiarly identifiable.67 Recruiting sergeants in London 
insisted on shaving the hair of new recruits, ‘in the military stile [sic.]’, and deserter 
advertisements reveal that many military men had little option but to desert in their full 
regimental uniforms.68 Others bore battle scars or were marked by military punishments.69 In 
                                                   
61 Sergeants Hill and Smith, of the Chatham Division of Marines, were placed on the London Road in 
Kent. During this period they ‘recovered to the Army and Navy above four hundred deserters’. They 
were, however, indicted for assaulting a bargeman whom they wrongfully believed to be a deserter. See 
petition against their conviction; HO 47/38/24, 191-2 Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty – Earl 
Spencer, 1 April 1806.  
62 A circular letter was communicated to the county magistracy via the Lords Lieutenants. Bury and 
Norwich Post, 27 April 1803. 
63 Mirror of the Times, 7 July 1798; The Morning Post, 14 September 1804; The Times, 5 February 1805. 
64 E. Higgs, Identifying the English: A History of Personal Identification 1500 to the Present (London: 
Continuum, 2011), pp. 106-7. 
65 See Secretary-at-Wars’ deserter out-letter books, for example, WO 4/609, 23, Yonge –Gepp, 5 November 
1792. 
66 Although the Hue and Cry was originally intended to circulate information relating to criminals, by the 
late eighteenth century, the paper was dominated by deserter descriptions. Hue and Cry, 1797-1805. See 
also, Higgs, Identifying the English, pp. 104-5. 
67 Ibid. 
68 For example, James Capes of the 70th deserted in ‘full regimentals’ while Thomas Dale claimed to have 
employment shaving the heads of recruits. Hue and Cry, 15 October 1803; WO 71/203, GCM Proceedings, 
Chelsea Hospital, 3 April 1805. 
69 Joseph Barber was described as bearing ‘the marks of corporal punishment on his back’, The Derby 




addition, from 1807, a form of branding, using needle punctures and gunpowder to leave an 
indelible ‘D’ on the skin, was introduced to punish repeat offenders.70  
Furthermore, the Mutiny Act offered a statutory twenty shilling reward, as an inducement to 
the soldiery and the public, for the capture of each deserter.71 An individual could obtain the 
reward once a deserter was positively identified and sworn before a magistrate. Receipts of this 
transaction exist in great numbers amongst the assessed tax records for each county.72 The 
surviving deserter bounty certificates for Essex and Kent demonstrate a remarkable upsurge in 
the workload of justices operating in these counties from the year 1803 which did not diminish 
significantly until 1807 (Figure 6). Ninety three per cent of the rewards issued in Essex and Kent 
between 1803 and 1805 were for soldiers in the army, the Army of Reserve and the militia.73 It is 
tempting to explain the sharp increase in the number of deserters apprehended in this period in 
terms of the increased number of troops stationed in these counties. Certainly, the numbers of 
troops stationed in Essex and Kent had almost trebled, rising 2.7 times, between 1796 and 
1803.74 However, over the same period, the number of deserter rewards being issued increased 
5.6 times suggesting that the relative frequency of desertion had grown as well as the absolute 
number.75  
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By the summer of 1803, there was general agreement among military officers that the extent of 
the desertion problem called loudly for a remedy. In addition to directing resources towards the 
apprehension of runaways, military authorities were prepared to invest in the terror of 
exemplary punishment in order to inhibit desertion.  
 [M]any officers … are disposed to make some severe example   
 in the case of Desertion, and indeed it is very much wanted, as   
 they happen very frequent; two from our very own Regiment   
 last night and two a few days ago and they are not less frequent   
 from other Regiments.76 
In October six deserters from the Army of Reserve were tried at Chatham Barracks and 
sentenced to the maximum flogging penalty of 1,000 lashes.77 Unusually for cases of desertion in 
England, the king did not moderate the sentence and the infliction of the full punishment was 
well publicised in the press.78  
Nevertheless, by the winter of 1803, with desertion showing no signs of abating, military 
authorities believed that a further public show of force was required. Stephen Carroll, who was 
tried for desertion in late October 1803, and was sentenced to death by a court martial 
assembled in Kent, proved to be a convenient object for this exemplary justice. Compounding 
his situation was the fact that his regiment had recently embarked without him for the West 
Indies.79 Additionally, newspaper reports claimed that Carroll was ‘a proper object to be made 
example of’ because he had taken multiple enlistment bounties in return for service in the Army 
of Reserve.80 These claims are impossible to verify from the exceedingly brief proceedings of his 
court martial.81 Regardless of the foundation of these reports, it was principally the scale of the 
desertion problem experienced at this time, which led the king and Judge Advocate General to 
decide that it was ‘indispensably necessary for the sake of example’, that Carroll should be 
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executed. Furthermore, if there was to be an execution, the king demanded that it be conducted 
in a manner which was ‘as public as may be’.82 
4.5.  Why Men Deserted 
Having looked at the official response to the desertion problem in this period an account will 
now be given of why so many men risked severe punishment and absconded from their 
regiments. Military historians have pointed to a range of motivating factors behind desertion. 
Bartlett suggests that the numerous desertions in this period simply reflect the extent to which 
the army relied on social misfits and criminals to fill the ranks, the implication being that such 
men were inevitably incapable of adapting to life in the military.83 More recently, Coss’ 
systematic analysis of the average calorie intake of a soldier during the Peninsula Campaign, 
suggests that desertion was spurred by short rations and dreadful working conditions.84 While 
Gilbert’s influential study of courts martial defence pleas emphasises drunkenness and fear of 
punishment as typical motivations behind the ‘spur of the moment’ decision to desert.85 
There is some wisdom in all of these assessments. However, few historians have considered 
deserters in the domestic context. In England the evidence suggests that desertion was often a 
conscious act of protest against working conditions, a means of denying one’s labour to the 
army or the militia, or a deliberate and calculated attempt to improve one’s lot, by escaping the 
confines of the camp or the barrack room.86  What follows will therefore attempt to highlight the 
individual agency of deserters. Moreover, as deserters frequently received help from various 
support networks, this chapter will attempt to establish that, despite the financial inducements 
offered by the Mutiny Act and deserter advertisements for the apprehension of military 
runaways, many plebeian men and women were prepared to assist deserters. Further, the 
evidence suggests that absconding from the military to find more profitable work elsewhere, 
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and even fraudulently obtaining multiple enlistment bounties, were practices deemed 
legitimate amongst certain sections of the labouring poor. 
An analysis of the defence pleas presented by deserters tried by GCMs in England between 
1793 and 1815 tends to support Gilbert’s claims that drunkenness and fear of punishment were 
the two most important factors behind desertion. Eleven per cent of defendants mentioned ‘fear 
of punishment’ as the reason for their desertion.87 Many soldiers admitted in their 
autobiographies to struggling to come to terms with the severity of life in the military. The 
regularity of public floggings was often particularly shocking to new recruits.88 Robert 
Flockheart, for example, was deeply affected by the floggings which took place every morning 
while he was stationed at Guernsey.89 While in England, the RCM records of the Grenadier 
Guards reveal that there was a flogging nearly every week in the regiment, for the crime of 
absence without leave, with soldiers receiving an average of 185 lashes.90 From GCM 
proceedings it appears that many soldiers deserted from their hospital beds, after receiving part 
of a flogging sentence, in anticipation of the next round of punishment.91 John Blackman, for 
example, escaped from Deal Military Hospital, where he was recovering from the flogging 
inflicted on him by a RCM. In his defence he explained that it was the ‘Very Great Dread of the 
Last punishment … which caused him to desert’.92 Paradoxically then, the lash, the army’s 
‘preeminent means of instilling discipline’, actually had the effect of making some men desert 
on impulse.93 
Similarly, ten per cent of defendants claimed that it was mistreatment by officers or comrades 
which caused them to desert. The officer’s right to summarily punish their men with painful 
drill exercises, with solitary confinement in the ‘black hole’, and even with physical correction, 
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could be demoralizing to the uninitiated, and was often felt to be ‘hard usage’ by new recruits.94 
Robert Jones complained of his treatment at the hands of Sergeant Fawthrop and Captain 
Sullivan whose ‘Brutality … induced him to absent himself’. It was proven in his trial that Jones 
had been subjected to ‘very irregular punishments’ including being gagged and flogged ‘with 
sticks’ at the head of the regiment. 95 Similarly, Thomas Weymark put his desertion down to the 
‘constant teasing he met with’ from the men of the 91st which made his life ‘wearisome’.96 
Clearly many desertions were linked to the brutality of military justice and the hardness of 
military life. The fact that most desertion occurred in the first year of service points to the 
difficulty recruits had in adjusting to this regime.97 
In addition to martial punishment, drunkenness has often been seen as the preeminent cause of 
desertion. Brumwell, for example, states that ‘most frequently it was the momentary 
irresponsibility engendered by alcohol that underlay desertions’.98 In some instances it was true 
that men got so drunk that they fell behind their regiments. Thomas Stephenson, for example, 
entered into the ‘convivial spirit’ at a ‘binding’ in Pensham, as a result he was absent from his 
regiment for five days and was eventually brought back as a deserter by a party sent to find 
him. The officers at his GCM accepted Stephenson had not intended to desert and reduced his 
sentence to 500 lashes under a charge of absence without leave.99 With twenty three per cent of 
deserters claiming to have been drunk at the time of their desertion this was the single most 
common factor mentioned in the defences laid before GCMs in England.   
However, there are several reasons why we should be cautious with this statistic. Firstly, the 
‘drinking culture’ amongst military personnel suggests that most recruits were quickly 
acclimatized to the effects of heavy drinking.100 Moreover, alcohol was more likely to have been 
a catalyst in the decision to desert rather than the reason itself. Most importantly, soldiers were 
aware, or they could easily guess, that those who claimed to have been ‘in liquor’ were much 
more likely to receive royal clemency than those who appeared to have been sober at the time of 
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their departure.101 As Adye’s military manual pointed out, it was ‘the intention of totally 
abandoning the service’ which legally distinguished ‘desertion’ from the lesser crime of 
‘absence without leave’.102 It is plausible therefore, that in many cases deserters chose to plead 
drunkenness rather than admitting to being disaffected or having committed a premeditated act 
of desertion. Overall statistics calculated from deserters’ defences are clearly limited in their 
reliability. However they are also partial. The majority of deserters tried in England chose to 
enter no defence plea whatsoever.103 Therefore, the characterization of desertion as a drunken or 
spontaneous act is one which is overly reliant upon the image which deserters presented of 
themselves while on the stand. It is possible however, through careful examination of 
subsidiary information provided in courts martial cases, and, through the use of supplementary 
sources, to arrive at a different construction of desertion, one which grants deserters a greater 
degree of agency.  
In many cases desertion can be seen as a premeditated act. This is hinted at by the frequent 
practice of selling one’s uniform. Deserters would often do this in order to generate enough 
money to fund their escape whilst simultaneously disguising their martial status while on the 
road. Thomas Waller of the 70th Regiment, for example, sold his uniform to an ‘ostler’ at the 
Crown in Romford.104 The frequency with which this practice was carried on in Brighton led to 
the issuing of a General Order requesting that all regimental shirts should be marked in 
indelible ink with the names of their owners.105 Similarly acts of theft might be committed in 
order to facilitate desertion. John Maybury ‘procured coloured Cloaths [sic.] by breaking open a 
Box in the House where he was Quartered’, thus disguised, he then stashed his regimentals on 
the highroad to Bath.106 Foreign mercenaries frequently hijacked sailing boats in order to make a 
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return to their homeland.107 And, the notorious deserter-turned-footpad, known as ‘Whitehorn’, 
managed to escape from a party of marines on the back of a stolen horse.108 
Determined deserters also stole weapons in order to facilitate their escape. Joseph Davies was 
taken up ‘with a loaded Pistol in his Bed’ and George Hook, captured outside a public house in 
Huntingdon, fired a horse pistol, belonging to the regiment, at his pursuers.109 The most 
infamous case of this kind is that of Philip Keating and John Keggan, who were advertised in 
the Hue and Cry as having deserted from Canterbury Barracks, taking with them their 
regimentals and a pistol.110 The two passed through Wrotham and, appearing suspicious, were 
cross examined by Colonel Shadwell who asked to see Keating’s pass: 
   [T]he ruffian replied, “I’ll Show you my furlough and be d---d to  
  you”, and drawing a pistol from his pantaloon pocket, shot him  
  immediately through the heart…111 
The Colonel died from his injuries and Keating was sentenced to hang for murder at the 
Maidstone Assizes.112  
Clearly these men were highly committed to a predetermined plan of escape. Linebaugh has 
emphasised the popularity of ‘excarceration’ narratives within eighteenth century popular 
culture and contemporary newspaper editors recognized this appeal by making room for the 
daring escapes of deserters.113 Five deserters from the Army of Reserve, for example, were 
reported to have broken through the arched ceiling of Lewes Prison and were discovered only 
as they lowered themselves by a ‘scaling ladder’ made from torn blankets.114 Even in London’s 
notorious Savoy Military Prison, with its ‘walls of prodigious thickness … raised up to an 
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immense height for security’, inmates awaiting corporal punishment, transportation, or foreign 
service, frequently made attempts to escape their confines.115 Six men scaled the walls of the 
prison and escaped over neighbouring rooftops in 1797 and a group of 25 prisoners successfully 
breached a wall on the Thames side of the building in 1790.116 Thus we often see deserters 
working together in small groups to an agreed plan. Seen in this light desertion begins appear 
more like a conscious act of protest than a spontaneous decision.117 
Furthermore, the reception which deserters received from civilians reveals something about 
popular attitudes towards desertion more broadly. Despite the financial penalties for assisting 
deserters enshrined in the Mutiny Act, William Fawcett lamented that ‘Harbouring Deserters’ 
was popularly viewed as a ‘meritorious act’.118 The relatives of deserters were certainly 
prepared to run the risk of prosecution by lending assistance to their loved ones. James Wood’s 
family, for example, obstructed a search party sent to his home in 1804, just long enough for 
Wood to make his escape out the back door.119 Rather more surprising is the support deserters 
received from complete strangers. For example, while escorting two captured deserters from 
Windsor to the Isle of Wight in 1805, Sergeant Jackson found that the people he met with in 
public houses along the way ‘pitied the prisoners … [and] were ready to aid their escape’.120 As 
we have seen, many individuals were prepared to assist deserters by purchasing their 
regimentals.121 Others provided them with a safe place to hide from the authorities and one 
Deal boatman was even willing to smuggle deserters from the Kentish coast to Calais.122 The 
protection offered to deserters clearly demonstrates a disjuncture between the way in which the 
authorities conceived of the crime and the manner in which it was viewed by the lower orders. 
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Irish deserters, in particular, could rely upon the support of their own ethnic communities. 
While being escorted in handcuffs through London James Ruggan, for example, broke free of 
his captors and ran into Covent Garden Market: 
  [Ruggan] got under a stall, and upon the Prisoner’s speaking  
  Irish, several women covered him over with Baskets, and   
  threatened to kill the witness [Sergeant James Hogg].123 
The inhabitants of the Irish enclave of St Giles were also prone to violent resistance whenever 
the Bow Street Runners attempted to execute warrants for the apprehension of deserters.124 
Similarly, in September 1804,  when a deserter was captured and held in the Horse Shoe pub by 
a small detachment of the 81st Regiment, a ‘prodigious multitude’ collected outside and a 
‘regular siege was commenced’. So menacing was the crowd that the soldiers were obliged to 
break a hole through the back wall of the pub and to make their escape towards Tottenham 
Court Road. 125 Six labourers were convicted for assaulting Captain Shaw and his party during 
the attempted rescue and the incident led to stricter policing of the area.126 Twenty men were 
taken up after magistrates issued warrants to search several houses in St Giles ‘suspected of 
harbouring deserters’ but similar raids on pubs in 1805 were again a locus for violent conflict.127 
For the Irish poor, and for those on the fringes of criminality, the practice of enlisting for the 
bounty money and immediately deserting was clearly seen as an acceptable and convenient 
means of supplementing one’s income. In London, and ‘for fifty miles around’, Colonel Ross 
believed there were ‘an uncalculable [sic.] number of bad characters’ who were prepared to 
engage in this ‘dreadful Traffic’.128 John Oswell, for example, who narrowly escaped execution 
for having enlisted and deserted four times in the space of fourteen months, confessed that he 
had been encouraged to do so by his father who ‘led him into habits of inebriety, and not only 
advised him to enlist into different regiments, but received part of the money, which was 
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iniquitously procured by so doing’.129 In North West England, where recruits could easily gain 
passage to Dublin, the practice of ‘bounty jumping’ was so acute in 1804 that recruiting officers 
in Lancashire refused to enlist any more Irishmen.130  
Crimps exacerbated the desertion problem by encouraging repeated enlistments and sharing 
their knowledge of the recruitment process with bounty jumpers. Joseph Pickard, for example, 
admitted to having made an agreement with James Noble, a ‘crimp residing at Guildford’, to 
defraud the South Hampshire Militia. 131 It is unclear exactly how much desertion can be put 
down to this kind of ‘swindling’.132 The large volume of recruits who absconded immediately 
after enlistment in the Army of Reserve or the militia between 1803 and 1805 certainly suggests 
that premeditated bounty jumping was a sizeable part of the problem. 
However, for the majority of recruits, enlistment was less about the bounty money, most of 
which was quickly spent on the purchase of ‘necessaries’, and more about the need for a steady 
income. Many soldiers had wives and families to support133 and, while pay in the forces was 
low, military service was at least a reliable source of income. Enlisting came at a price however. 
For those with a stake in the land or a skill in a craft, joining the army or militia entailed the loss 
of a degree of economic independence.134 Much of the desertion which occurred in England 
should be considered, from this perspective, as an attempt on the part of soldiers to reclaim 
control over their labour by returning to civilian patterns of work. Occasionally soldiers 
confessed in the courtroom that they deserted in order to seek employment elsewhere. John 
Young, for example, was found working as a ‘gentleman’s groom’ in London and Ernest Mellin 
deserted to gain ‘better situations’ in the employ of a sugar baker.135 Often the low pay of the 
army and militia was not enough to meet soldiers’ familial responsibilities. Hence men deserted 
in order to seek better paid work. William Goldsmith, for example, stated: 
  The cause of his Desertion to be the Extreme want of a Wife and  
  four helpless Children, whom He hoped to support by working  
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  near them. He further alleges that He has maintained them ever  
  since his Desertion without any assistance from the Parish of  
  Sandwich where they now reside. 
The fact that Goldsmith was sentenced to the maximum 1,000 lashes suggests that the officers at 
his trial were unimpressed by the impertinence of his defence.136 Similar themes, and the same 
defiant tone, can be seen in an extraordinary anonymous letter sent to the Duke of Richmond in 
1793: 
  I am a deserter out of his majesty sarvis … and there is to the  
  number of fourteen more of [us] Now present which maney of  
  them has wifes and familyes in a Wreched Condishin as [they]  
  are a fread to put there heads out to look for work for fear of  
  Bean taking up I hope your grase will take it in to   
  Consideration to optain a free pardon for all disarters up to this  
  time if Not the Consequence of this if his Majesty Does not  
  grant a free parden … he shall be shot by me the writer for I  
  may as well die for that[,] as to be shot or flogged to death at  
  Water Dowen Camp.137 
As Thompson has argued, anonymous threatening letters were a customary means of 
expressing unvarnished plebeian grievances.138 This letter is perhaps unique in that it portrays 
aspirations common to so many eighteenth-century deserters. The author strongly conveys his 
desire to evade capture and punishment, to find gainful employment, and to support his 
dependents financially. 
There is convincing evidence to suggest that large numbers of deserters sought agricultural 
employment after leaving their regiments. As we have seen, almost half of the men in the 
British army were casual labourers, drawn from rural employment.139 Much of the soldiery 
therefore had a thorough understanding of the seasonal fluctuations in agricultural wages. In 
the South East of England, it was during the harvest months that losses to desertion were most 
severe, suggesting that soldiers timed their escape to coincide with the upturn in wages (Figure 
7).140 Even on a national scale, it was September, when agricultural workers were most needed 
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for the grain harvest, which was by far the most popular month in which to abscond.141 The 
declining tendency in real wages, noted by Gayer et al, between 1793 and 1801, may have 
inhibited rates of desertion in England during the 1790s. Between 1803 and 1805, by contrast, 
the increasing money wages of agricultural labourers, and the strong demand in the labour 
market, was undoubtedly motivation enough for many soldiers to risk deserting.142    
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Furthermore, agricultural labour was advantageous to deserters, not just because of the wages 
on offer, but because of the anonymity and protection which a large workforce could provide.143 
Captain Coldberg of the Windsor Foresters, for example, complained that ‘many Deserters get 
into farmer’s employ and cannot be heard of’.144 For the same reason deserters can also be seen 
seeking employment in the country’s coal mines and ironworks. Both were places densely 
populated with workers known for their hostility to military and magisterial intervention. 
Deserters were reported both in the ironworks at Merthyr Tydfil and in the collieries around 
Stourbridge.145 Similarly, in 1804, several reports from South Lincolnshire reached the Home 
Office, of deserters being ‘received, harboured and protected’ in the town of Boston.146 Military 
runaways were undoubtedly attracted to the area by the abundance of unskilled work offered 
by contractors engaged in the draining of the Fen-lands.147 However, the fen-drainers, who were 
themselves ‘very numerous’, were also deemed responsible for the ‘encouragement of 
desertion’. The Adjutant General was convinced that the workmen had entered into a successful 
‘confederacy’ to ensure that no deserter could be taken up by the local authorities, an accusation 
which caused considerable embarrassment amongst the Justices of the borough.148  
4.6.  Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that between 1803 and 1805, during the height of invasion fears, 
desertion from the army and militia was a considerable problem facing the civil and military 
authorities. Contrary to those accounts of the period which emphasise the power of anti-
invasion propaganda, and suggest that the nation was ‘galvanised’ in the face of the French 
threat, stark lines of conflict can be seen between the elites and the lower orders over the issue 
of desertion. Nicholas Rogers has demonstrated the ferocity with which port-side communities 
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resisted naval service and impressment in this period.149 This chapter supports Rogers’ position. 
While there was no extensive rioting against the recruitment initiatives of the army and militia 
between 1803-5, desertion can be seen to undermine, or at least significantly limit, each new 
plan of action put forward by successive governments.  
Far from a drunken or impulsive act, the evidence suggests that desertion was often a carefully 
calculated action committed as a fraud to obtain bounty money or as a means of returning to 
civilian forms of employment. It was also an act of protest. Often committed by small groups of 
soldiers working together, desertion was a rejection of the strictures and brutality of military 
discipline, and an attempt to regain a position of economic independence. The nature and 
extent of the desertion problem in this period, reiterates the point that enlistment had profound 
economic consequences, and that the experience of soldering at home, was by no means 
preferable to civilian forms of labour.  
The authorities fought hard to stem the flow of deserters from the army and militia and 
exercised the full terror of the military law in the case of Stephen Carroll. However in England, 
under the watchful eyes of the civilian public, military justice was a limited tool. Deserters were 
inevitably treated more leniently in the home garrison. Furthermore, the help and support 
which some deserters received from sympathetic strangers, workforces and communities – in 
direct contradiction of the Mutiny Act – suggests that the labouring poor understood both 
enlistment and desertion to be risky but legitimate components of the ‘makeshift economy’. 
Moreover, the sheer scale of desertion from the army and militia should be taken into 
consideration when attempting to gauge the loyalty of the nation at this time. Clearly not every 
man in uniform should be counted as a loyalist. A close examination of the experiences of the 
thousands of men who deserted from the army and militia in this period demonstrates that, 
while ‘training in arms under the auspices of the state’ may have roused nationalism in some, 
for others it was a profoundly alienating experience. Many of the poor men who joined the 
ranks of the regular army and the militia clearly had a very different experience of the early 
1800s than those who joined the volunteers. We should be careful therefore to distinguish 
between the different branches of the armed forces. Moreover, the rough conflicts of this period, 
                                                   




which often tell us most about the culture and lives of the labouring poor, should not be 




Part III – The Military and Public Order 
5. The Military and Public Order: Attitudes in Transition, 1714-1792. 
This chapter looks at how the role of the military in public order developed over the course of 
the eighteenth century. It will be argued that strongly-held elite prejudices against the notion of 
a ‘standing army’ placed considerable checks upon the role of the military in society. Over the 
second half of the eighteenth century, however, these elite notions were gradually worn away. 
It will be argued that the American and French Revolutions, as well as the growing scale of 
domestic protest, gradually undermined, and ultimately transformed, the terms of the high 
political debate. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the strike waves of 1791-2. These 
labour disputes were the first major outbreak of popular protest experienced after the French 
Revolution. Elite responses to the industrial disturbances of 1791-2 can be shown to have been 
qualitatively different from those which characterised the earlier period. Government sought to 
strengthen its hand through the building of barracks and the extension of the military resources 
at its disposal. Moreover, it will be seen that the central state was encouraged and supported in 
this endeavour by local magistrates in the worst affected regions. This chapter therefore seeks to 
trace how a new consensus, which granted greater latitude for military interventionism, 
emerged over the eighteenth century.   
5.1.  Military Interventions in Protest c.1714-1779 
The Riot Act (1714) established a firm legal basis for the involvement of the army in the 
suppression of popular protests.1 It was passed by a Whig government harried by Jacobite 
opposition to the Hanoverian Succession.2 The terms of the Act indemnified civil and military 
officers of the crime of maiming or murdering any protestor assembled (peacefully or 
otherwise) above an hour after the reading aloud of the Proclamation against riots and tumults 
by a Justice of the Peace. Despite this seemingly draconian legislation the Riot Act did not open 
the floodgates for violent military suppression of all forms of protest.3 Throughout the 
eighteenth century, and indeed in our own period, the civil and military authorities usually 
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avoided deploying lethal force when confronting protestors. Moreover, in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, historians have noted that local authorities were reluctant even to request 
military assistance, and government was equally cautious in authorizing the use of soldiers in 
the aid of the civil power.4 The heavily circumscribed role of the armed forces in the context of 
riot control requires some further explanation. 
In part, we can account for the restricted role of the military in eighteenth-century society in 
terms of the landed gentry’s longstanding fears regarding standing armies. Standing armies 
were seen as the basis for the establishment of despotism or of Catholic absolutist monarchy 
and were therefore deemed a threat to the constitution. This eighteenth-century prejudice was 
rooted in seventeenth-century experience. During the Interregnum, for example, Cromwell’s 
‘Major Generals’, army officers of low social origin, effectively usurped powers from rural 
magnates - the ‘natural rulers of the countryside’ - and upset the traditional social hierarchy.5 
Although Cromwell’s New Model Army was disbanded at the Restoration, ‘English liberty’ 
was again seen to be threatened under the reign of pro-Catholic James II. Parliament was 
suspicious of the fact that James continued his enlarged army, which trebled in size between 
1685 and 1688, after the successful defeat of the Monmouth Rebellion. The monarch’s 
subsequent attacks on the established Church, his proroguing of Parliament, and his 
replacement of Protestant officers in the Irish branch of the army with Catholics, all tended to 
confirm the suspicion that James was attempting to use a professional standing force to 
establish a Bourbon-style Catholic autocracy.6 
Landed concerns about the political threat posed by James’ standing army therefore played an 
important part in the Glorious Revolution. In the settlement which followed, a small army, 
under the authority of the Crown, was tolerated on the grounds of national defence. However, 
the constitutional compromise was that Parliament had control over the ‘purse strings’; voting 
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on both the size and pay of the army.7 Peacetime standing armies, and the extent to which they 
should be used to uphold law and order, remained constitutionally controversial well into the 
eighteenth century.8 
Successive Whig administrations implemented the Riot Act and deployed the regular army 
with a degree of caution in the knowledge that military interventionism could invite a chorus of 
constitutional criticisms from their political opponents.9 During the Wiltshire weavers’ dispute 
of 1738, for example, a lengthy editorial in the Gloucester Journal criticised the use of a 
detachment of Foot Guards to subdue a crowd that had destroyed the property of a prominent 
Melksham clothier: 
 When it discovers a riotous Spirit in the People, [Government] must 
 not trust in the trite, and, of late, too common Way of suppressing, or 
 rather stifling the Discontents of the Subjects by a Military Force; 
 which may only spread the Gangrene farther…  A Body of Troops may 
 disperse Rioters, and cause an outward Face of Quiet on the People; 
 but this is not giving Bread to the Hungry, nor covering the Naked with a 
 Garment … a Government ought to shew themselves, by looking with 
 the utmost Integrity and Care, into the real Causes of a Riot and using 
 all possible Means to redress all True Grievances of the People.10 
Similarly, the use of troops to contain a bitter strike in the North Eastern colliers in 1765 drew a 
great deal of negative editorial attention in the London press:  
 I am really heartily grieved and pained to hear that the light-horse 
 have been out against the poor pitmen … it really vexes me as an 
 Englishman, as a man born in a free country, to see the fashion daily 
 more and more prevailing of sending out a regular military force to 
 oppose every commotion of the people … we may soon be reduced to 
                                                   
7 Schwoerer, The Anti-Army Ideology, p. 4; Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, p. 45. 
8 The ‘very modest’ peacetime establishment, (which allowed for just 17,000 home troops in the 1783) is 
testament to the survival of the anti-army ideology into the last quarter of the eighteenth century. See 
Palmer, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, p. 209; and for vociferous debate on the reduction of the 
army in the Commons see Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England: from the Norman Conquest in 1066 to 
the Year 1803, (London, 1816), Vol. 10, (Commons), 3 February 1738, col. 397-457; (Lords), 9 March 1738, 
col. 479-561.  
9 Gilmour, Riot, Rising and Revolution, p. 143. 
10 Anon., ‘An Essay on Riots … of the Poor Wiltshire Manufacturers’, Gentleman’s Magazine, Vol. 9 
(London, 1739), p. 7. Colley attributes this essay to the Tory clergyman Thomas Andrews; Colley, Defiance 




 a military power, and every gentleman depend upon the favour of the 
 army.11 
To some extent then, when considering the deployment of soldiers, government had to balance 
the need to maintain public order against the inevitable accusation that the army was being used 
to erode ‘English liberty’. 
Tony Hayter has demonstrated that for much of the century government attempted to protect 
itself from the political force of such criticisms by adopting a very specific administrative 
procedure for the deployment of troops. Firstly, magistrates were discouraged from calling 
upon troops except as a means of ‘last resort’.12 Secondly, any requests for military assistance 
that were made were subject to the approval of both the Secretary-at-War and the Secretary-of-
State.13 In this manner, accusations that government was allowing military commanders to act 
unilaterally, or beyond their legal authority, could be effectively countered. However, the 
practical implication of this policy was that provincial magistrates could often be left in extreme 
isolation. Any military assistance they might request could take several days or even weeks to 
arrive.14 During the anti-militia riots of 1757, for example, the authorities of Yorkshire struggled 
unaided for two weeks while the Secretary-of-State prevaricated over whether to endorse 
requests for troops.15 The sluggish response-times of military aid may therefore have prevented 
local magistrates calling for their assistance on a more frequent basis. 
However, the limitations placed on the role of the military in maintaining public order did not 
derive solely from the policies of central government. Many magistrates were themselves 
sufficiently indoctrinated by constitutional ideology to revile at the idea of relying upon a 
military force to maintain order and exhibited a marked preference for civilian institutions. As 
one London J.P put it in 1738, ‘a constable at the head of his posse, by a warrant from a justice of 
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the peace who is beloved, can do more than a colonel at the head of his regiment’.16 While 
Bernard’s claims were largely rhetorical he was nevertheless right to point out that magistrates 
had a limited amount of coercive force at their disposal in the form of the ‘civil power’. 
Members of the community could be temporarily enlisted – as parish constables, special 
constables, and the posse comitatus – to serve under the direction of the Justice of the Peace.17 
Beloff asserts that in the early part of the century the raising of the posse was a fairly 
commonplace response to rural disorder.18 While in the more populous towns, the swearing-in 
of respectable ratepayers as special constables remained common practice throughout the 
century.19  
Early modern historians have, however, rightly doubted the practical ability of magistrates, 
constables and the posse comitatus to suppress instances of serious rioting on their own. 
Particularly where local inhabitants shared, or had empathy for, the ‘legitimising notions’ of the 
crowd, enlisting the support of the community to suppress disorder could be extremely 
problematic. Magistrates might have difficulty in raising a sufficient posse or in keeping one in 
the field long enough to effect its purpose. While it was not unknown for parish constables to 
sympathise with or even lead crowds drawn from their own communities.20 According to 
Bohstedt’s recent work, during the nation-wide food riots of 1740, military forces opposed 
crowds in one in five food riots while large bands of civilians were raised for peace-keeping 
duties in just one in twenty instances.21 In addition, Bohstedt’s work highlights that, in 1740, 
1756 and 1766, the military was deployed in only a minority of recorded instances against the 
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crowd and, particularly in the early stages of the protests, many food riots were allowed to run 
their course seemingly unopposed by local authorities.22  
The prime weapon at the disposal of the magistrate in these mid-century disorders tended to be 
compromise rather than coercion. Indeed several historians have argued that the intended 
function of ‘riot’ was to underscore popular grievances and to enlist the support of local 
grandees in order to facilitate the amelioration of those complaints. Brewer and Styles, for 
example, have argued that crowd actions should be placed in the wider context of the 
‘negotiative process’. Collective action tended to be preceded by petitions for redress, litigation, 
threatening letters, or acts of arson. On these grounds, they argue that outbreaks of disorder 
were rarely unforeseen by the active magistrate.23 Riot can therefore be read as the final stage in 
this process and as an attempt by the crowd to establish a ‘dialogue through disorder’.24  
In many mid-century food riots historians have found examples of magistrates entering into 
such a dialogue. In September 1766, for example, after several food riots in Gloucestershire, 
High Sheriff William Dallaway met a crowd at Stroud ‘to speak with the chief of them’. 
Dallaway exhorted those present not to break the law, but he also read to them the Royal 
Proclamation against forestalling and regrating,  and he later prevailed upon local farmers to 
bring their produce to market at a fixed rate.25 Similarly, in the same year, Sir Roger Newdigate 
confronted a large body of colliers at Nuneaton and promised to ‘satisfy all their reasonable 
demands’ so long as they remained peaceable. Under Newdigate’s supervision, the colliers 
searched the town for produce, which was then sold off, and the town’s magistrates 
subsequently set the Assize of Bread.26 In both Gloucestershire and the West Midlands then, 
magistrates dealt with the crowd in a manner that was placatory and overtly interventionist.  
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Similarly, a number of historians have noted that magistrates tended to eschew a repressive 
stance towards collective bargaining in labour disputes and instead put themselves forward in a 
mediatory role between masters and men.27 Particularly in the capital, magistrates were 
cautious about calling on the assistance of troops to break up striking workers and Dobson 
suggests that by the 1760s an informal ‘tripartite system of industrial relations’ had emerged.28  
In 1766, for example, the Middlesex magistrate Saunders Welch, went unattended to a 
gathering of striking journeymen shoemakers in Cranbourne Alley and prevailed upon the 
workers to disperse. However, Welch also harangued the master shoemakers, listening from 
their first-floor windows, and successfully persuaded them to engage in wage-negotiations with 
their workers.29 Several interventions of this nature have led Dobson to suggest that, in the mid-
century, ‘conciliation in industrial disputes’ was a major part of the urban magistrate’s duties.30  
The often sympathetic response of magistrates to both food riots and trades disputes in this 
period can be attributed to landed acceptance of ‘the paternalist model’ of economic relations. 
As E.P. Thompson has demonstrated, many gentlemen, certainly in the mid-eighteenth century, 
believed in the principle of a regulated economy. This paternalist model had both a 
‘fragmentary real’ existence, in terms of customary practices, as well as a strong ideological 
grounding in various pieces of Statute and Common Law. 31 Until their repeal in 1772, statutes 
from the reign of Edward VI prohibited dealers from engaging in the practices of forestalling 
(buying-up of foodstuffs before they reached the marketplace), engrossing (engaging in the 
wholesale purchase of grain) and regrating (purchasing stock to sell again at the same market 
for a profit).32 Additionally, J.Ps were empowered to check weights and measures in the 
marketplace and to peg the price of bakers’ loaves in relation to the going rate for wheat 
through the Assize of Bread.33 Through these laws magistrates were empowered to prevent 
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attempts to artificially enhance the price of foodstuffs. Similarly, the apprenticeship clauses of 
the Statute of Artificers, as well the Common Laws regarding the rating of wages, granted to 
magistrates the authority to intervene in industrial relations.34 
When riotous crowds asserted the ‘moral economy’, by punishing refractory dealers or setting a 
‘just’ price for bread, the perceived legitimacy of their actions derived in part from the 
paternalist tradition of England’s elites. Through their emulation of officially-sanctioned market 
regulations food riots can be seen, not as attacks upon the established order, but as efforts to 
reinforce it.35 Similarly, in relation to trades disputes, Randall has argued for the existence of an 
‘industrial moral economy’. When skilled workers were engaged in defending customary 
wages, restrictions on apprenticeship, or attempting to ward off the detrimental effects of 
technical innovation, they too were appealing to the tradition of the regulated economy.36 Some 
of the coolness and the spirit of compromise, which we may note in magisterial responses to 
disorder in the first half of the century, suggests that local authorities recognized the ideological 
force of this appeal, and even accorded an area of licence to the riotous crowd. Furthermore, by 
interposing themselves at the early stages of tumultuous proceedings, and by claiming to 
uphold the ‘moral economy’ of the poor, England’s elites, in times of distress, could actually 
strengthen their authority by asserting popular consent for their rule.37 
By contrast, the vigorous application of repressive force could be calamitous. When magistrates 
called in the army or authorized the use of firearms they had to go on living in the community 
after the troops had left ‘incurring the odium of the local population, perhaps receiving 
threatening letters, and being the victims of broken windows or even arson’.38 On rare 
occasions, magistrates and military officers who gave premature orders for the troops to fire, 
before the proclamation against riots had been read, could even face legal prosecution for the 
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consequences.39 Fear of the ‘collateral damage’ which might result from the ‘sledgehammer’ 
response of the agents of central government may explain why magistrates often failed to report 
even serious incidents of rioting to the Secretary of State in this period.40 Asking for support 
from the centre involved an admission of defeat on the part of the magistracy and the arrival of 
troops to the area entailed a further loss of face within the local community.   
To sum up then, in the first part of the century, politically charged arguments, which associated 
standing armies with an overly powerful executive, operated to constrain any desire on the part 
of central government to deploy troops regularly, or with any rapidity, in a public order 
capacity. The same forces also prevented ministers from allowing military commanders 
stationed in the home garrison to assume any autonomy in their policing responsibilities. 
However, by far the most important restraining factor in this period, in terms of the limited 
deployment of troops in trades disputes and food riots, was the attitudes of local authorities 
themselves. Magistrates appear to have been sympathetic to the crowds’ invocation of the moral 
economy. They were therefore more inclined to interpose themselves, through the use of ‘good 
words’ and compromise, or to simply turn a blind eye to disturbances, which they themselves 
did not feel particularly threatened by, than to invite the potentially destabilizing influence of 
armed troops into their communities. 
5.2.  Attitudes in Transition, c.1760- 1789 
The ending of Tory exclusion from government, at the accession of George III, extinguished 
much of the party-political opposition towards the use of the military and the Riot Act, which 
Whig governments had to contend with before 1760.41 The removal of such opposition allowed 
the political space for Viscount Barrington, during his second tenure as Secretary-at-War (1765-
1778), to oversee a gradual streamlining of the procedures for requesting military assistance, 
and granted him a growing autonomy from the Secretary-of-State. Although the War Office 
maintained a ‘cautious approach’ well into the 1770s – asking magistrates not to request 
military assistance until after the civil power had proved ineffective, and refusing to deploy 
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troops on the mere anticipation of riot – Hayter has stressed the increasing efficiency of troop 
deployments over this period.42 Additionally, Shelton has argued that ‘the growing scale of 
social protests in the late eighteenth century finally dispelled any lingering doubts about the use 
of military force’ in the context of riot control.43 Certainly the number of recorded food riots and 
trades disputes balloons considerably towards the close of the century. However, changing 
government policy, in regards to the suppression of these instances, derived not just from the 
growing number of disturbances, but from changing elite perceptions regarding the threat that 
such disturbances posed to the existing order.  
A number of historians of crime have emphasized that during the later eighteenth century a 
new emphasis upon order and decorum arose among England’s rulers.44 The ‘rising tide of 
order’ can be seen in the ‘moralising’ and ‘improving’ reforms imposed on numerous aspects of 
everyday life.45 The striking-out of traditional blood sports, field games, parish feasts, and other 
‘unrefined’ indulgences, is one aspect of this transition.46 Another is the closer supervision of 
labour seen in the increasing criminalisation of formerly tolerated customary perquisites.47 The 
gradual closeting of previously public punishments is a further aspect: the renunciation of the 
procession to Tyburn, the removal of whippings from the open streets into the privacy of the 
prison along with the declining use of the pillory.48 Concurrent with these changes there seems 
to have been a slow erosion of elite tolerance of the ‘criminal’ and the ‘riotous’ poor.49 Popular 
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demonstrations came to be regarded as ‘unacceptable, dangerous and potentially revolutionary 
by the beleaguered authorities at both central and local government levels’.50  
The shifting attitudes towards the riotous poor in particular, can be in part attributed to the fact 
that oppositional politics and plebeian unrest were increasingly thrown together, and perceived 
to be linked. In 1768, for example, London experienced ‘a great crop of industrial unrest’ which 
coincided with the ‘Wilkes and Liberty’ disturbances. Rudé has stressed that the two 
movements were ostensibly separate but that government was particularly concerned by the 
possibility of striking workers swelling the ranks of Wilkite demonstrators.51 Exaggerated fears 
of a potential ‘revolution’ compelled government to  repeatedly bring troops against both 
election crowds and workers’ demonstrations.52 Six Wilkes supporters were killed in the 
‘massacre of St George’s Fields’ in May of 1768 and, in 1769, troops swamped East London after 
the Foot Guards were involved in a bloody shootout with a gang of silk weavers.53 The firm 
response of government to these disorders is suggestive of both their intensity and their 
perceived threat to the stability of London.  
Although Wilkes was no revolutionary, historians have suggested that his protracted election 
campaign had important ramifications for the development of an anti-aristocratic reform 
movement in England. ‘Wilkes and Liberty’ touched on issues of a free press, an 
unrepresentative parliament and an overweening oligarchical government.54 The movement 
may also have had an important politicising effect on London’s plebeians. The campaign 
stimulated the formation of artisan radical debating clubs, where issues of universal suffrage 
were discussed, and even unskilled dockside workers were drawn into the political ferment, 
adopting the cry of ‘Wilkes and Coal-heavers Forever’.55 And if the Wilkes campaign ‘planted 
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the seeds’ of an English reformism, these were surely nourished by the American Declaration of 
Independence.56  
Social protest in the American colony, was ‘central to the revolutionary process’, and had 
ramifications on both the nature of English protest and on the perceived threat posed by such 
unrest.57 Linebaugh, for example,  has suggested that American politics cast  a long shadow 
over England’s ports, with sailors being particularly receptive to Atlantic ‘ideas of opposition’. 
The Liverpool seamen’s strike of 1775, which bordered on an insurrection – with the sailors 
taking the unprecedented action of seizing small arms from gunsmiths’ shops and removing 
cannon from the decks of ships in the docks – provides some strong evidence for this 
interpretation. The strike was provoked by the lowering of wages for outbound voyages, but it 
took on a far more dangerous visage due to the bungled handling of the authorities, who hired 
armed mercenaries and allowed them to fire into a crowd of demonstrators outside the 
Exchange, killing several. The seamen responded with mass demonstrations and, flying a red 
flag, they fired their cannon over the Exchange and took control of the city.58 Order was 
restored only by the arrival of a regiment of horse from Chester the following day. In the 
aftermath, one commentator couldn’t help but observe that, ‘we had Boston here, and I fear this 
is only the beginnings of our sorrows’.59 
Furthermore, the Gordon Riots of June 1780 further compounded elite anxieties regarding the 
revolutionary potential of ‘the mob’. A number of crime historians have emphasized this 
moment as a key watershed in terms of shifting elite attitudes towards popular protest60 and the 
riots themselves are beginning to receive the historical contextualisation they deserve.61  In the 
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early stages, demonstrators hostile to the Catholic Relief Bill (1778) attacked a number of West-
End Roman Catholic chapels with little or no resistance from City of London magistrates, many 
of whom, including the Lord Mayor, Brackley Kennet, were sympathetic to the political aims of 
Lord George Gordon’s Protestant Association.62 Certainly, the licence granted to the crowd gave 
momentum to the disturbances and on 6 June 1780, ‘events took a more revolutionary turn’, as 
the crowd switched their targets of attack from symbols of popery to symbols of state power. A 
number of major institutions including the Palace of Westminster, the Bank of England and 
Lord Mansfield’s house were attacked.63  
In the most iconic moment of the Gordon Riots, troops stood awaiting permission from the City 
magistrates to fire on the crowd as Newgate prison was demolished and its prisoners 
liberated.64 No orders were given by the J.Ps present and the Earl of Orford remarked that the 
Mayor of London was ‘very blameable relative to the mischief which was done’.65 Newspaper 
accounts and popular prints (Print 4) imply that, as rioting had become so furious and so 
widespread by this stage, no magistrate was willing to permit the troops to act for fear of 
becoming an object of the crowd’s ire.66 After a week of rioting and near-revolution, and 
dismayed by the ‘great supineness of the civil magistrates’, the King and Privy Council were 
forced to declare a modified form of martial law and the shooting dead of between 300 and 700 
rioters was found to be the only means of restoring peace to the capital.67 
The evident inadequacy of London’s local authorities to meet the challenge of the riots was seen 
as a scandal and allowed the political space for new attitudes and approaches to the policing of 
the poor to be articulated. A slew of newspaper commentaries68 and pamphlets69 emerged 
                                                   
62 Rudé has suggested that the magistracy ‘virtually condoned’ the assaults on Catholic properties’. Rude, 
Crowd in History, p. 263; C. Hibbert, King Mob: The Story of Lord George Gordon and the Riots of 1780 
(London: Longman's, 1958)., pp. 43-4, 64-5, 56-61, 129. 
63 Haywood and Seed (eds.), The Gordon Riots, p. 5. 
64 Ibid., p. 6. 
65 Norfolk Records Office, BUL 16/13/11, Horatio Walpole - Wiggett Bulwer, 29 June 1780. 
66 Whitehall Evening Post, 10 June 1780; One magistrate is quoted as saying “Good God, Sir, if I should give 
such permission, I should have my house burnt down in a quarter of an hour”. 
67 Haywood and Seed (eds.), Gordon Riots, pp. 5-6; Hibbert, King Mob, p. 88-91. 
68 ‘An Englishman’ criticised London’s magistracy in London Courant, 30 June 1780; while ‘G.A’ observed 
‘there is no police in this country; [thus] there is no authority but what is trampled on and laughed at’ in 
London Chronicle, 25-27 July 1780. 
69 Emsley, The English Police, p. 20; See for example W. M. Goodschall, A General Plan of Parochial and 
Provincial Police, (London, 1787); George Barrett, An Essay Towards Establishing a System of Police on 




advocating centralisation and reform of London’s police and it is in the 1780s that we see the 
first efforts of government to  introduce a centrally co-ordinated system of stipendiary 
magistrates in the capital.70 Furthermore, the Gordon Riots radically destabilised 
constitutionalist notions that the ‘civil power’ alone was the best means of maintaining the 
peace. In the event, it was the military, in spite of the magistracy, that had saved London from a 
worse fate. At least one innovative writer suggested a dramatic extension of the army’s role in 
policing by allowing military officers themselves to read the Riot Act.71 Although this specific 
plan received little traction lessons were clearly drawn from the ‘June days’.72 In the 1780s and 
90s the Gordon Riots were remembered as  a ‘blot on our English History and Character’, one 
which should never be allowed to happen again.73  
In contrast to the tone of public opinion in the first half of the century, which, as we have seen, 
was frequently condemnatory of military interventions, after 1780 commentators frequently 
justified the vigorous suppression of protest by way of reference to the botched handling of the 
Gordon Riots. During the London Crimp Riots of 1794, for example, one editor announced; ‘we 
know from experience that mobs are to be subdued by terror only; and not by reason’.74  While 
yet another lamented:  
 Had those who pulled down the Sardinian Ambassador’s Chapel 
 been fired upon by the Guards, and pursued by the horse until they 
 were completely defeated, there the riot would have ceased. But an ill-
 timed lenity encouraged the insurgents to proceed, and produced 
 widespread devastation which followed.75 
In the intervening period between the Gordon Riots and the Crimp Riots, the French Revolution 
had, of course, compounded elite fears of a popular rising. William Pitt was informed direct 
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from Paris that the French monarchy had been undone by a combination of a ‘Panic-struck’ 
magistracy and an unreliable army during July 1789.76 With such immediate examples of 
unchecked disorder spiralling out of control with disastrous consequences it is perhaps 
unsurprising that England’s governors in the late eighteenth century adopted a much more 
vigorous approach to the suppression of protest. 
  
                                                   




Print 4 - BMSat 5688, Anon, The Mayor of London on the Throne of Ease, (London, 1780). 
 




5.3.  The Military and Labour Disputes, 1791-2 
Figure 8 - Showing Military Presence in Labour Disputes in England, 1791-2 
Year 


















1791 13c 5 18 11 61.1% 
1792 25 2 27 14 51.9% 
Total 38 7 45 25 55.6% 
a Dobson, Masters and Journeymen, pp. 154-70. 
b WO 1, ‘War Office In Letters’, 1791, 1792. For detailed sources see Appendix II. 
c Dobson actually records 14 strikes in England in 1791. However, two of these, the hatter’s and 
stockingers’ strikes, are recorded as occurring in Swaffham and Dareham in Norfolk. In actual fact, 
these dispute took place concurrently at Nottingham, and troops were sent from Norfolk to suppress 
them. I have chosen to record this strike as a single instance. See Norfolk Chronicle, 12 March 1791. 
 
Historians are agreed that the last decade of the eighteenth-century saw a marked upswing in 
labour militancy.1 While our sources for comparison are certainly imperfect, recent studies have 
argued that the 1790s may well have seen a greater number of strikes than in any of the 
preceding decades.2 In particular, Dobson’s useful index of trades disputes points us to the 
period 1791-2 as a moment of unusually high workplace militancy. An attempt has therefore 
been made to reconstruct the official responses to the labour disputes of these years and to place 
this in the context of what we know of earlier periods.  
Dobson’s list of trades disputes recorded in the London press has been used in conjunction with 
Home Office and War Office files to get an impression of how frequently the military were 
called in response to instances of industrial unrest.3  This evidence (Figure 8) suggests that the 
military were in attendance at a considerable proportion locations in response to the industrial 
disputes recorded by Dobson. The overall figures of 55.6 per cent, however, should be treated 
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with caution. While Dobson’s survey remains the most complete national study of eighteenth-
century trades disputes which we have, a number of historians have articulated doubts about 
its completeness.4 Firstly, many labour disputes recorded in the provincial press may not have 
been reproduced in the sources consulted by Dobson. Secondly, as suggested by the column of 
‘additional labour disputes’ found in the War Office papers, some disputes may not have been 
recorded at all in the newspapers. Thus we must consider the total reported instances of labour 
disputes as an extremely provisional estimate. 
With regard to the War Office records, Roger Wells has cautioned against the reading-off of 
these sources as a ‘complete corpus’ of military interventions. It is possible that, as Wells 
suggests, some Commanding Officers operated independently of the Secretary-at-War, and that 
they subsequently failed to report back their movements.5 Wells is correct to urge caution. I 
have found a handful of examples of regional commanders acting independently of the centre. 
However, this pattern of behaviour was not the norm. Officers were expected to keep their 
superiors informed of their activities. Moreover, the Secretary-at-War’s correspondence from 
this period suggests that many officers – ever-concerned with promotion – were keen to gain 
credit for their extracurricular activities, including their involvement in riot-control duties, and 
were keen to communicate their movements to their superiors.6 Although imperfect, I would 
suggest that the War Office papers are probably a fairly accurate representation of the military 
interventions which took place in these years. 
Moreover, even if we concede the criticisms mentioned above, it could be argued, presuming 
ministers read the London press and opened their post, that the sources used here are a 
reasonable approximation for the information which was available to Whitehall regarding the 
number of major labour unrests which had occurred in the country and the resources which 
had been dedicated from the centre toward their control and suppression. From this statistical 
information it is clear that, contrary to the image presented in the secondary literature for the 
earlier eighteenth century, by the 1790s a large proportion of labour disputes involved some 
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element of military response. The growing importance of the army to the neutralising of trades 
disputes also comes through in the qualitative detail of the records left behind from these 
interventions and emphasizes the importance of the military in preventing potential outbreaks of 
disorder as well as containing actual instances of ‘collective bargaining by riot’. 
A minority of the military interventions in the labour disputes of 1791-2 conform to the 
traditional War Office policy of deploying troops only in cases of ‘extremity’. In Wiltshire, for 
example, the cavalry were twice called to respond to machine-breaking and property damage 
committed by groups of woollen-spinners.7 In both cases, the size of the crowds involved, and 
the highly charged circumstances from which these protests arose, suggests that they were 
commotions well beyond what the civil power was capable of containing. The magistrates of 
Trowbridge emphasised that the town’s constables had been knocked down and the prisoners 
they had taken up for riot had been liberated by the crowd. Justice Gibbs remarked, ‘of course, 
after such treatment, it is totally impossible they can do their Duty or [that] we [can] put Laws 
in force’.8 As Adrian Randall has demonstrated, the South-Western woollen workers were at 
this time engaged in a protracted battle with the clothiers over the introduction of scribbling 
jennies.9 It was these machines which were the focus of the crowd’s attack, and it was the 
violence and destruction of the workers which was used as the justification for a military 
presence by local JPs. 
In many other disputes, however, troops were brought in where no such dramatic scenes of 
violence existed. Indeed, a clear development from this period is the extent to which local 
authorities began to request military  aid in anticipation of industrial disorder,  at the first signs 
of mass walk-outs. Of course, peaceful workers’ demonstrations were often accompanied by the 
explicit or implicit threat of violence. Especially in sectors where workers were grouped 
together in large numbers, such as in mining and weaving, strikes tended to represent risings of 
entire communities and the tactics of ‘mass intimidation’ were commonplace.10 For example, 
when upwards of 1,000 workers from the foundries and collieries of Coalbrookdale rallied to 
resist changes to their rate of wages, they backed their demands with the threat of destroying 
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the house of Mr Reynolds, the proprietor of the works.11 While the Mayor of Leicester inferred 
the threat of violence posed by a procession of 200 canal navigators from their numbers and 
their ‘very riotous Manner’.12 Troop movements in these instances stemmed from traditional 
fears of local authorities regarding certain ‘ungovernable’ communities and their ability to 
threaten large-scale disorder. 
Coal miners were notoriously perceived to be one such grouping.13 The bargaining power of the 
Kingswood colliers, for example, was bolstered by their numbers, their close knit patterns of 
work, but also by their ability to completely interrupt essential supplies of coal to the homes 
and industrial concerns of the inhabitants of Bristol.14 When the colliers of the Mendip hills 
went on strike for a wage increase, those of Kingswood followed suit shortly afterwards, 
demanding pay parity.15 In both cases pay rises of two pence a day were quickly granted to the 
workers at the behest of local grandees, concerned by the potentially destabilising effects of the 
strikes, and the miners returned ‘cheerfully to work’. The Duke of Beaufort was said to have 
‘interested’ himself on behalf of the Kingswood men while the High Sherriff of Somerset, J.H. 
Cox, gathered the coal proprietors in his own locale and brokered a deal with the Mendip 
miners. 16  At the same time, however, several troops of dragoons were stationed at Camerton, 
Wells, and Bath as a precautionary measure in case negotiations broke down.17 The military 
involvement in these disputes was therefore fairly peripheral. The conciliatory and mediatory 
approach of local authorities, in the first instance, therefore demonstrates a continuation of 
‘tripartite’ industrial relations described by Dobson earlier in the century. 
In other areas, however, we can see that this analogy is less appropriate, and the military 
appear to have played a more instrumental role. At Coalbrookdale, there was no mediation on 
the part of the authorities when workers from the ‘extensive’ iron foundries and mines owned 
by William and Richard Reynolds assembled in ‘a very mutinous manner’.18 In this instance, the 
Reynolds brothers were attempting to introduce a new system of regulating hours and wages. 
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When mass resistance to these measures occurred the employers took it upon themselves to 
press the High Sheriff for military assistance.19 Although some unspecified ‘concessions’ to ‘ease 
the atmosphere’ were made by their employers, the discontents of the workers were subdued 
primarily by the hasty arrival of a troop of Oxford Blues from Worcester within twelve hours of 
the original request.20 The presence of the horse, who remained in the area for several days, was 
said to have ‘had a very good effect upon the misguided Rabble’.21 An indication of the relief of 
the employers is suggested by the fact that commanding officer, Sir Charles Turner, was invited 
to stay at William Reynold’s house, at Coalpit Bank, while Richard Reynolds donated fifty 
guineas to  the Blues for their services.22 Personal intervention by the Shropshire magistracy 
seems to have been entirely absent in this instance. The High Sheriff did not make a personal 
appearance and was content with simply endorsing requests for military assistance to 
strengthen the hands of the employers. 
Other instances also demonstrate the role of the army as strike-breakers as well as keepers of 
the peace. In April 1792, for example, two merchants of Northwich informed Lieutenant-
Colonel Maxwell that there was an ‘insurrection’ amongst the flats navigators on the River 
Weaver.23 Captain Torriano was immediately dispatched with a detachment of infantry. On his 
arrival however: 
 ‘[I]nstead of finding the place, as it was represented, distracted by 
 tumult, all was Peace, nor has there been one discordant murmur to 
 disturb the most perfect repose.’  
Despite this air of tranquillity the principal inhabitants of the town insisted that the foot soldiers 
should remain. As the flatmen had already been on strike for over three weeks, it seems to have 
been the intention of Northwich’s merchants to use the troops to put pressure on their workers 
to return to work ‘at the usual price’.24 Similarly, in 1793, Newcastle’s magistrates dealt with an 
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assemblage of striking miners at General Lambton’s pits at Harraton by ‘show[ing] them the 
military at a distance’.25 The Town Clerk of Newcastle, Nathaniel Clayton, reported the success 
of this measure. The troops were able to retire that evening after having ‘frightened the Pitmen 
into a return to their duty’.26  
In these examples, the local authorities were often prepared to countenance the requests of 
employers for armed force on the grounds that doing so early on might prevent the escalation 
of existing disorder and the further diffusion of labour unrest. This seems to have particularly 
been the case during the strike waves of 1792. In Wigan for example, the assistance of dragoons 
was sought from Manchester and foot soldiers were sent by ‘passage boat’ along newly-built 
canals from Liverpool, to protect steam engines from the aggressions of miners striking for 
higher wages.27  As well as wishing to prevent the destruction of steam engines, the Mayor of 
Liverpool  justified his vigorous suppression of the miners’ strike on the grounds that, he was 
attempting to prevent the spread of a ‘contagion’: 
 This Riot, by being taken in time … has in my opinion saved many 
 from the Gallows and prevented much bloodshed … Many Colliers 
 and Cannelers from distant works had come to observe the progress 
 of our people and, had they succeeded, it would certainly have 
 spread far over this county.28 
Similarly, on the East Anglian coast, sailors’ strikes emerged at Great Yarmouth and Lynn in 
imitation of ongoing disputes at Shields.29 Although major disorder was prevented at Lynn 
through the raising of the seamen’s wages, the Lord Lieutenant of Norfolk reported that he was 
concerned about the detrimental effects this example might have, and enquired about the 
possibility of reinforcing the military forces in the region.30 Subsequent seamen’s strikes at 
Ipswich were forcefully repressed by magistrates with the aid of dragoons. Soldiers assisted in 
breaking up assemblies of seamen, in guarding those men willing to sail on the old terms, and 
in arresting several ringleaders. Three men were subsequently turned over to the navy in lieu of 
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criminal charges, and the ‘zeal and activity’ of Ipswich’s Mayor, Charles Sisted, was recognized 
by the Home Secretary.31 
Although the authorities seem to have resorted to troops in this period with greater speed, and 
sometimes in anticipation of riot, we may note a certain continuity of the military’s role in the 
foregoing examples. In each instance they involved conflicts among sailors, weavers, and 
miners. These were large workforces whose ability to organize collectively and to raise a 
disturbance was notorious throughout the eighteenth century. By contrast, the journeymen and 
artisan trades, whose numbers were usually smaller, were not generally associated with the 
tactics of mass intimidation.32 Particularly in the service industries, strikes tended to consist of 
the orderly withdrawal of labour, and they were often accompanied by newspaper insertions 
emphasizing the ‘reasonableness’ of their demands.33 Many trades disputes among the artisanal 
trades between 1791-2 adhered to this model of respectability and did not therefore elicit a great 
deal of concern among the authorities nor did they justify a military response.34     
Nevertheless, there are a handful of examples in this period where the army did play a role in 
countering strikes among urban artisanal trades. In Nottingham, for example, the journeymen 
shoemakers collected together and demanded an increase in wages in May 1792. The response 
of the authorities was particularly forceful: 
The [6th Enniskillen Dragoons] assembled – loaded their pieces with ball, and, with 
drawn sabres so intimidated the heroes of the strap, that, after a short parley they 
took to their heels’.35 
Two cordwainers were subsequently charged at the Quarter Sessions for conspiracy and for 
offering co-workers access to a considerable strike find.36 While in Birmingham ‘meditated riots’ 
among the striking brass button-makers, rather than actual tumultuous assemblies, were 
enough for the authorities to bring out the Oxford Blues and have them parade the streets. 
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Newspaper editors commended the Birmingham magistrates for using ‘the terror of the 
military’ in order to ‘prevent [the button makers] from becoming riotous’.37 One editor was 
particularly explicit about the potential threat posed by these workers: ‘There is no doubt that 
here would be a riot if the military were absent’.38 The assertive response of Birmingham’s 
magistrates may well have been influenced by the disastrous ‘Priestly Riots’ of the preceding 
year, which were, in many ways, the Gordon Riots in microcosm.39 Likewise the Nottingham 
shoemaker’s dispute occurred within a week of food rioting in the town.40 Yet despite these 
local considerations, the evidence form these years suggests a general trend amongst local 
magistrates situated in northern towns and industrial regions not to mediate in industrial 
conflicts but to suppress them with the threat of armed force. 
As further evidence of this trend, we may observe magistrates in these same locations appealing 
not just for temporary military aid to oppose outbreaks of labour unrest but for permanent 
rolling contingents of soldiers in order to prevent the possibility of disorder. The experiences of 
the Mayor of Liverpool in suppressing a general strike among dockside carpenters, labourers, 
and seamen in 1791, coupled with his successful use of troops during the Wigan miners’ strike 
of 1792, persuaded him that it would be ‘absolutely necessary in future to have a Regiment of 
Horse & Two of Infantry always in this County’.41 Likewise in Leicester, the fear of a future 
‘rupture’ between the stocking weavers in their employers (‘which is not improbable from the 
present mutinous Disposition of them’) convinced the  Mayor that the Leicester could not be 
considered ‘quite secure without military’.42 Even in Ipswich, Charles Sisted urged the Home 
Office to consider providing ‘an armed Boat ready at the call of the Magistrates’ to ensure that 
‘nothing could ever happen in this small Port again’.43  
However, the most persistent cries for a permanent garrisoning of troops came from the 
magistrates and employers situated in the weaving districts of Somerset and Wiltshire and in 
the coal ports of the North East. In the South West, the continuing battle over the introduction 
of machinery ensured that the clothiers lived in constant fear of attacks upon their property. 
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Requests for permanent detachments of troops to prevent such incidents therefore came from 
Bradford-upon-Avon, Taunton, and from Trowbridge.44 In the latter town there was perhaps 
the strongest cause for concern: 
 [W]e beg leave to observe, such a large populous Town as this 
 (perhaps the first in the Kingdom of the Woollen Manufactory) 
 ought not to be without a military assistance, especially at this time, 
 when the Minds of the People are ripe for Riots and Mischief.45 
These fears were proven to be justified. When the troops were removed from the town in 
September 1791 in order to assist in the Mendip miners’ dispute. Five hundred woollen-spinners 
collected, in order to intimidate the clothiers, and were only dispersed by the arrival of a 
reinforcement of dragoons from Frome.46  
Likewise in the North East, it has been well documented that the coal trade was regularly 
interrupted by strikes amongst sailors, keelmen, and pitmen.47 The fact that any stoppage in the 
North East affected London’s supply of coals placed each of these groups in a strong bargaining 
position. The coal proprietors were particularly keen to explore any means for the curtailment of 
these regular outbreaks of collective bargaining and felt they had a strong case for the 
permanent stationing of troops. After a particularly fractious crop of seamen’s strikes in 1785,  
for example, government received a petition with 100 signatories lobbying for the erection of 
barracks in Sunderland. Both local justices and employers argued that barracks were required in 
order to prevent damage to property in the town (ships in particular), to secure the ‘very 
valuable Collieries adjoining thereto’, and to counter the ‘the turbulent Spirit of the Seamen, 
Keelmen and Labourers belonging to the said Town and Port’.48 In 1792, when the seamen 
repeated their wage-bargaining campaign, the ship-owners of South Shields again argued that 
‘Government ought to be at the expense of Barracks here … it is the earnest wish of all people 
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here, to have the Mob quelled’.49 While from Newcastle, the Secretary-at-War was informed that, 
‘all Descriptions of Persons interested in Collieries’ were themselves prepared to meet the 
expense of building cavalry barracks in the town in the hope that having a couple of troops of 
horse constantly on hand would assist in counteracting the ‘tumultuous spirit’ of the pit men 
and sailors.50 
5.4.  Pitt’s Barrack-Building Programme and the Growth of Armed and Auxiliary 
 Forces, 1792-1801 
Pitt’s barrack-building programme, initiated in 1792, established the country’s first network of 
inland barracks. A number of historians have emphasized the importance of this moment, 
which represented a decisive break from earlier policy driven by constitutional rhetoric. 
Fortescue, for example, described the introduction of barracks as a ‘revolution’ in the lodging of 
soldiers.51 Although coastal forts had been permitted as a defence against invasion, ‘inland 
fortresses’ for the vast majority of the eighteenth century, were resisted as inimical to the 
constitution. Judge Blackstone’s argument ran that a tyrannical executive power, when 
equipped with barracks, could hide from public view the true size of their forces and make a 
‘distinct order of the profession of arms’ by separating them from civil society. Thus, according 
to Blackstone, ‘in a land of liberty … no barracks, no inland fortresses should be allowed.52 As 
Emlsey has demonstrated, in the early 1790s, this doctrine was entirely inverted. 53 With the 
arrival of republican doctrines to England’s shores in the aftermath of the French Revolution, it 
was deemed a positive virtue, and essential to the survival of the constitution, to separate the 
soldiery from discontented individuals who might wish to subvert the troops for revolutionary 
purposes. This fear was based upon reports received at the Home Office, that radicals were 
actively attempting to circulate the Rights of Man among the soldiery.54   
In response to these reports, in May 1792, the Deputy Adjutant General, Colonel De Lancey, 
was sent on a clandestine mission to visit troops stationed in the major manufacturing towns. 
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He was tasked with both examining the reliability of the soldiery, and with assessing the 
political state of those places.55 In Manchester De Lancey unearthed evidence of a small but 
dedicated group of a dozen or so soldiers among the Scots Greys who gathered every Saturday 
to read and discuss the works of Paine. The Colonel was convinced Manchester’s middle-class 
radicals had provided the troops with the pamphlets and invited the soldiers to socialise with 
them.56 While at Sheffield, a considerable confrontation had occurred between the soldiers of 
the 6th Enniskillen Dragoons – led by their officers – and the town’s large and committed radical 
population. The troops had been pinned down to their quarters by an angry crowd who pelted 
the windows of the Tontine pub. In the absence of the magistracy, the officers ordered their 
men to ‘repulse’ the crowd causing injury to fifty-two persons.57 The Colonel’s report makes it 
clear that the dragoon officers and the crowd were at variance over the attempts by the town’s 
radicals to ‘gain the soldiers over to their party’.58  
On the basis of this rather patchy evidence of subversion, De Lancey made a case for the 
dangers of leaving soldiers in quarters in the manufacturing towns and pressed for the erection 
of barracks as a means to preserve their political allegiance.59 In the autumn of 1792, Prime 
Minister Pitt secured a Royal Warrant to begin the building of barracks. The first were 
commissioned to be built in many of the towns where De Lancey had been sent to investigate – 
Coventry, Manchester, Nottingham, Norwich, and Sheffield.60 The political significance of this 
move has been closely attended to by historians.61 Emsley and Wells, for example, have argued 
from the evidence of sedition found in De Lancey’s correspondence, that it was the danger of 
radical subversion of the soldiery which convinced Pitt of the need for barracks.62 Undoubtedly 
this was an important factor. In all of those towns where the first barracks were thrown up there 
was some degree of radical influence which could prove dangerous to the discipline of the 
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troops. In Parliament, Pitt himself justified the policy on the grounds that barracks would serve 
‘as a preventative of the seduction of the army’.63   
However, we should be careful not to overplay the evidence of the ‘seduction’ of the soldiery. 
Radicals may well have been interested in educating soldiers – and working men in general – in 
their ‘rights’ but there is little evidence of radical attempts to involve the soldiery in 
insurrectionary activities at this particular time. Even among the Scots Greys, De Lancey 
concluded that, ‘the body of the men is yet dependable’ – an assertion backed by the regiment’s 
‘firm determination’ in the suppression of the Wigan miners’ strike and in their steadiness at the 
Newcastle-under-Lyme election disturbances.64 Furthermore, while Sheffield’s radicals may 
well have tried (and failed) to politicise the dragoons, De Lancey found that in Nottingham, 
Liverpool, Leicester, and Birmingham there had been no such approaches made to the troops 
who were ‘in good order and very well disposed’.65 What he did find in these towns, however, 
was large labouring populations ‘extremely prone to Riot’ due to the high money wages and the 
‘Dissipation’ which this independence entailed.66 
Emsley has suggested that, in addition to preventing the subversion of the soldiery, barracks 
were equally designed as a ‘police measure’.67 Likewise, Radzinowicz is correct to assert that 
barracks could not have been built without the approval of the local leaders most affected.68 
However, few historians have examined the letter books of the Secretary-at-War and considered 
closely the duties which the army was called upon to perform in the period immediately before 
these barracks were commissioned. In many of the locations where cavalry barracks were first 
built, we find that magistrates were anxious about being left, for even short amounts of time, 
without such forces. The magistracy in Coventry referred to the ‘turbulency’[sic.] of the 
common people69, while removing the cavalry from Manchester could not be complied with 
without ‘endangering the quiet of the place’. 70 Pitt was surely making reference to these kinds 
                                                   
63 See Pitt’s comments in Cobbett's Parliamentary History, (London, 1817), Vol. 30, col. 495. 
64 HO 42/22, ff. 625-6, De Lancey – Dundas, 30 November 1792.  
65 HO 42/20, ff. 386-395, De Lancey – Dundas, 13 June 1792. 
66 HO 42/20, f. 392, De Lancey – Dundas, 13 June 1792. 
67 Emsley, 'The Military and Popular Disorder’, p. 17 
68 Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law, Vol. 4, p. 121 
69 WO 1/1051, f. 279, Town Clerk of Coventry – Yonge, 11 April 1792. 
70 WO 1/1054, f. 173, Major Ramsay – Yonge, 3 October 1792. See similar concerns from Sheffield and 
Birmingham: WO 1/1055, f. 239, Captain Wheelock – Yonge, 24 January 1792; HO 42/20, f. 289, Joseph 




of communications, and the important role that the army had played during the strike waves of 
1791-2, when he stated to Parliament that a ‘spirit had appeared in some of the manufacturing 
towns which made it necessary that troops should be kept near them’.71 Moreover, after the first 
barracks were built in the industrial cities of the north, infantry barracks were also erected in 
Sunderland (1793), and cavalry barracks in Trowbridge and Taunton (1793-4), precisely the 
locations where, as we have seen, industrialists and magistrates had both been calling loudly 
for their introduction.72 Thus the evidence for radical subversion of the troops should not be 
overstated. Pitt’s barrack building programme was primarily a response to the industrial unrest 
of these years.  
5.5.  Impact of Barracks and the Growth of Coercive Force Available to the State. 
In addition to their constitutional novelty, the impact of barracks, in regards to the policing of 
large industrial towns of the north, should not be understated. As we have seen, soldiers were 
usually quartered in public houses. They therefore tended to be thinly spread across a given 
settlement and it could take an officer a considerable amount of time to gather up his men when 
called upon to perform riot-duties. Troops in barracks, by contrast, could be mobilised with 
much greater speed. We can see this in action in Manchester, where the country’s largest 
cavalry barracks, capable of holding six troops of horse, were built. In 1795, for example, a 
crowd intercepted a cart carrying meal at the New Cross. The crowd set about opening the 
sacks and distributing the contents but troops from the barracks arrived ‘before they could 
complete their business’.73 While in 1798, an attack was launched by disgruntled cotton spinners 
against the premises of factory owners who had attempted to lower their wages. They gathered 
in ‘many thousands’ and broke the windows of the factories. However the business owners 
praised the swift arrival of the magistrates and the Ross-shire Fencibles from the barracks – as 
there was ‘no doubt, if it had not been for the assistance of the Civil Power and the Military that 
the said factories … would have been demolished and destroyed’.74   
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Barracks may also have had a symbolic value. These were large and imposing buildings, placed 
on the outskirts of towns, in the least built-up areas, where ground was relatively cheap, and 
where troops could be housed far enough away to ‘prevent too free an intercourse between the 
soldiery and the inhabitants’ (Print 5).75 In Sheffield, for example, the barracks were built three 
quarters of a mile from the town on the Halifax Road, while in Manchester they were situated in 
the then sparsely populated region of Moss Side, half a mile from the city.76 The separateness  of 
the barracks made it hard for townspeople to judge how many soldiers were available for riot-
duty, and therefore made it harder to calculate the chances of success of any given collective 
action. In Nottingham, for example, a food riot broke out when the troops quartered in the town 
were seen to be marching to Loughborough. The crowd, ‘conceiving that the whole Regiment 
was gone’, were given a rude surprise when three remaining troops of dragoons appeared from 
the barracks and ‘prevented any material mischief being done’.77 Further, the erection of cavalry 
barracks at Trowbridge has been rather overlooked by Adrian Randall. By 1797, Eden reported 
that, ‘by degrees’, a number of scribbling jennies had been successfully introduced in the town. 
It may well have been the permanent stationing of troops in the newly-erected cavalry barracks 
which gave the Trowbridge clothiers confidence enough to attempt to overcome local 
opposition to machinery.78  
In 1790 there was enough room to quarter 21,000 troops in barracks. By the end of the 
Napoleonic War this figure had grown to 100,000.79 Although many of the newly-built barracks 
were erected on the southern coast as a defence against invasion, and as a means of housing 
infantry waiting to board transport ships, the impact on the countryside was palpable.80 When 
the LCS radical John Gale Jones, toured the southern coast of England in 1796, he remarked on 
the changed landscape, and the ‘numerous barracks and fortifications which everywhere 
surrounded us’.81 The Hammonds too commented on the militarisation of the Midlands and the 
North, describing the manufacturing districts as akin to ‘a country under military occupation’.82 
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While Edward Thompson argued that the growth in the coercive force available to the state, 
ensured that by 1815, ‘the English people were held down by force’.83 Thompson’s emphasis has 
been vigorously denied by Perry Anderson. Anderson stresses that in 1815, ‘with an army of 
25,000 – the total troop force available for domestic repression – was scarcely sufficient to pin 
down a society of 12,000,000’. In Ireland Thompson may have had a case, but in England, 
Anderson argues, the power of the ancien regime rested on a combination of the ‘bloody code’ 
and a powerful culture of nationalism.84 
Thompson’s claims may well be overstated for the year 1815, and we should not underestimate 
the propaganda value of British victory at Waterloo.85 However, in the 1790s, there is a stronger 
case to be made for a country held down by force. Social historians have tended to avoid 
quantifying in any detail the extent of the forces available to the state. The total ‘establishment 
strength’ of the army, voted by Parliament, can be easily ascertained86 yet the historian is 
presented with a number of difficulties in forming precise statistics for the actual number of 
soldiers in the home garrison at any given time. The problem of finding like for like sources 
with which to compare over time presents a further difficulty. Nevertheless, an attempt to draw 
together a range of sources has been made in order to establish figures for the overall military 
forces available in England and Wales over the course of the eighteenth century (Figure 9). 
These figures (although imperfect) demonstrate that, as the strength of Britain’s military might 
grew with each eighteenth-century conflict, the presence of troops in the country itself also 
increased. The introduction of the new Militia (1757), the volunteers (1778), and the yeomanry 
(1794) dramatically increased the coercive capacity of the state in proportion to the population 
as a whole. By 1801 the number of soldiers to civilians was three to four times what it had been 
in the reign of George I. Moreover, at the close of the Revolutionary Wars, we can see that the 
proportionate strength of the military in England and Wales was not far from the ratio which 
was dedicated by the government to the suppression of the 1798 Irish Rebellion. Government’s 
fears of a Napoleonic invasion after the crowning of the First Consul in November 1799 explains 
                                                   
83 Thompson, Making of the English Working Class, p. 663 
84 P. Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism (London: Verso, 1980)., p. 38, fn. 57. 
85 Colley, Britons, 327. 
86 See J. Gregory and J. Stevenson, The Routledge Companion to Britain in the Eighteenth Century, 1688-1820 




why half of Britain’s regular forces were stationed in England and Wales by January 1800.87 
However, we must concede, that a secondary effect of anti-invasion measures was to equip the 
state with an unprecedented degree of coercive force which could be turned toward domestic 
repression. Contrary to Anderson’s dismissal of the Thompsonian argument, there was a 
dramatic militarisation of English society over the late eighteenth-century. 
 
  
                                                   
87 For invasion fears see Dundas’ speech in the Commons 3 February 1800 in Lloyd's Evening Post, 3- 5 




Figure 9 - Showing the Strength of Military Presence in Comparison to Populations of England and Wales, 1715-1801, 
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Sources for Size of Military: 1715: Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England (Commons), Vol. 32, 2 
November  1796, cols. 1242. 1741: SP 41/13, f. 148, ‘Disposition of Troops’, 4 June 1741. 1757: Hayter, Army 
and the Crowd, pp. 22, 95. 1783: Conway, The British Isles, p. 24 (army at home has been estimated). 1796: 
(Regulars), Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England (Commons), Vol. 32, 21 October 1796, col. 1224; 
(Militia), HO 50/25, u.f, ‘State of Militia’, 18 April 1796; (Volunteers and Yeomanry), Gee, The British 
Volunteer Movement, p. 114. 1801: WO 30/65, No. 28 - General Disposition of the Army in Great Britain, 
February 1801. Ireland, 1798: Ferguson, 'The Army and the Irish Rebellion 1798', p. 97. 
Size of Population in England and Wales: Gregory and Stevenson (eds.), Routledge Companion, p. 244. 




Print 5 - Plan and Elevation of the Barracks at Sheffield (1792). 
 
  




6. Military Interventions in Food Riots, 1795, 1800-1. 
Continuing from the Chapter Five, this chapter will examine the central and local government’s 
response to the food riots of 1795 and 1800-1. As we may expect, given the considerable amount 
of coercive force at the hands of the state in this period, military interventions became more 
widespread and reflexive from the mid-1790s. This chapter will therefore seek to demonstrate 
this point, by examining the way in which military resources were directed towards the 
suppression of food riots, and considering how this differed from earlier periods. However, as 
the use of armed force was never universal, an attempt will be made to analyse the geography 
of military deployments. The second half of the chapter will therefore seek to consider which 
factors were decisive in determining whether labour unrest and food rioting, in a given locale, 
was met with armed repression, and why the 1790s represented such a clear moment of 
discontinuity.  
It will be argued firstly, that the changing social structure of the industrialising regions of the 
country was of key importance, both to the manifestation of protests, and to way in which they 
were resolved. Secondly, it will be suggested that the perceived influence radical ideology 
affected the ability of local magistrates to negotiate with a crowd, while simultaneously 
encouraging central government to take a firmer stance against protest. Thirdly, the growing 
intellectual influence of political economy will be emphasized. The economic convictions of the 
government provided powerful justification for the  vigorous suppression of food rioting and 
‘collective bargaining by riot’. However, once laissez faire economics were adopted and 
enforced, they provided fuel for plebeian disorder while simultaneously denuding local 
authorities of the traditional means of extinguishing popular discontent. This heady concoction 
of factors apparent in the 1790s ensured that, for the first time, many magistrates in urban and 
industrial districts, had to admit their dependence upon unformed military force for 
maintaining the peace. 
6.1.  Nature of Military Interventions in Food Riots 
In accordance with the dramatic increase in the coercive force at the hands of both the central 
and local government, historians have noted that official responses to the food riots of 1795 and 




Thompson, for example, has stressed that the 1790s bring us into ‘new historical territory’.88 
While Bohstedt’s work suggests that we can witness a ‘a substantial and significant change in 
governance’ when we consider the degree of military intervention in the food riots of 1795 and 
1801.89 Using an impressive evidence base of over 700 food riots between 1500 and 1800, 
Bohstedt has recently provided some compelling statistical evidence which suggests that that 
one in six food riots in the mid-eighteenth century resulted in a ‘deployment’ of troops, but that 
by 1795 this proportion had gone up to one in two, and that by 1800, two thirds of all food riots 
resulted in a military response.90 
A number of historians, notably Wells and Poole, have coherently set out some of the major 
difficulties for compiling reliable statistics on the total number of food riots in any given year. 
Firstly, there are definitional problems. It is hard to delineate what activities one means by the 
term ‘riot’ or on what scale such an incident has to take place before it is counted. Secondly, 
rioting often went unreported or is obscured in some way by our sources. We are, therefore, 
cautioned by these historians, not to lay too much analytical weight on any statistical evidence 
taken from these phenomena.91 Such advice is wise. However, the absolute number of recorded 
military interventions in the late eighteenth century, even if we take into consideration these 
evidential problems, does seem unusually high. While it is true that we are unable to gain a 
complete view of the extent of food rioting,  I would argue that those riots which elicited a 
military response of some sort tended to leave a greater mark on the historical record than those 
which did not. This evidence therefore warrants further investigation. 
Thus an attempt has been made to reconstruct from secondary sources, online newspaper 
archives, and the Home Office papers as full a list as possible of military interventions in the 
food riots of 1795. In addition, for the year 1795, we have thirteen volumes of the Secretary-at-
War’s letter books and evidence from these sources have been incorporated into the study.92 In 
terms of defining ‘military intervention’ I have looked for occasions where there has been a 
stand-off between the protesting crowd and the armed or auxiliary forces. My criteria have been 
                                                   
88 Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd’, p. 129. 
89 J. Bohstedt, The Politics of Provisions, p. 230. 
90 Ibid., pp. 157, 230. 
91 Wells, 'Counting Riots in Eighteenth-Century England', pp. 68-72; S. Poole, 'Popular Politics in Bristol’, 
Appendix C, Counting Riots. 




firstly that a food riot can be demonstrated to have taken place, i.e. a crowd action involving the 
seizure of foodstuffs, the forced sale of goods, attacks upon middlemen, or demonstrations over 
the price of food. Secondly, that an armed and uniformed force was sent into the same vicinity 
to assist the magistracy, or, if forces were already stationed in a disturbed town, that they were 
drawn out of their quarters or barracks in order to do so. 
It should perhaps be made clear that many of the military interventions I have included in my 
count involved little or no exchange of violence between the crowd and the soldiery. Often it 
was enough for the authorities to simply provide a ‘show of force’. In May 1795, for example, 
when a body of Kingswood colliers were reported to be seizing control of wagons loaded with 
provisions, the Gloucestershire authorities sent the whole of the East Devon Militia, headed by 
General Rooke and a county magistrate, to meet them. In response the majority of the miners 
fled on the appearance of the troops.93 It is the physical presence of the armed or auxiliary 
forces, at the behest of the authorities, and at the scene of a food riot, which I have sought to 
find evidence of before recording an incident as a military intervention. 
From a thorough search of the above sources, seventy-six military interventions in food riots 
can be established for the year 1795. Further, as two or more separate units were sometimes sent 
to deal with a single riot, we can establish a second total of ninety-three instances of military 
‘deployment’, in which orders to attend a disturbance were received and executed (Figure 10).94 
These figures coincide with the recent findings of Bohstedt. If we accept both his estimate of 
roughly 150 food riots in 1795 and his suggestion that one in two riots resulted in a military 
response, then around seventy-five interventions in food riots is what we would expect to see.95 
An attempt to repeat this national study for the years 1800-1 has been rejected on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence. Unfortunately, the crucial Secretary-at-War’s in-letters are not extant for 
this period. While the Secretary of State for War’s papers are available, they run to just two 
volumes per year and do not contain the same level of detailed communication from 
commanding officers on the ground.96 Instead a detailed reconstruction of the food riots of the 
                                                   
93 Chester Courant, 19 May 1795. 
94 For example, if both the regular cavalry and the yeomanry were sent to suppress rioting in a town on a 
given day this would be counted as two ‘deployments’ but one instance of military intervention in a food 
riot. 
95 Bohstedt, 'The Pragmatic Economy’, p. 59-60 




West Midlands, one of the most disturbed areas of 1795, has been made.97 Roger Wells’ data has 
been used as a starting point, and has been cross-referenced with Home Office, and local 
newspaper sources.98 Here it has been found that out of a total of fifty recorded food riots, well 
over half were met by a military intervention (Figure 11). This evidence suggests that the 
traditional local responses to food riot, with magistrates intervening on a personal level to 
appease the crowd, or simply turning a blind eye, were in many areas being supplanted by a 
much firmer stance towards riot. 
                                                   
97 ‘West Midlands’ has been defined throughout as the following counties: Derbyshire, Leicestershire, 
Nottinghamshire, Warwickshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire, and Worcestershire. 
98 HO 42/49-56, Home Office In-Letters, 1800-1; Staffordshire Advertiser; Derby Mercury; Wells, Wretched 




Figure 10 - Military Interventions in Food Riots in 
England, 1795. 
Type of Force 
No. Food Riots 
Attended 
% 
Reg. Cavalry 39 41.9% 
Yeomanry 20 21.5% 
Volunteers 17 18.3% 
Fencibles 11 11.8% 




Total Food Riots Resulting in a 
Military Intervention 
76 
Sources: see Map 3 below 
NB. Some food riots were attended by two or 
more units hence we see a higher number of 
‘deployments’ than ‘interventions’. 
 
Figure 11 - Military Interventions in Food Riots in the 
West Midlands, 1800-1 
Type of Force 
No. Food Riots 
Attended 
% 
Reg. Cavalry 24 48.0% 
Yeomanry 12 24.0% 
Volunteers 14 28.0% 
Militia 0 0.0% 




Total Food Riots Resulting in a 
Military Intervention: 
30 (60%) 
Total Recorded Food Riots: 50 (100%) 
Sources: Wells, Wretched Faces, Tables 1-12, pp. 
357-369; Staffordshire Advertiser; Derbyshire 
Mercury; HO 42/49-55. 
 
 
The data presented in the above tables points us to the importance of cavalry. Seventy-two per 
cent of deployments in the West Midlands were of mounted units and both the national and 
regional data presented here evidences the pre-eminence of the regular cavalry as the preferred 
agent of riot control. Regular cavalry, and particularly the light dragoons, were highly mobile 
and tended to have a wider tactical repertoire than the infantry. In Manchester, for example, the 
local authorities ordered the 28th Light Dragoons first to ride ‘gently’ through a protesting 
crowd, and then to retreat to a distance. After the Riot Act was read, and peaceful attempts to 
persuade the crowd to depart were shown to have failed, the troops charged ‘at a full gallop 
through the midst of them’ and the crowd was successfully dispersed.1 Similarly, the Town 
Clerk of Nottingham,  praised the cavalry for their skill at rounding-up ringleaders.2 Likewise, 
the Mayor of Liverpool stated from experience that, ‘one Troop of the Horse is better than half a 
Regiment of Foot for avoiding bloodshed, which is always much to be desired’.3 
                                                   
1 Chester Courant, 4 August 1795. 
2 HO 42/49, f. 216-18, Coldham, Town Clerk of Nottingham – Portland, 25 April 1800. 
3 HO 42/20, ff. 181-2, Blundell, Mayor of Liverpool – Dundas, 5/06/1792. See similar remarks from 




Foot soldiers, by contrast, were considered to be particularly disadvantageous and were rarely 
deployed in 1795.4 The cavalry could use their horses and the ‘flat part of their swords’ to great 
effect.5 By contrast, the infantry were relatively immobile and were equipped only with the 
potentially lethal weapons of the musket and bayonet. This made them poorly suited to riot-
control. The magistrates of Trowbridge offered a further reason to avoid the use of infantry: 
‘Most of the lower class of people in the neighbourhood have been in the Militia, and do not 
dread or heed the Foot so much as the Horse’.6 In the spring of 1795 it was not just the efficacy 
but the reliability of the militia which was in question. As we have seen, between March and 
April, militiamen incited and joined in with civilian food protests in towns right across the 
south coast of England.7 Militia regiments were thereafter considered to be ‘abettors’ of food 
riots and were rarely called upon to assist in their suppression.8  
By contrast to the minor contribution of the regular infantry and militia, the importance of the 
auxiliary forces should be stressed. Gee exaggerates when he claims that the volunteers (in 
which he also includes the yeomanry) ‘were much more frequently used against food riots than 
the regulars’.9 This claim is based on the work of Roger Wells, which, as this study has found, 
does not adequately distinguish between the different types of armed force deployed in these 
years. To give just one glaring example, the famous Barrow-upon-Soar food riot, in which the 
Leicester Yeomanry Cavalry shot dead several individuals, is recorded in Wells’ tables as a 
having been attended by ‘regular’ troops.10 Nevertheless, careful reconstruction of the types of 
forces involved in the suppression of food riot does bear out the importance of the auxiliary 
forces who were deployed in around half of all military interventions.  
In particular the yeomanry played  a role out of all proportion to their numerical strength. In 
1795 the War Office received returns from individual yeomanry regiments which totalled some 
4,000 troops, however, we know that not every regiment sent in returns, so the true figure is 
                                                   
4 Only a handful of Fencible infantry regiments and an equally small number of militia units were 
deployed against food rioters in 1795. The regular infantry appear not to have been used at all. 
5 HO 42/52, ff. 13-4, Alexander Haden – Portland, 1 October 1800; White-Spunner, Horse Guards (London: 
Macmillan, 2006), p. 255. 
6 WO 1/1050, f. 61-2,  J.Ps for Trowbridge – George Young, 21 August 1791. 
7 See Chapter 3.3. 
8 HO 42/34, ff. 291-92,Sir William Elford, Banker of Bickham, near Plymouth – Portland, 6 April 1795. 
9 Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, p. 248. 
10 Wells, Wretched Faces, Table 8, p. 365. For a more detailed and accurate account of the ‘Barrow butchery’ 




probably more like 5,000 for that year.11 By 1798, Henry Dundas’ calculations suggest a 
yeomanry of 20,000 had emerged.12 To put this in context, in the West Midlands, where the 
population was some 1,250,000, the yeomanry amounted to just 3,500 in 1800, yet they attended 
over a third of the recorded food riots in the region.13 The eagerness of the yeomanry has 
frequently been correlated with the social status of the men who made up these units.14  Under 
the Yeomanry Cavalry Acts, men joining these troops had to provide their own horses and 
uniforms.15 They were therefore socially exclusive units. The Duke of Richmond described the 
Sussex Yeomanry as the ‘younger, brothers, sons and servants of [the] Farmers’ while the 
Marquess of Buckingham characterized them as the ‘young idle gentlemen of the country, 
foxhunters and sportsmen’.16 In Oldham the members of Yeomanry were the ‘principal 
inhabitants’ – factory owners and churchwardens.17 The Yeomanry tended to represent the 
interests of industrial or agrarian capital depending on where they were formed. They were 
therefore understandably reliable when it came to resisting crowds attempting to force down 
prices or to seize stocks of grain and were frequently praised for their ‘readiness to give their 
assistance’18 
As local soldier-civilian groups, the yeomanry could be deployed with much greater speed than 
the regulars. During a food riot in Yaxley, for example, Earl Fitzwilliam’s troop of Gentlemen 
Cavalry were assembled at Peterborough and travelled five miles to the scene of the 
disturbance within the space of twenty-five minutes.19 The  advantage of yeomanry was also 
proven during the Militia Act riots. In 1757, when anti-militia riots broke out in the countryside, 
                                                   
11 WO 17/1015-23, Yeomanry Cavalry Returns, 1795; P. Mileham, The Yeomanry Regiments: 200 Years of 
Tradition, (Cannongate: Edinburgh, 1994). 
12 PRO 30/244, ff. 237-239, Volunteer Corps of Cavalry and Infantry accepted by HM between 14 April 
1794 and 14 July 1798 specifying the number raised in each of the counties in England, Scotland and 
Wales, 1798. 
13 Ibid.; Population taken from E.A. Wrigley, The Early English Censuses, Table 4.1 ‘Estimated County 
Population Totals, 1600-1851’. 
14 Archer, Social Unrest and Popular Protest in England, p. 80; Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p. 50. 
15 P. Mileham, The Yeomanry Regiments, p. 10. 
16 HO 42/28, f. 197, Buckingham –Grenville, 2 February 1794; HO 50/88, u.f., Richmond – Hobart, 8 
August 1802. 
17 Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution, p. 34, n. 55;  ‘Return of Dates During the Last ten 
years at which any volunteer of yeomanry troop was clled out for actual service, PP 1828, XVII (273); and 
Derby – Dundas, 18 Sep 1803 (HO 50/76) and for 1808 (HO 50;196). 
18 HO 42/51, ff. 286-287B, Monckton – Portland, 19 Septmeber 1800. 




the government had been ‘sluggish’ in sending regular forces.20 In 1796, by contrast, the Lords 
Lieutenants of Northamptonshire and Buckinghamshire were able to deploy the yeomanry, and 
thereby curb protests in their infancy. Additionally, the mere existence of yeomanry troops was 
seen as ‘invaluable’ in terms of preventing rural disorder.21 In Derbyshire for example, although 
there is no evidence of direct confrontations with riotous crowds, the yeomanry were paraded 
in several locations where there were fears of disorder. Demands for this service in the summer 
of 1795 were said to be ‘incessant’.22 In Norfolk and Essex, local authorities also praised the 
yeomanry’s suppressant effect; ‘in those parts where there is Yeomanry Corps they are quiet’.23 
Particularly in rural areas, where they were most in evidence, the yeomanry evidently played 
an important role in minimising overt acts of protest.24 
The contribution of the volunteers to riot duty is much less clear cut. As Gee has recently 
demonstrated,  the social composition of the volunteer infantry was heterogeneous and specific 
to local communities.25 In the market towns of Devon, the strong ‘corporate’ identity of 
volunteer corps, who elected their own leaders, and the inclusion of large numbers of artisans 
and labourers in the ranks, ensured that Devon’s volunteers were as likely to join with food 
rioters as they were to resist them.26 By contrast, the corps of the industrial towns of the North 
made a considerable contribution to public order. These urban corps tended to be outshoots of 
the loyalist clubs of the early 1790s.27 Several loyalists who corresponded with John Reeves in 
1792 advanced the concept of ‘armed associations’ for the purpose of ‘dispersing rioters’ and 
preventing the ‘seditious assemblies of the people’.28 Many of the northern volunteer units that 
                                                   
20 Hayter, The Army and the Crowd, p. 101. 
21 For the Buckinghamshire yeomanry as ‘invaluable’ to public order see HO 50/26, Marquis of 
Buckingham – Portland, 17 and 18  December 1796. For use of yeomanry in suppression of rioting of 1796 
see HO 50/26, Northampton – Portland, 9 December 1796; Neave, 'Anti-Militia Riots in Lincolnshire’, p. 
22. 
22 M. Thomas, 'The Rioting Crowd in Derbyshire in the 18th Century', Derbyshire Archaeological Journal, 95 
(1975-6), p. 44; WO 1/1090, f. 441-2,  Mundey – Windham, 4 August 1795. 
23 HO 42/50, ff. 365-6, Ruggles – Portland, 6 July 1800. 
24 R.A.E. Wells, 'The Development of the English Rural Proletariat and Social Protest 1700-1850', Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 6 (1979), p. 127. 
25 Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, Chap. 3. 
26 Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p. 50; Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, p. 245. 
27 Western, 'The Volunteer Movement’, p. 606; Dozier, For King Constitution and Country, p. 153; 
O'Gorman, 'English Loyalism Revisited', p. 227. 
28 For just two examples among many see Add. MS 16,921, f. 117, Anon. – Reeves, 10 December 1792; 
Add. MS 16,920, ff. 129-30, ‘Pacificus’ – J. Reeves, 5 December 1792. See also, M. Philp, 'Vulgar 




emerged in 1794 shared the counter-revolutionary concerns of the APLPRL.29 In Leeds, the 
banker John Beckett hoped that by mobilizing the town’s wealthy middle classes, the 
government would be supported and ‘our necks kept from the Guillotine’.30 While Reverend 
Russel of Dronfield, a fierce anti-Jacobin, launched the Loyal Independent Sheffield Volunteers 
in May 1794, with the backing of JP Reverend Wilkinson. Both men hoped that the volunteers 
would assist in ‘repressing the Insolence of the disorderly, turbulent and seditious Spirit 
apparent in some People among the Multitude’.31 Similarly, in Birmingham, it was the Loyal 
True Blue Society, headed by the staunchly conservative Justice Joseph Carles, which oversaw 
the formation of an armed association in the town.32 In both Sheffield and Birmingham 
membership was contingent upon demonstrably loyalist politics.33 Likewise in Bradford, the 
allegiances of each new recruit were investigated ‘minutely’ and only those men who were 
‘unquestionably staunch in his political principles’ were accepted.34  
It was these closely-monitored urban volunteer corps, tinged with counter-revolutionary 
fervour, that made the most considerable contribution to public order in 1795. Volunteer units 
in Wakefield, Leicester, Stockport, and Rochdale all assisted in riot-control. Their local status, as 
with the yeomanry, meant they could be called out quickly and summarily by JPs who needed 
only local approval from the Lord Lieutenant or the High Sherriff in order to place them on 
active duty. Volunteers were mobilized to escort grain barges along canals, to prevent 
blockading, and were frequently drawn up in the marketplace, in the hopes of preventing price 
fixing.35 Subscriptions were even raised to recompense the Stockport Volunteers for loss of 
earning after they were called upon to ‘stand under arms [for] whole nights together’.36 Like the 
Yeomanry and the regulars, in addition to confronting crowds, urban volunteers played an 
important preventative role in 1795. Undoubtedly, the staunchly loyalist principles of the 
volunteer commanders in these places ensured that such corps were particularly zealous in 
coming forward to assist in suppressing the food riots.  
                                                   
29 Cookson, Armed Nation, p. 27. 
30 SCA, WWM/Y17/5, Beckett – Fitzwilliam, 22 April 1794. 
31 HO 50/346, James Wilkinson, Sheffield – Dundas, 7 May 1794; HO 42/30, ff. 52-3, J. Russel – Dundas, 12 
May 1794. 
32 HO 42/30, ff. 21-22, Brooke– Dundas, 6 May 1794 (with enclosures). 
33 Ibid.; HO 42/30, ff. 52-3, J. Russel – Dundas, 12 May 1794. 
34 HO 50/346, u.f., Busfield, Bradford – Dundas, 10 June 1794. 
35 Star, 7 August 1795; Courier, 2 May 1795. 




However, Gee has cautioned us against John Western’s interpretation, which sees the volunteer 
movement as an devoted counter-revolutionary force.37 According to Gee, many of the rank and 
file volunteers joined from broader patriotic motives and were ‘loyal but not loyalist’.38 
Moreover, the fact that the volunteers could not be subjected to military discipline, and the 
existence of many artisans and labourers at the core of their membership, meant that volunteer 
units had their limits in terms of repressing food riots, even in urban locales.39 Occasionally, 
corps might outright refuse to act against their ‘neighbours’ while those working men who 
were known to have played an active role in suppressing popular protests might become victim 
to hostility or even reprisals. 40 Given the evidence of volunteer involvement in the south-
western food riots in 1800-1, and in light of the widespread absenteeism, and even the folding 
of some volunteer regiments over the same period, Wells has even suggested that local and 
national government experienced a ‘crisis of confidence’ in the volunteer movement at the close 
of the decade.41 
The evidence from the West Midlands corroborates Well’s findings. Popular hostility towards 
the volunteers became particularly acute in the latter part of 1800. In March of that year, the 
Duke of Portland issued a circular, in anticipation of food riots due to unusually high prices, 
calling upon Lords Lieutenants to make use of the volunteers to protect the ‘free circulation of 
corn from one part of the country to another’.42 The volunteers and yeomanry of the West 
Midlands were therefore called upon extensively particularly in April to suppress the outbreak 
of food rioting. The appearance of disturbances once more in the late summer led to the 
publication of a Royal Proclamation demanding that ‘ample Security be afforded to all Farmers 
and other lawful Dealers of Corn’ and enjoining local authorities to make use of the Riot Act 
and the military forces at their disposal.43 Both communiqués were poorly received by the 
public and focused popular resentment upon the volunteer forces. 
                                                   
37 Western, 'The Volunteer Movement’, p. 612 
38 Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, p. 8 
39 Ibid., p. 234; Wells, Wretched Faces, p. 275. 
40 Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, p. 235. 
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In the landlocked region of the West Midlands, where there was no direct access to the 
international grain trade, and where the proportion of arable land compared to the size of the 
population was relatively small, price increases were acute.44 Rumours that grain prices were 
artificially inflated by farmers, and that the King and Government were complicit in a pacte de 
famine, were widely disseminated through the West Midlands. At Birmingham, the magistrates 
reported that: 
 The Proclamation, so well intended to check the spirit of Riot, has 
 been made to produce a very opposite effect and to excite in the 
 minds of the lower and middle classes indignation and resentment 
 against government … Conversations in Public houses and other 
 places and in many where the Company were formerly remarkable 
 for their Loyalty and Attachment to Government is truly afflicting 
 … The [Volunteer] Associations and Yeomanry corps which were 
 formerly so popular here and are of such immense national 
 importance now find themselves as unpopular and perpetually 
 exposed to insults.45 
This state of affairs was repeated across the region. At Kidderminster, anonymous handbills 
directed popular animosity towards the King and the Duke of Portland who, it was claimed, 
had engineered the ‘famine’ with the help of the volunteers: 
 Aided by a Set of Rouges that do infest the Nation 
 They are the Famine Guards or the Devil’s Association46 
With popular hostility to the volunteers growing rapidly in 1800, their reliability as a police 
force was, in many places, thrown into question. The Stafford Military Association, for example, 
was dissolved despite local evidence of ‘formidable preparations for riot’.47 Similarly, the 
Newcastle-under-Lyme Volunteers continued a precarious existence. The journeymen and 
labourers in the corps were feared to be ‘corrupted’ after local friendly societies vowed to expel 
any of their members who acted as volunteers.48 Nor were these isolated incidents. It is clear that 
in the West Midlands there was a crisis of confidence in the ability of the volunteers to act 
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against protestors. The Earl of Warwick suggested at the close of 1800 that ‘few if any of the 
Volunteer Corps can be depended upon [and] on the contrary most of them will refrain to act’.49 
At the same time, reports were received at the Home Office that ‘a most dangerous spirit of 
Insurrection not to say of Rebellion has taken root in a great many places’.50 Specifically there 
were claims that the colliers around Wolverhampton were making pikes and had declared 
‘their firm resolution to rise in a body’, that the disaffected artisans at Birmingham were making 
pike-heads to send into the potteries, while the framework knitters of Nottingham were said to 
be ‘perpetually propagating whispers of a revolution to be expected before Christmas [and] of 
Pikes being prepared’.51 Concerned by these developments, the government dispatched 
stipendiary magistrate Aaron Graham to investigate and, in addition, provided ‘a very large 
amount of military force’, in the form of three regiments of infantry, thereby doubling the 
amount of soldiers in the region.52 Graham found that the claims of a rebellion were overdrawn, 
as the colliers were lacking leadership and a ‘regular plan’. However, the magistrates he met 
with did ‘confess that their chief defence is on the Kings Troops (for the Volunteers here and 
everywhere, I am afraid, must be employed with a certain degree of caution)’.53 
Thus, while the hands of government were considerably strengthened in this period they did 
not have at their disposal a perfect solution to disorder. As we can see from the West Midlands, 
a minority of food riots occurred unopposed. At Birmingham in February 1800, crowds 
successfully set the price of potatoes seemingly with impunity.54 While in Chesterfield , 200 
miners from Ashover marched with a petition pledging to lower the price of grain to the home 
of Justice Sitwell Sitwell. Although he refused to sign their paper, Sitwell Sitwell agreed to set 
up a subscription in order to buy stocks of foreign wheat from Hull. As one historian has 
commented, the magistrates of Derbyshire remained the ‘prisoners of the people’.55 Disorder 
was much more closely watched than in former decades and much greater efforts were made to 
prevent and suppress food rioting than in earlier periods of dearth. However, although 
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responses to food riot were changing they were not transformed beyond all recognition in this 
period . At least in the West Midlands, paternalism and the old moral economy persisted even 
within this climate of increased repression. 
6.2.  Analysis 
The findings presented above, in relation to military interventions in both the strike waves of 
1791-2 and the food riots of 1795 and 1800-1, suggests an increased reliance of both the local and 
national government on military force for maintaining the peace. Several key factors can be put 
forward in order to explain this development. The remainder of this chapter will look at these in 
detail. Firstly, structural change wrought by the Industrial Revolution, and the effect which this 
had upon public order, requires close consideration. Secondly, the rapid growth of English 
radicalism and the perceived threat of revolutionary ideology will be highlighted. Thirdly, and 
finally, the important influence of the new political economy upon central government’s 




Map 3- Showing Military Interventions in Labour Disputes (1791-2) and Food Riots (1795) in England 
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6.3.  Industrialisation and Structural Change 
When we map late eighteenth-century military engagements in food riots and strikes it becomes 
clear that they fell extremely unevenly across the country. This geography requires some 
explanation. Firstly, it should be noted the extent to which there is an urban-rural divide. It has 
been observed by historians of protest, that food riots and industrial disputes tended to be 
urban, or at least non-agricultural, phenomena.1 Whereas townspeople and wage-earners were 
reliant upon the market for their food supply, most rural labourers had privileged access to 
foodstuffs, even at times of high prices, through ‘pilfering’, subsistence farming, and 
preferential rates from local producers. Farmworkers were therefore less likely to instigate 
protests over food prices.2 Furthermore, the collective capacity of farmhands to organize in this 
period was severely limited by their dependence upon their employers and by their 
geographical dispersal.3 We may note, therefore, a distinct bias towards urban and non-
agricultural protest in the period. Having said this, not every town which saw food rioting in 
1795 made use of military force against its protestors. We must therefore examine more 
carefully the social structure and economic context in those localities to which the military were 
sent. 
Writing in rural Herefordshire in 1797, Uvedale Price argued that English society was distinct 
from other nations because ‘there are more gradations of property’ and all are ‘equally secured 
and equally favoured by the laws’. According to Price, this fact promoted ‘intercourse between 
highest and lowest’ and ‘happiness and security of individuals, and of the state at large’.4 
Certainly, in some parts of the country, strong ‘vertical relations’ between socio-economic 
groups were apparent. Bohstedt, for example, has argued that this was the case in Devon’s 
‘small and stable’ borough towns.5 When food rioting broke out in these localities, it tended to 
have a high level of community consensus, and we see middle-class and elite complicity in 
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protests, rather than forceful repression.6 According to Bohstedt ‘mildness and conciliation’ 
characterized magisterial responses in Devon.7 With a degree of caution, we might venture to 
suggest that this was also true in much of the southeast of the country. Despite the availability 
of troops, many south-eastern market towns saw food riots go on unopposed by the military in 
1795.8  
A rather different scenario can be seen elsewhere in the country. In areas where industrial 
growth and regional specialization were in evidence, the resulting social structure tended to be 
much more polarized than in the market town. In the western woollen trade, for example, we 
find large merchant capitalists employing both domestic handicraft workers, through the 
putting-out system, and skilled weavers, in small workshops. The economic growth of the 
industry, through the seventeenth century, encouraged population expansion, particularly 
along the Wiltshire-Somerset border.9 By the 1720s, the clothier-employer had emerged as a 
distinct class, culturally and socially distanced from their workforce.10 At the same time, the 
weavers became increasingly divorced from the land and dependent upon their wages. This 
gave them a degree of social independence unknown to the live-in farm-servant. Yet wage-
dependency also made the weaver vulnerable to the effects of market forces. According to 
Randall, the structure of employment in the western woollen industry encouraged the growth 
of a ‘community consciousness’. Weavers shared a common experience of being both textile 
producers and marketplace consumers. The social cohesion found among the weavers is 
demonstrated by their capacity for collective action in the eighteenth century.11 While the 
mutual alienation between worker and employer is suggested by the use of troops to contain 
                                                   
6 See middle-class and elite sympathies with Devon’s food rioters in R.A.E. Wells, 'The Revolt of the 
South-West, 1800-1801: A Study in English Popular Protest', Social History, 6 (1977), pp. 720-1. 
7 Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, p. 58. 
8 Compare Map 3 with A. Charlesworth (ed.), An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain, Map 27, ‘Food Riots 
1794-6’, p. 98-9. 
9 See Wrigley, Early English Censuses, Figure 1.2 ‘Growth of Population by Hundred, 1761-1851’, pp. 28-9. 
10 M. H. Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (London: Routledge, 1963), p. 143; D. Rollinson, The 
Local Origins of Modern Society: Gloucestershire 1500-1800 (London: Routledge, 1992). 
11 A. Randall, 'Work, Culture and Resistance to Machinery in the West of England Woollen Industry', in P. 
Hudson 1948- (ed.), Regions and Industries : A Perspective on the Industrial Revolution in Britain (Cambridge: 




industrial disputes in both 1726 and 1738, as well as during period of machine-breaking in the 
early 1790s and 1800s.12 
Similarly, sustained food rioting and industrial disturbance between 1700-1800 can be seen in 
the mining communities of Cornwall, Gloucestershire, the West Midlands, and on the 
Tyneside.13 Here again, we can see a highly polarized social structure which took root even 
before the eighteenth century. In the North East, for example, Levine and Wrightson suggest the 
colliers of Whickham were landless, geographically concentrated, and ‘thoroughly 
industrialised’ by the late seventeenth century. Over time ownership of the local coalfields  was 
increasingly concentrated into the hands of a small cartel of Newcastle lease-holders.14 It has 
been suggested that mining communities derived their collective strength from their 
homogeneity and physical separateness from society.15 Certainly, the authorities saw miners 
and their families as ‘ungovernable people’, who lived beyond the reach of the squire and the 
parson, and therefore outside of the traditional networks of deference and social control.16 
Malcolmson has demonstrated that this view was an oversimplification. The Kingswood 
colliers, for example, sought to (forcefully) negotiate with authority rather than to overturn it.17 
Likewise in Whickham, the parish continued to exercise some control over its inhabitants. 
Nevertheless, the pitmen developed a strong sense of their own collective industrial power.18 
Moreover, due to the large numbers of miners who could turn out during food riots and trades 
disputes, employers and local magistrates could usually play upon the perceived disorderliness 
of these workforces.19 Throughout the eighteenth-century, and particularly in our period, the 
central authorities consented to sending troops to oppose protests emanating from tin mines 
and collieries. 
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In both weaving and mining districts, we see early industrial communities, well-established in 
the seventeenth century, continuing to grow during the eighteenth, and presenting a sustained 
problem of order for the authorities. However, the late eighteenth century also saw the 
emergence of new sites of conflict. Population growth and rapid urbanization was evident 
throughout the century but became particularly pronounced after 1740.20 By 1800 thirty per cent 
of inhabitants lived in towns of 2,500 or more.21  In some areas, particularly in the Midlands and 
the North, boom towns sprang up so quickly as to leave substantial settlements completely 
devoid of J.Ps. In South Shields, for example, the ‘spirit of commerce’ and the growth of the 
North-Eastern coal trade produced a town of 14,000 citizens, ‘without a single Magistrate to 
control it’.22 Similarly, in the early nineteenth century, the populous Lancashire towns of 
Oldham, Middleton, and Ashton were all said to be ‘entirely without magistrates’ while the 
sprawling pottery district surrounding Stoke-upon-Trent shared the same difficulty, despite a 
population of some 50,000 inhabitants.23 
Even in towns where the traditional structures for maintaining the peace were in place, 
population growth could threaten to undermine the efficacy of the ‘civil power’. In Sheffield, for 
example, there was just one resident magistrate and thirty parish constables to oversee a town 
of 46,000 souls.24 Colonel De Lancey characterized Sheffield as existing in a ‘turbulent and 
ungovern’d state’.25 While in Manchester, Bohstedt has argued that ‘the scale of urbanization’ 
was the crucial factor in dissolving the more traditional ‘negotiative process’ between 
magistrates and the crowd.26 Certainly, there was a  large influx of migrant workers, drawn by 
the opportunities for unskilled labour provided by emergent cotton factories, and Manchester’s 
population trebled between 1774 and 1801.27  For Bohstedt, this growth swamped out the 
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vertical ties of deference and patronage. Manchester’s authorities were confronted by an 
anonymous mass of ‘unconnected inhabitants’ and thus they resorted to a firmer stance 
towards food rioting. Soup kitchens and cavalry became the dominant response in the ‘city of 
strangers’.28 
However, Bohstedt has been criticized for placing too much emphasis upon urbanization and in 
overlooking economic developments.29 The Manchester region saw profound socio-economic 
change in the late eighteenth century. According to Walton, the Lancashire woollen trade was 
fully ‘proto-industrial’ by the third quarter of the century. Lancashire’s woollen workers were 
dependent upon the putting-out system and through this form of organization the county’s 
merchants and clothiers accumulated substantial capitals.30 While from the 1770s, cotton 
spinning was becoming increasingly mechanized both in Manchester and in the surrounding 
towns.31 This provided more work for domestic cotton weavers. However, it also ensured that 
wages were kept low and reduced the need for highly skilled craft workers. Throughout the 
region then there was a palpable movement towards proletarianization with the life chances of 
a much larger proportion of the population determined by the market.32 At the same time, 
positions of authority in towns such as Manchester and Oldham, where increasingly held by 
successful merchants and industrial capitalists.33  
This polarization of social relations in Lancashire is essential to our understanding of the 
difficulty which local authorities had in resolving conflict peacefully. In Rochdale for example, a 
number of female weavers gathered in August 1795 to protest over the high price of oatmeal 
and to demand an advance in wages.34 Their complaints were heard by two local magistrates, 
including the textile merchant, John Entwistle. 35 However, the magistrate’s poorly calculated 
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offer, of supplying the town with subsidized potatoes, enraged the protestors rather than 
subduing them. The women beat pots and pans in the marketplace and the crowd was swelled 
by workers arriving from the countryside and by local ‘mechanics’ at the end of their shift. The 
authorities found that issuing verbal requests to disperse was merely ‘talking to the air’. The 
volunteers, headed by Colonel Entwistle, were called out and, after the Riot Act was read, were 
ordered to fire over the heads of the crowd, killing two bystanders. Thereafter the volunteers 
were forced to retreat, ironically to the town’s Cloth Hall, to await the arrival of dragoons. It is 
clear from the Rochdale example that the deference and reciprocity, which characterized 
traditional plebeian-patrician interactions during food rioting, was breaking down in 
Lancashire. The incident is also suggestive of the extent to which food protests over temporarily 
high prices were becoming increasingly interlinked with the more intractable grievance of low 
wages in the textile trade.36 
A similar scenario existed in Nottingham, where troops were sent to defuse both food riots and 
trades disputes in the 1790s. In 1791, the Town Clerk justified the need for a rolling contingent 
of troops in Nottingham, on the grounds that, ‘the lower and more disorderly class of people 
are, I believe, greatly more numerous than in any other Town in England, compared to the 
whole number of Inhabitants’.37 The local economy in Nottingham was dominated by the 
stocking trade. Between 1727 and 1782, the number of stocking frames in the vicinity of 
Nottingham more than doubled.38 At the same time, independent framework knitters were 
increasingly being replaced by workers renting frames from their employers.39 While there was 
a growing presence of wage-earning framework knitters in the town, the local bench tended to 
be dominated by merchants and employers. This had profound consequences in terms of public 
order. In 1783, for example, mayor Henry Fellows – a prominent hosier – was at the very 
epicentre of violent protests among the framework knitters after he decided to lower the wages 
of the men in his employ and to lock-out workers who refused the new wage-regime. When 
hostile crowds gathered outside his town-house, Fellows chose not to negotiate but to fire upon 
the crowd, leaving the Horse Guards to disperse the enraged knitters. This was one of the 
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bloodiest labour protest witnessed in the final decades of the eighteenth century.40 In 1800, 
Nottingham’s new mayor, Joseph Oldknow, a successful grocer, was also a target. 
Inflammatory handbills accused him of being a ‘Corn factor’ and of forcing up the price of 
grain.41 The inclusion of employers and merchants on the Commission of the Peace, in borough 
towns like Nottingham, removed the possibility of ‘disinterested’ magisterial mediation, which 
was commonplace during the mid-eighteenth century.42 Thus, the structure of authority and 
employment within a given locality, and the interactions between the two, had important 
ramifications both in terms of the scale of protests which emerged, and the manner in which 
local authorities sought to deal with them.  
6.4.  Radicalism and Revolution 
While structural change was hugely important in fuelling popular disorder and in foiling 
traditional responses thereto, the effects of industrialisation were often compounded in this 
period by shifting elite attitudes towards disorder. Overseas explosions of popular rebellion, 
such as the American Revolution and the French Revolution served as potent reminders, to 
both government and local rulers, of the potentially disastrous effects of allowing popular 
disorder to go unchecked.  Additionally, the intellectual debates unleashed by the French 
Revolution, the publication and ‘phenomenal’ commercial success of both parts of Paine’s’ 
Rights of Man (1791-2), and the emergence of English working-class political clubs, such as the 
London Corresponding Society (founded January 1792), focused the minds of the elites on the 
potential threat posed by popular dissent.43  As Thompson suggests, ‘the acute anti-Jacobinism 
of the gentry led to a new fear of any form of popular self-activity’.44 After 1789, signs of 
sedition were read into forms of protest that had formerly raised little concern. Hence the 
newfound readiness to deploy troops in instances of popular unrest can, in part, be explained 
by this shift in elite mentality.  
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However, elite fears of sedition and revolution, though often exaggerated in this period, were 
not merely paranoiac. A number of historians have argued that there was indeed a 
‘politicisation of discontent’ in this period. From the evidence of the food riots and trades 
disputes presented here this seems to be well-founded. The mere scale and proliferation of 
protests in the 1790s was, in itself, something of a novelty. Bohstedt’s estimates of annual rates 
of food rioting suggests that from the 1740s food riots ‘grew into a sturdy and nationwide 
tradition’ with levels of disturbance peaking in 1800-1.45 Similarly, Dobson’s data for 
eighteenth-century labour disputes also points us to the final two decades of the century as a 
heightened period of labour militancy with strikes penetrating into new sectors and 
geographical locations.46 Moreover, when we examine the nature of the food riots and strikes 
which provoked a militaristic response from the authorities, we can see that it was often those 
protests in which the crowd expressed a degree of political consciousness or voiced a new kind 
of oppositional language which were perceived to be of the greatest challenge. 
During the strike waves of 1791-2, troops tended to be directed towards those workers who 
were amongst the most advanced both in terms of labour militancy and in terms of political 
engagement. In Bradford-upon-Avon, for example, the town’s magistrates believed the rash of 
unrest following the introduction of labour-saving machinery was not merely economic in 
character. They suggested the temper of their wool spinners had been increased by the 
‘speculative opinions which have been brought forward for the public consideration in respect 
to the Government of the Country.’47  Stronger evidence of the alliance between labour protests 
and radical politics can be seen in the North East. The magistrates of Newcastle complained that 
in the vicinity of the town there was a general ‘dissatisfaction prevalent among the labouring 
ranks arising from Principles industriously propagated among them’.48 Specifically the keelmen 
of Shields were reported to have confronted  General John Lambton, the owner of substantial 
coalfields, stating ‘they had read Paine’s little book and liked it and they would soon divide 
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Lambton’s estate among themselves’.49 One ship-owner complained that ‘Pitmen, Keelmen, 
Waggonmen and other Labouring men’ were  all ‘hardy fellows strongly impressed with the 
new doctrine of equality, and … composed of such combustible matter that the least spark will 
set them in a blaze’.50 Thus, in those places where radicalism was seen to be infusing the labour 
movements of large industrial workforces, local authorities tended to regard these 
developments as particularly threatening and, on receiving such information, central 
government was certainly more likely to sanction the deployment of the army. 
Whether these workers were truly committed to radical revolutionary politics remains an open 
question. The keelmen of Shields may simply have invoked the name of Paine in a theatrical 
manner to add weight to their attempts at mass intimidation. Indeed there is considerable 
historical debate about the precise role which trade unionism played in terms of raising the 
political consciousness of the labouring classes. Christie has suggested that, as workers’ 
combinations  tended to have in view the essentially conservative goals of preserving 
traditional patterns of work and standards of living, and considering that they often met with 
success in this regard, trade unions may have actually retarded the politicisation of the poor by 
blunting the detrimental economic effects of the Industrial Revolution.51 Interestingly, John 
Foster came to similar conclusion when investigating the non-emergence of a ‘mass political 
movement’ in South Shields in the mid-nineteenth century. The appeal of radical politics, 
according to Foster, was lessened in the northeast primarily because Tyneside unionism was 
unusually successful in protecting workers against the worst effects of the Industrial 
Revolution.52 
However, it is difficult to deny that in those towns where we have strong evidence of radical 
organisation - in places such as Norwich, Sheffield and London - there was significant overlap 
between membership of a trades unions and membership of radical clubs.53 As Thompson has 
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suggested, those active and articulate enough to form local unions and to organise strikes were 
likely to be ‘no strangers to the rights of man’.54 It also seems plausible, as Malcolm Chase 
suggests, that the increased collective confidence of workers, seen in the more numerous strikes 
of the early 1790s, owed something to the widening of workers’ political awareness in the wake 
of the French Revolution.55  
Whether or not the connection between unionism and radicalism was universal, the 
government certainly became convinced that labour organisations were a means through which 
Jacobinism could be propagated.56 London magistrate Patrick Colquhoun, for example, advised 
the government that there were 100,000 journeymen and labourers - ‘linked together’ in friendly 
societies - who met seventeen times a year. In the event of an invasion, Colquhoun stated that 
these men could not be trusted with arms. One fifth were ‘seduced and proselyted to 
disaffection by being Members of Corresponding Societies’ and the remainder, through their 
membership of the friendly societies, were ‘open to Seduction’.57 Similarly the Home Secretary, 
the Duke of Portland, stated that all workers’ ‘associations’ with elected presidents and 
delegates should be considered as containing ‘within themselves the means of being converted 
at any time into a most dangerous instrument to disturb the public tranquillity’.58 It was partly 
elite fears about the spread of revolutionary politics via industrial organisations which lead to 
the passage of the Combination Acts, prohibiting all trades unions in 1799.59 Thus, if workers 
combinations were increasingly viewed as politically dangerous it is hardly surprising that 
overt acts of labour militancy should be repressed more vigorously in this period. 
Similarly, the tougher stance of the central and local authorities towards food rioting, may also 
be attributed to the fear of the politicization of these disturbances. A number of historians have 
noted the sharp growth in membership enjoyed by working-class political clubs, such as the 
                                                   
54 Thompson, Making, p. 546. 
55 Chase, Early Trade Unionism, p. 81. 
56 A. Charlesworth and A. Randall, ‘Industrial Protest, 1750-1850’ in An Atlas of Industrial Protest in Britain, 
1750-1990, p. 5; Chase, Early Trade Unionism, p. 82. 
57 PRO 30/8/254, ff. 192-3, Colquhoun, ‘Suggestions favourable to the public Security in case of Invasion or 
in Cases of Tumult or Disorder … ’, May 1797. 
58 Chase, Early Trade Unionism, p. 82; Quoting, HO 43/11, ff. 22-3, Portland – Bolton JP, 8 August 1799. 
59 J. Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial Capitalism in Three English Towns 
(London: Methuen, 1974), p. 38; A. Charlesworth and A. Randall, ‘Industrial Protest, 1750-1850’ in An 




LCS, during the subsistence crises of 1795.60 In many urban centres inflationary prices were 
used to recruit popular support for the radical cause. In London and Sheffield, large-scale 
public meetings, to petition for the end of the war, and to lobby for a reform of parliament, were 
held at the height of the food crisis of 1795.61 At the St George’s Fields meeting, chaired by John 
Gale Jones, the connection between food and politics was palpable. Embossed biscuits were 
handed with the slogan 'Freedom and Plenty, or Slavery and Want'.62 Even in rural Norfolk, 
Justice Fellows reported that  ‘the very high price, not only of bread corn but of every other 
necessary of life, gives to every ill-disposed person but too plausible ground to harangue the 
common people’.63 Additionally clandestine attempts were made by radicals to harness popular 
protests for their own ends. In Birmingham for example, ‘alarming’ revolutionary handbills 
appeared in advance of an attack upon a corn mill, arguing not just for more affordable prices, 
but a ‘different form of relief of the poor’. 64 After two of the assailants were shot dead by the 
military, further seditious literature appeared in the streets the following day, criticising the 
magistrates for the bloodshed.65 This incident was said to have resulted in an increase in 
membership among the Birmingham Constitutional Society, suggesting that radicals had some 
success in marrying economic with political grievances.66 
Furthermore, there seem to have been a general feeling among many of the local authorities 
who called upon troops in 1795 that the influence of radical politics had undermined the 
traditional ‘negotiative process’ by sharpening latent hostilities between ruler and ruled. The 
High Sherriff of Gloucestershire, Sir George Onesiphorus Paul,  for example, led a party of 
dragoons against a crowd blockading barges on the Stroudwater Canal in July 1795. Paul later 
explained he had been induced to act in this manner because: 
 [T]he Cry of Want of Bread … forms a Body of Insurgents, and 
 amongst these are mixed a number of seditious persons whose 
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 business it is to excite the number to mischief, and make them deaf to 
 reason.67   
The MP for Chester, John Crewe found himself similarly unable to parlay with a protesting 
crowd at Nantwich: 
 [The crowd] told him they knew him well, but that he had better 
 take care and recollect the fate of France … Tom Payne’s book has 
 been long the favourite study of many here… I have heard today 
 that some families in this county are so alarmed as to think of 
 removing to London. 
Crewe’s political sympathies lay with Charles James Fox and he had formerly been convinced 
that ‘no Towns in England could ever require troops’. After his experiences in Nantwich, 
however, he anxiously awaited the arrival of the soldiery along with the other ‘sober’ 
townspeople.68 The permeation of radical critiques of aristocratic hegemony, therefore, may 
have had the effect of destabilising the magistrate’s ability to negotiate effectively with the 
crowd. 
Furthermore, evidence from the  West Midlands food riots of 1800-1 also suggests protests were 
becoming markedly less deferential. ‘Symptoms of insurrection’ were reported from 
Wolverhampton, where the crowd hoisted a red flag and marched about  ‘with two half penny 
rolls on iron spikes, and blowing a horn’ and, in the vicinity of the Cosely Ironworks, crowds of 
‘several thousand’ blockaded grain barges armed with ‘about thirty pikes’.69 At Stafford, 
protesting crowds outside the house of a baker, Mr Thompson, exchanged gunfire with those 
inside and at the Nine Locks, near Dudley, bricks from the brick-kiln were used as missiles, and 
bulldogs were unleashed, against the local yeomanry.70 Elsewhere we can also find evidence of 
crowds attempting to lame the cavalry ‘by Chains drawn across different places’ or by throwing 
down ‘Cats’ (small iron spikes).71 The evidence confirms that, in the late eighteenth century, 
crowds of the West Midlands were becoming more heavily armed, and that protests were 
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becoming more violent. This is consistent with recent findings relating to the London ‘mob’.72 
Whether crowds became less deferential as a result of the increasing use of troops, or whether 
the increasing use of troops was a response to growing crowd violence, is difficult to discern.  
However, it is clear that local authorities associated the intensity of food rioting in these years 
with an increased political consciousness amongst the mass of the people. Regional studies of 
food riots in the South West and the North West suggest that there was a greater level of 
sophistication in their organization with evidence of ‘inter-regional co-operation’ and handbills 
advertising and directing protests more noticeably in 1800 than in 1795.73 In the Midlands we 
may also note the same trends. Placards appeared in Worcester inviting [inhabitants] to disturb 
the public peace by open acts of Violence’ and the Earl of Warwick believed that ‘the Chief 
Cause of Riots [was] the Artful Instigations’ of Jacobin agents.74 The volume and tenor of the 
anonymous threatening letters received by magistrates in this period should also be considered. 
Williams suggests that those threatening letters received during the 1766 Midlands riots had a 
‘myopic’ concern with local issues and personalities.75 By contrast, the majority of those 
forwarded to the Home Office in the 1800-1 disturbances had strong political overtones and 
blended local with national issues.  Particularly after the publication of the Royal Proclamation 
in September, anonymous authors blamed ‘Billy Pitt’ and ‘that old ‘ellborn tyrant the King’ for 
the scarcity and dearness of corn.76 Copies of the Proclamation itself were said to have been 
‘sprinkled all over with blood’, ‘defaced and abused in the most shameful manner’.77 
Magistrates also received persistent threats of a nation-wide ‘general insurrection’ planned for 
mid-November.78 While John Massey reported from Newcastle-under-Lyme that ‘five sixths of 
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the labouring people would join these plans’ and that ‘the word revolution is almost in every 
mouth as if already entered into’.79 
As noted above, it was on the basis of these reports, and the evident concern which they raised 
amongst the West Midlands authorities, that the government dramatically increased the 
amount of military force available in the region at the start of November. By increasing the 
troop numbers in the vicinity of Birmingham (‘cramming such a set of bloody soldiers, into that 
Town’) government was said to have dampened the ardour, not just of the Jacobins in 
Warwickshire, but also those in Lancashire. Plans of a general rising were thus said to have 
been suspended.80 Whether the claims of rebellion were overdrawn, and whether  those men 
and women who participated in the food riots of 1800-1 shared the revolutionary and 
republican sentiments of the anonymous letter-writers and handbill-drafters, is extremely 
difficult to assess.81 As John Stevenson has pointed out, just because we have riots, strikes and 
radical handbills ‘running together’ this does not necessarily ‘indicate the presence of an 
incipient ‘working-class movement’’.82 Food rioters had always made ‘theatrical’ claims of 
levelling. Talk of a ‘revolution’ in the 1790s and 1800s may  simply have been a development of 
this tradition.  
However, the evidence presented here suggests that, for the authorities of the West Midlands, 
such threats had a much greater immediacy in the wake of the French Revolution and in the 
midst of a food crisis. The more frequent resort to armed force by local authorities during the 
food riots of the 1790s and 1800s was therefore strongly linked to the perception that radical 
politics was infusing protest. The spread of ‘Jacobinism’ was perceived, by the authorities on 
the ground, to make crowd actions more violent, more difficult to assuage by personal presence 
alone, and more threatening to the status quo.  
6.5.  The Influence of ‘New Political Economy’ 
The increasingly firm line taken against striking workers and food rioters was not merely a 
reaction to the perceived influence of radical politics or to the rapid growth of unruly industrial 
populations. Intellectual debates shifted considerably in the eighteenth century in regards to the 
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proper modes of economic relations. Under the old ‘paternalist model’, as outlined by E.P. 
Thompson,  government had sought to regulate exploitative practices in dealing and milling, to 
prevent the export of corn, and to impose price ceilings in times of scarcity.83 The rating of 
workers’ wages by magistrates was a further element of the paternalist practice of regulating 
the economy.84 With the striding advances of capitalism over the course of the eighteenth 
century, however, these traditional interventions in the economy to protect wage-earners and 
consumers increasingly seemed outmoded. As early as 1757, two decades before the Wealth of 
Nations, the clothiers of Gloucestershire had successfully deployed laissez faire arguments to 
ensure the repeal of statutory legislation for the rating of wages in the weaving trade.85   
However, it is really in the last quarter of the century that we can see free market doctrines 
really gaining ground within Parliament.86 Right up to the food riots of 1766 government had 
periodically responded to times of dearth by posting up proclamations condemning the 
immoral practices of forestallers and regrators. In 1772, however, these statutes were repealed. 
Although Lord Kenyon argued in 1795 that these marketing offences remained punishable at 
Common Law, this moment marks the beginning of a significant dismantling of the old 
paternalist model.87 We can see, from the same time-period, Parliament granting to employers 
more legislative powers for the closer supervision of their workforces. Workers were 
increasingly criminalised for taking customary (and formerly tolerated) perquisites and 
penalized under the growing number of ‘master and servant’ Acts.88 By 1814 all the Elizabethan 
statutes regulating apprenticeship (and thereby preserving the property-in-skill of artisans) 
were repealed and the Combination Acts (1799-1800), prohibiting trade union organisation 
across all trades, were in force.89 While the efficacy of the Combination Acts in deterring and 
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prosecuting trade unionists has been debated90, many historians are agreed on the symbolic 
impact of these legislative moves.91 By the end of the century, a still largely gentry-dominated 
Parliament stood much nearer to the employer and the large farmer than was the case formerly, 
with profound affects upon the social and industrial relations of the period.  
The influence of the new political economy upon central government must also be 
acknowledged. Many of the leading figures in Pitt’s ministry,  including Foreign Secretary 
Grenville, Home Secretary Portland, and the Prime Minister himself, had read Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations (1776) and had been converted to the merits of free trade.92 In addition to Smith’s work, 
endorsements of laissez faire economics were made in the 1790s by Burke’s Thoughts and Details 
on Scarcity (1795) and Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population (1798). Both publications 
asserted the immorality of ‘meddling’ in the supply of foodstuffs and emphasized the ‘natural’ 
system of ‘checks’ which rationing-by-price placed on undue population growth.  
Indeed the growing intellectual capital of laissez faire economics had an important impact upon 
the Home Office response to strikes and food riots. The traditional ‘area of licence’, which was 
once afforded by those in authority to the riotous crowd, was increasingly seen as incompatible 
with the interests of trade and therefore the nation.  So too was the notion of paternalistic 
compromise. As the Shields ship-owner, Thomas Powditch, expressed it, ‘tampering with a 
Mob, treating with Rioters, or offering terms to people illegally assembled for the purpose of 
extorting high wages from their employers are Crimes little inferior in magnitude to rioting 
itself’.93 The government agreed with Powditch in his essentials. Undue interference in 
economic relations, as well as disruptions to the peace, were to be prevented by the 
interposition of the military. It is for this reason that we see government consenting to the 
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sending of troops to attend the nonviolent demonstrations of workers, and why  government 
was prepared to dedicate large numbers of regular troops for riot-duty during the crisis years of 
1795 and 1800-1. A new firmness is discernible from Portland’s many out-letters from 1800 
which depart from the traditional Home Office stance of allowing magistrates on the ground to 
form policy. Troops were sent unsolicited to Nottingham and Oxfordshire, over the heads of 
Justices, and Portland repeatedly urged soft-pedalling magistrates to take ‘prompt and effectual 
measures’ emphasizing that ‘resort cannot be too soon had to the assistance of the Military’.94  
Furthermore, at least two unfortunate magistrates who failed to prevent disruptions to the free 
market, through the use of armed force, were brought before the King’s Bench for neglect of 
duty.95   
Wilkinson has recently argued that we should not overstate the influence of laissez faire 
economics  and present Portland as an ‘ideologically motivated moderniser’.96 Wilkinson 
suggests that Portland’s efforts to protect of the free circulation of corn was rooted in traditional 
view that ‘liberty and property’ were sacrosanct and upon the pragmatic belief that attacks on 
farmers and dealers was a discouragement to future production and would therefore worsen 
scarcity in the long term.97 Similarly, Bohstedt has also argued that Home Office policy was born 
of ‘pragmatism’ – Portland was primarily concerned  with ensuring the tranquillity and survival 
of London and the boom towns of the North by ensuring that ‘steady provisioning’ was 
maintained.98 Thus, the argument goes, Portland was not waging war upon the traditional 
values of the moral economy and the paternalist model. Both historians raise a fair point. The 
preservation of public order was never entirely about maintaining laissez faire. Upholding the 
security of property rights had long been integral to the exercise of authority.99 However, the 
growing intellectual weight of free market ideology surely gave a renewed urgency to the 
vigorous protection of private property. Moreover, Portland’s ‘profound conviction that price 
                                                   
94 Wells, Wretched Faces, p. 259.; HO 43/12, f. 154-5, Portland – Mayor of Stafford, 22 September 1800, f. 
604, Portland – Homfray, 27 September 1800. 
95 For J.P George Donisthorpe of Somerton see S. Poole, 'Popular Politics in Bristol, Somerset and 
Wiltshire’, p. 466; Bath Herald, 6 August 1796; For J.P Thomas Thomas of Glamorganshire see Times, 6 
February 1801. 
96 Wilkinson, The Duke of Portland, p. 113. 
97 Ibid. 
98 J. Bohstedt, The Politics of Provisions, p. 229-30. 
99 D. Hay, 'Property, Authority and Criminal Law', in D. Hay, et al (eds.), Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and 




rises reflected genuine deficiencies in supply’ was surely strongly influenced by his reading of 
Smith and Burke.100 On the basis of this conviction, Portland argued that attempts by the crowd 
to interfere in the marketing of goods in one location would be detrimental to the supply of 
those elsewhere and thus should be vigorously repressed. Likewise, magistrates who 
temporized with the mob, and who promoted ‘the most pernicious doctrine of establishing a 
[price] Maximum’ were said to hold out encouragement to ‘the lower orders of the people in 
other districts to have recourse to the same means of persuasion’.101 
Many local authorities who communicated with the Home Office in 1800 remained 
unconvinced by Portland’s reading of the scarcity. In the West Midlands the landlord- and 
clergy-dominated Bench unanimously claimed that the high prices of 1800 were linked to the 
‘avarice’ of the farmers who were now ‘above all control’.102 Magistrates complained that 
farmers and dealers  withheld stocks of grain from the market and pushed up prices in the 
confidence that they would be protected from the odium of the people by government and the 
volunteers.103  The Earl of Warwick agreed and stated that the poor were ‘actually starving not 
from the visitation of God but by the adoption of an Erroneous Theory’:104 
 Water, it is true, always finds its level, but it may be so artificially 
 obstructed as to bring destruction on thousands by rising above 
 the level of those places which it destroys, such I think is the 
 present state of the Corn’105 
Local authorities accepted that it was their role to keep the peace and agreed with Portland that 
it was ‘an end to all Government when the mob can dictate’.106 However, given the prevailing 
view in the West Midlands that the scarcity was artificial and that farmers were ‘sacrificing [the 
poor] at the shrine of avarice’, JPs continued to blend repressive measures with paternalistic 
interventions.107 Local authorities implored government to intercede by placing an absolute 
price-ceiling on grain, while others prevailed upon local millers and farmers to bring flour and 
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wheat to markets at pegged prices.108 Portland invariably admonished those responsible for 
such interventions where he found them to have occurred. Magistrates were directed to raise 
charitable subscription for the relief of the poor but they were not to interfere in market 
prices.109 
Many local authorities resented the position they were placed in by the Home Secretary and 
Parliament.110 The most vocal of the West Midlands magistrates was Reverend Haden: 
 Alas. No step has been taken except a Proclamation from the 
 throne strictly commanding us to do what in my opinion would be 
 almost an Impossibility…to protect the inhuman, barbarous, cruel 
 oppressor to the utmost extent, at the same time that he must order 
 perhaps thousands of his fellow creatures to be mowed down with 
 the Edge of the sword, because they ask only for a morsel of Bread 
 to satisfy their hunger!!!111 
The sense of impending danger and rebellion, which we have noted in the winter of 1800, 
derived in part from the vulnerability magistrates felt once they were denied the ability to fix 
prices at local markets and to force farmers to bring in their produce. Indeed, it is plausible that 
the alarms raised by the West Midlands magistracy were part of an effort to put pressure on 
government to intercede in the grain market: ‘Something, if possible, must be done for now all 
ranks are dissatisfied with the Ministry and Magistrates, they say the king is kept in the 
Dark’.112  
However, the Pitt ministry was unerring in this regard. Portland responded to the magistrate’s 
concerns primarily with troop reinforcements.  The West Midlands, a landlocked region which 
faced no threat of invasion, became one of the most heavily garrisoned in the country. By 
November 1800, fifteen percent of the country’s cavalry were stationed in the region and the 
newly-built barracks at Coventry and Birmingham were filled with cavalry. In addition six 
                                                   
108 HO 42/51, ff. 175-176, Monckton – Portland, 16 September 1800; ff. 493-4, Haden – Portland, 27 
September 1800; ff. 266-9, Bracebridge – Portland, 19 September 1800; HO 42/52, f.144, Printed 
Resolutions of the Inhabitants of the City of Worcester, 9 October 1800 
109 HO 42/53, ff. 468-73, Draft Portland – Gower, 29 November 1800; HO 43/11, f. 500, Portland – 
Coventry, 21 May 1800. 
110 ‘[A]lmost every individual in either house of Parliament’ was said to agree that the scarcity was real. 
WO 1/1105, ff. 589, Dundas – Warwick, ? December 1800. 
111 HO 42/51, ff. 493-4, Reverend Alexander Bunn Haden – Portland, 27 September 1800 




regiments of foot were also sent.113 As we have seen, many magistrates, fearful that food riots 
would turn into rebellion, made use of the increased coercive forces at their disposal, and took 
comfort in their presence. However, the repressive agencies of the state were not used ‘to the 
utmost extent’ in order to ensure the absolute freedom of the market.114 Magistrates remained 
too committed to the old paternalist model to make a complete transition to laissez faire and, 
though sensible they were ‘treading on tender ground’, they continued to exceed the bounds of 
their authority by pressing producers to lower their prices.115 
6.6.  Conclusion 
The evidence presented here demonstrates that, in comparison to earlier periods, military 
responses to food riots and trades disputes became more reflexive and increasingly central to 
the maintenance of public order in the 1790s. The external factor of warfare was important in 
allowing a dramatic extension of the coercive force available to the state over the eighteenth-
century. However, this additional strength was thought to be especially needed in the 1790s. 
Many local authorities, and government ministers, were perturbed by the possibility of an 
English sequel to the French Revolution. The evidence suggests that even familiar disturbances, 
such as the food riot, were becoming tinged with radical politics and that protestors were 
becoming markedly less deferential. Thus radical critiques of the ancien régime played an 
important role in destabilizing the old ‘negotiative process’ between ruler and ruled. However, 
of more considerable weight was the changing social structure in the industrialising areas of the 
country. The unevenness of military deployments reflects the jagged pattern of industrialisation 
in late eighteenth-century England. Troops were sent most frequently to those parts of the 
country where regional specialisation, proto-industrialisation, and industrialisation, created 
large groups of single-industry wage-earners. In these areas the labouring poor gained an 
increasingly strong sense of collective identity as a result of their shared work and their 
dependency upon the movements of the market. At the same time, employers were increasingly 
seen to dominate positions of authority, and the notion of the magistrate as ‘neutral arbiter’, 
became more difficult to sustain.  
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In the industrialising districts of the country, government’s lack of confidence in the ‘civil 
power’ to maintain the peace can be read into the establishment of barracks. Many of those 
inland barracks built between 1792-5 were a direct response to the strike waves of 1791-2, which 
saw local authorities calling loudly for permanent garrisons of troops. Government was willing 
to accede in these demands in part because of the possibility of radical fraternization with the 
soldiery. However, the Home Office increasingly felt itself justified in extending the role of the 
army and encouraging the use of the volunteers on the grounds of economic reasoning. Striking 
workers and food rioters were seen, from the centre, as a menace to the constitution, to the 
proper ordering of ‘commerce’, and therefore, they were considered to be ‘destructive of all the 
sources which have contributed to our present prosperity’.116 This outlook undoubtedly led to 
the closer policing of protest even though, as we have seen, the gentry and the clergy continued 
to show a determined paternalism.  
The experience of the 1790s, in which the regular cavalry repeatedly demonstrated their utility 
in repressing disorder, appear to have had long-lasting consequences. Workers in the industrial 
districts became more and more accustomed to a uniformed response to their collective actions. 
Food rioters, in particular, faced a point of diminishing returns, as magistrate’s hands were 
increasingly tied, in terms of price-setting. This certainly had an impact upon the decline of the 
food riot in the early nineteenth-century.117 Furthermore, this experience was also important for 
England’s industrial capitalists and ruling elites. It is worth noting that in 1779 the Peel family 
were the victims of machine breaking when their spinning jennies were thrown into the River 
Calder at Altham.118 In 1783, however, when the ‘Peel and Yates’ print-works were threatened 
by a mob from Burnley, dragoons were dispatched to protect their factories.119 By 1798, when 
the future Home Secretary – Robert Peel – was ten-years-old, his father was Lieutenant-Colonel 
of the Bury Military Association consisting of 300 infantry and 40 cavalry.120 In 1808 Robert Peel 
Senior’s effigy was burned by the Lancashire cotton weavers demanding a minimum-wage bill, 
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and troops were sent to break up the weavers’ numerous demonstrations.121 It is worth 
speculating that Robert Peel senior intimately understood the value of a uniformed force, for 
both the maintenance of good order and free trade, and that he passed his experiences on to his 
son. In any case, the seventeenth-century constitutionalism, which had once dominated high 
political discourse, and which sought to place checks on the influence of the army in society, 
was largely abandoned by the Pitt ministry in this period of industrialisation, heightened 
anxiety, and laissez faire. The newfound reliance upon armed force, so redolent in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century, surely helped to clear the ideological path for the first serious 
discussions of a centrally-controlled English police in the 1820s. 
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This thesis has sought to offer a response to Linda Colley’s Britons, or, at the very least, to offer 
a qualification of her argument. It must be admitted, however, that it does not meet Colley on 
equal terms. Geographically it examines England and not Britain or the wider empire. 
Chronologically, it terminates at Trafalgar (1805) rather than Waterloo (1815). And in terms of 
scope, it has been concentrated solely upon interactions between the army, the militia, and 
civilian society. This narrowness, in part reflects the pressures, both temporal and financial, 
upon the research student to provide a coherent self-contained argument. Within this limited 
field of operation, it is perhaps inevitable that a different narrative emerges to that which seeks 
to take the ‘long view’, and which explores important changes over time, such as the growth of 
modern nationalistic society. The intention here has not been to libel Colley’s project or to deny 
its importance. The value of long-term or ‘big history’ is increasingly evident within eighteenth-
century history.1 However, this thesis has sought to question some of the key assumptions, and 
the evidential base, upon which the ‘Nation-in-Arms’ thesis rests. It has sought to question 
whether we can interpret the mass mobilizations of the French Wars as a unitary and unifying 
experience, for all classes of Britons. It is hoped that the research offered here has contributed to 
this debate, and particularly the argument put forward by Nicholas Rogers, that the regular 
armed forces do not slot neatly into the rather panglossian narrative, presented by Colley and 
others, of the French Wars.2 Furthermore, by studying the relatively neglected tropes of the 
army and militia in England, it is hoped that a number of contributions and additions have been 
made to the fields of military history, labour history, and the history of protest.  
One of the key themes of this work has been to emphasize that men enlisted for economic 
reasons. While this suggestion is hardly a novel one it is hoped that any doubts on this head can 
now be swept away. As Conway has argued for the earlier period, only a minority of soldiers 
were criminals or vagrants impressed into the army from the country’s goals. Likewise, very 
few militiamen were balloted and compelled to serve as ‘primaries’.3 The vast majority of 
soldiers were, nominally, ‘volunteers’. However, surprisingly few, even among the self-
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selecting group of military autobiographers examined here, gave an indication that it was a 
strong sense of nationalist sentiment which drew them to engage in patriotic martial 
endeavour.4 What lay behind the decision to enlist was almost always an amalgamation of 
personal reasons in which economic distress featured extremely prominently. It is in detailing 
this dynamic which this thesis has had something original to contribute. The research presented 
in Chapter Two has demonstrated just how closely the fate of the recruiting service was tied to 
the health of the wider English economy. During the French Wars, rural-born ‘labourers’ 
enlisted in those years when their real wages were detrimentally affected by inflation, and, at 
those times of year when their options for seasonal work were slimmest. While urban 
‘manufacturers’ tended to enlist when their trade was hit by recession or when they found their 
skills had been devalued by machinery or proto-industrial reorganization.5 
Thus, war had a contradictory impact upon working-class experiences of the Industrial 
Revolution. On the one hand, war disrupted trade and threw large numbers of workers out of 
employ. On the other, wartime demand for soldiers was such that the army became something 
of a refuge for the under- and unemployed. While there were many disadvantages to 
soldiering, armed service did at least offer a minimum of subsistence, free lodging, and medical 
care. In this manner, the army and militia cushioned many working-class men from the long 
term effects of the Industrial Revolution. Enlistment might also be used by men as a way of 
escaping familial responsibilities.6 However, this thesis has found evidence to support the work 
of Jennine Hurl-Eamon, who argues that married men often enlisted as part of a ‘family 
survival strategy’.7 Family men, in the industrialising North of England, took the ‘King’s 
shilling’ in the knowledge that their dependents were likely to find unskilled work in their 
absence. While married men everywhere might calculate that, through enlisting to serve ‘King 
and Country’, even the most parsimonious parish officials would be forced to look more 
favourably upon their kin. Entry into the land forces, therefore, reflected a matrix of personal 
economic calculations.8 
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A second contribution has been to demonstrate that the act of enlistment was popularly viewed 
as a voluntary engagement contingent upon the provision of bounty money, food, 
accommodation, and leisure time. Protests were quick to erupt whenever any aspect of this 
equation was infringed upon. The crimp riots of 1794-5, for example, were a forceful popular 
rebuttal against attempts by the independent regiments to coerce and inveigle would-be 
recruits. ‘Crimping’ was understood by contemporaries to mean, not just illegal impressment, 
but also aggressive recruitment tactics, trickery, fraud, and deception. Such methods were an 
affront to law but also to popular morality. This thesis has demonstrated that such practices 
were more widespread, during the early years of the wars, than has often been recognized. The 
recruitment process was also more urban and more fraught than the bucolic scenes, depicted by 
Rowlandson and other printmakers, would have us believe. The use of crimps and aggressive 
recruitment tactics by the independent regiments became notorious between 1793 and 1795. 
While the approval which these corps received from the state, in its desperation for men, 
provided powerful material for metropolitan radicals seeking to build a case around the notion 
of ‘old corruption’ and offering the remedy of reform. Indeed, constitutionalist notions of the 
‘freeborn Englishman’ were exploited by radicals in the capital to critique the recruitment 
process and to channel popular aggression towards the government. While internationalist 
arguments were used to question the justice of the war itself. In a variety of ways then, radicals 
sought to impede working-class enlistment. However, even in Sheffield, the ‘storm centre of 
English political unrest’9, members of the reform societies accepted that unemployment and 
wartime recession would inevitably draw large numbers of their ‘fellow citizens’ into the 
conflict against the French.10 
Understanding that enlistment was perceived as a contractual engagement is the key to 
unlocking many of the protests evident in the courts martial records and in the Home Office 
files.11 This thesis has sought to survey those mutinies which have been well-known to 
historians, such as the militia mutinies12, and to elaborate upon those less well-known instances, 
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such as the independent regiment mutinies.13 In both sets of protests, soldiers sought to uphold 
elements of their enlistment-contract, which they felt had been breached. The violent outbreaks 
of mutiny noted in the independent regiments underscores the importance of bounty money to 
the would-be soldier. New recruits expected to receive a healthy prize for enlistment and were 
unwilling to serve obediently without it. Furthermore, the fact that the full balance of bounty 
money was so frequently denied enlists in the independent regiments, demonstrates the shoddy 
administration and dubious recruiting sergeants, to be found within those ‘crude and hasty 
levies’.14 While the food riots which broke out almost exclusively among the militia regiments is 
evidence of the weaker form of discipline in those corps.15 They are suggestive of the 
militiaman’s strong attachment to civilian society and his adherence to the ‘moral economy’. 
Indeed, some of the most effective instances of ‘price-setting’, seen in the eighteenth century, 
occurred across the south coast, at the point of bayonet, in the spring of 1795.16 The militiamen 
resented the unaffordable prices of that year and were determined to retain their customary, 
though elementary, diet of bread and meat.17 Wells is correct to assert that the militia mutinies 
therefore put enormous pressure upon the government to consider the men’s case. 
Indeed, this thesis has set out the complex and changing material conditions of the rank and file 
over the period. It has been demonstrated that the standard of living of the common soldier was 
allowed to fall far below that of the rural labourer by 1790.18 However, Chapter Three has 
shown that the French Revolution dramatically shifted the government’s outlook on this issue. 
Chase has argued that the success of the Parisian sans culottes granted a degree of self-
confidence to English workers’ combinations and trades unions in the 1790s.19 In a similar 
fashion, the well-publicised role of the Gardes Françaises in the storming of the Bastille, 
dramatically improved the bargaining-power of the English soldiery post-1789. Whether the 
rank and file themselves were aware of this fact, or could sense the government’s sensitivity, is 
unclear. Regardless, this vulnerability quickly became self-evident. Even the hitherto unnoticed 
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(and admittedly small-scale) riot among the Queens Dragoons in 1791, caused huge waves 
among military commanders, and set in train a series of reforms to provisioning and pay.20  
Indeed, each of the reforms noted in Chapter Three flowed directly from either outbreaks of 
mutiny or, as in 1797, the serious threat of mutiny in the land forces. This fact throws 
considerable doubt upon the interpretative framework adopted by many traditional military 
histories. It is certainly inadequate to limit the question of military reform solely to the actions 
and programs of ‘great men’, such as the Duke of York or the Duke of Wellington.21 Over the 
important issues of pay and conditions, at least, the government and its military commanders 
were forced to respond to changes on the ground and to offer solutions which often ran 
contrary to their better instincts. The alterations made to the soldier’s pay and conditions 
during the 1790s were the most comprehensive military pay reforms of the century. It should be 
more widely acknowledged that these improvements were the product of negotiations between 
ordinary soldiers and a government deeply concerned about losing the loyalty of its armed 
forces. 
To be sure, the government reacted quickly, efficiently, and with increasing generosity, to the 
military protests it encountered in the 1790s. One wonders what would have happened had 
they not done so in either 1795 or 1797. The image of Pitt, awoken on 26 May 1797, with news of 
a disturbance in the Royal Artillery barracks at Woolwich, while the red flag was still being 
flown by the naval mutineers at the Nore22, gives credence to Thompson’s instinct that this was 
a potentially revolutionary moment, if not handled with great care.23 Certainly, as we have seen, 
ultra-radicals in England were poised to take advantage of disaffection among the rank and file 
arising from a pay dispute. Moreover, we know from subsequent events, that the Foot Guards 
were hardly impervious to politicization.24 However, the Pitt ministry knew these details well 
and responded appropriately. The unprecedented rise in wages granted to the soldiers in 1797, 
in combination with the earlier concessions of pegged food prices, and the provision of free 
‘necessaries’, elevated the soldiery to something of a privileged group in English society. Very 
few occupational sectors in England can claim to have improved their material conditions 
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during the course of the French Wars, and fewer still were protected from wartime inflation. 
The stabilising effects of these moves can be gauged by the lack of food rioting among the 
militia during 1800-1 and the army’s reliability in the suppression of civil disturbances during 
the same period. The military was perhaps the only sector of the economy not to feel the bite of 
dearth in those years.25 It seems reasonable to assert that, at the core of soldierly loyalty in this 
period, lay the sanctity of the soldier’s basic diet which, from the summer of 1795, was carefully 
protected by government. 
Certainly, historical claims which emphasize the unconditional loyalty of the soldiery, and 
which argue that military service was a conduit for national sentiment, should be approached 
with a degree of caution. There is some basis to the concept of a ‘military melting pot’.26 Soldiers 
from different backgrounds were undoubtedly intermixed in the armed forces. However, there 
was also a degree of segregation via the army’s ‘regimental system’ and though the militia’s 
county-based organization. Furthermore, it has been observed that ethnic identities generated 
conflict both  between regiments and between soldiers and civilians. This was particularly 
apparent during the Irish Rebellions of 1798 and 1803, where Irish soldiers and their regiments 
were consistently abused by civilians as ‘rebels’. Regardless of their service records, the Irish in 
the ranks remained ‘Other’. Moreover, the trumpet of state nationalism, according to Colley, 
was the Anglican clergy.27 Yet attempts to expose the rank and file to Protestantism were very 
sparing in this period.28 With so many Catholics and Dissenters in the ranks, commanders were 
loathed to enforce a Protestant version of Britishness upon their men. All shades of religion, and 
private worship, were generally tolerated in the interests of avoiding a sectarian backlash. 
Similarly, political opinions, were to be compartmentalised as far as was possible. At least one 
officer tried to impress a sense of Reevesite loyalism onto his men. However, for the ruling elite, 
even loyalism was too rich a cocktail for the common soldier to imbibe.29 The redcoat was to 
remain politically inert at all costs. Hence, the few soldiers who voiced republican sentiments 
tended to be punished and relieved of their duties. It would appear that the officer’s prerogative 
was to tolerate a degree of religious sectarianism, to suppress political engagement of any kind, 
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and to encourage identification, first and foremost, with the regiment. In this regard, this thesis 
supports the work of both Kennedy and Cookson.30 
Within the ‘regimental world’, this thesis has emphasized that the experience of soldiering was 
not dissimilar to civilian waged labour. Mansfield and Way are right to highlight this 
continuity.31 Soldiers laboured officially as military artificers, as overseers of convict labour, as 
prison guards, and as ad hoc riot police. They were set to work digging entrenchments, clearing 
ground, and were drilled tirelessly. However, soldiers were also released from their ‘ordinary 
duties’ to do harvest work, to tailor the regiment’s uniforms, and to mend the company’s shoes. 
We must therefore be careful of assuming, as Cobbett implied in his recollections, that all 
privates were slovenly layabouts. Cobbett was not unique in finding a path to self-betterment 
within the military. As many as one-fifth of private men could expect to be promoted to 
corporal while others learned or honed civilian trades. Undoubtedly, where soldiering differed 
dramatically from factory- or workshop-labour was in the irregularity of work. Soldiers could 
be called at a moment’s notice to quell protests, which might require several days of marching, 
and hours of exacting confrontation. Yet equally, in the winter months, there were prolonged 
periods of relative inactivity. Soldiers filled this time, it would seem, primarily with drinking 
and gaming. Protests among militia units over foreshortened curfews, seen at Warley camp and 
Yarmouth barracks, demonstrate quite how important the privilege of leisure-time was. Indeed 
for at least one military autobiographer, it was the perception that soldiering was a relatively 
easy life which drew him to enlist in the first place.32  
However, the reality of life in the ranks could be shocking to the uninitiated. Soldiers were not 
tied to the plough, or to the loom, but neither were they free. New recruits complained of being 
subjected to a repetitive training regime, they were demoralised by the use of physical 
correction, and shocked by the frequency and severity of floggings. Moreover, even in England, 
the soldier’s living quarters were found to be cramped and insanitary in the extreme. 
Unsurprisingly, many men sought to escape such conditions. Chapter Four has set out to 
demonstrate just how common desertion was. Contrary to Cookson’s suggestion, that the 
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armed forces were raised with little difficulty during the early Napoleonic Wars33, it has been 
shown that the authorities were confronted with a serious desertion problem between 1803 and 
1805. A minority of men sought to turn a profit from bounty-jumping. However, thousands 
more sought to escape the military in search of less exacting and better-paid forms of labour. 
Moreover, the fact that runaway soldiers were welcomed by various civilian support-networks 
suggests that desertion was something of a ‘social crime’.34 Plebeian folk understood both 
enlistment and desertion primarily as economic choices. This suggests that the mass arming of 
the period was less significant, in terms of nationalistic sentiment, than the propaganda of the 
period would have us believe. Furthermore, Thompson’s view, that the popular outlook on the 
French Wars was probably one of ambivalence, remains tenable.35 
At the very least, the evidence presented here supports Semmell’s argument that, during the 
late 1790s and early 1800s, the ruling elite carried with them a nagging uncertainty about the 
basic allegiance of the common people.36 In 1797, workers from the Pennines played upon this 
vulnerability when protesting against the Militia Acts. The magistrates at Ulverstone were met 
with shouts of ‘No Militia! Why should we fight … if the French come they will not hurt us – 
they will only plunder those who have too much’.37 In the same year Uvedale Price predicted 
that marauding bands of British bandits would materialise in the event of a French invasion.38 
Even in 1803, at the height of invasion fears, the magistrates of Birmingham were busy 
selectively arming the reliable one per cent with pikes and cutlasses, in order to ‘secure the town 
from Riot and Plunder’, should the regular cavalry be drawn to the coasts.39 Similarly, in the 
West Riding Yorkshire J.Ps reported that the ‘the evil spirit of sedition is by no means laid’. 
Pamphlets appeared in the town of Bingley hailing Napoleon as a social leveller and welcoming 
an invasion.40 This dissonance was perhaps isolated only to a few select groups. The majority of 
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English radicals denounced Napoleon as a tyrant after he became First Consul in 1799.41 
However, the depths of the ‘revolutionary underground’ during the Napoelonic period remain 
under-explored and demand further detailed research. From the evidence presented in this 
thesis, it is clear that many civil authorities, in the urban and industrial parts of the country, and 
many military commanders, dealing with the desertion problem, would have been sceptical of 
Colley’s claim of a nation galvanised through mass arming. The historian is therefore entitled to 
share this scepticism.42 
This thesis has also raises questions about the stability of England’s ‘ancien regime’. In his 
influential monograph, Stress and Stability, Christie identified several crucial bulwarks against 
revolution; Britain’s relatively generous poor relief system, her relatively porous ruling elite 
(which was open to successful merchants and industrialists), and the pervasiveness of deference 
and paternalism throughout the country. For Christie, these factors prevented revolutionary 
aspirations from taking root among the populace.43 However, as we have seen, in the urbanising 
and industrialising areas of the country Christie’s analysis seems out of place. In these areas, the 
deference and reciprocity integral to the peaceful resolution of protests was clearly breaking 
down.44 Furthermore, radical critiques of aristocratic hegemony were gaining ground. 
Protestors were therefore less inclined to negotiate with magistrates, while the perceived threat 
of revolution, made the ruling elites predisposed to stifle popular commotion at its outset. 
Protests also became more frequent and more trenchant as regional specialisation concentrated 
workers, and bound them together, in single-industry wage-labour. Simultaneously, the same 
economic processes dissolved the finely-grained society, described by Christie, and forged more 
polarized social relations. Employers became more distanced from their workers and their 
interests became increasingly well-represented by a government committed to curbing price-
setting and workers’ combinations in defence of the free market.45  
Concurrent with the slow dismantling of the old ‘paternalist model’ we see the rise of new 
modes of maintaining public order. This thesis has shown that the eighteenth century witnessed 
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a cumulative increase of the military force available to the state for domestic repression.46 This 
process was primarily a response to the growing demands of warfare and was thus a by-
product of the extension of the ‘fiscal-military state’.47 However, these military resources were 
also perceived by the local authorities to be necessary for the growing task of maintaining 
public order. This thesis has demonstrated that, during the strike waves of 1791-2, and the food 
riots of 1795, urban magistrates openly admitted their dependence upon armed force for the 
security of their jurisdictions. This was a clear break from the past. Likewise, local officials, 
contrary to constitutionalist political traditions, actively lobbied for the building of barracks, 
and the Pitt ministry satisfied these claims. It has been shown that in 1800-1, sixty per cent of 
recorded food riots in the West Midlands were met by an armed response.48 The mid-century 
formula, of calling for troops in the ‘last resort’, was being rewritten in this period.49 Portland 
demanded ‘the immediate application’ of military force ‘the moment occasion calls for it’.50 
While the Royal Proclamation of September 1800 urged the authorities to use the yeomanry to 
protect farmers’ grain in transit.51 Similarly, over the winter of that year, troops were poured 
into the unruly industrial regions, such as the West Midlands, when fears of a popular rebellion 
were communicated by local grandees. 
While much of this story is already well-known, the details presented in this thesis add 
something to the ‘revolution debate’. If we accept that 1800-1 was one of the worst food crises of 
the century52, that the politicization of the food riot reached something of a high water-mark53, 
and that English workers’ combinations became alienated by Pitt’s Combination Acts54, then 
this year looks as good as any for an English Revolution. Yet, at this same critical moment, the 
state had at its disposal an unprecedented degree of force. Proportionately, almost the same 
number of troops as were needed to crush the Irish Rebellion of 1798, were present in England 
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in 1800-1.55 While we may doubt the steadiness of the volunteer forces, in terms of riot-control, 
the regular troops were better fed and better disciplined than they had been in previous 
decades. In the cities they were housed in barracks from whence they could be deployed with 
greater speed. Moreover, in the large towns of the Midlands and the North, the armed 
cavalryman had repeatedly proven his efficacy in preventing and containing popular protests. 
These details tend to support the analysis offered by Edward Royle in Revolutionary Britannia: It 
was not that there was no desire for a revolution in England, merely that the strength of the 
British state precluded any realistic hope of a revolution succeeding.56 It should be 
acknowledged that the state’s strength during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was, at 
least in part, underwritten by a military whose welfare the government had been forced to 
attend to closely, between 1790-1805. 
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Appendix I: Enlistment Motives from Soldiers’ Autobiographies, c. 1790-
1805. 
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Appendix II: Showing Military Involvement in Labour Disputes, 1791-2. 
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